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
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Fig.[1] JOSEPH ANTOW KOCH
Schmadribachfall, 1821-
 Oil on Canvas.



Fig.[2] J.M.W. TURNER
SNOW STORM : HANNIBAL & HIS ARMY CROSSING THE ALPS, 1812
 Oil on Canvas



What is in the Mind of the Image-Maker ?

Some views on pictorial representation in antiquity

GORAN SORBOM

The theory of imitation is very often seen as a theory of pictorial representation in which the basic relation is the one between the image and things in the world. The image or imitation is described as a thing similar to things in the world or even as a kind of copy of them.

In this paper I will argue for the view that the main content of the theory of imitation, in antiquity at least, was not concerned with the relation of similarity between image and things in the world. The basic distinction is, on the contrary, the one between the inner and outer image, the mental image and the thing image. The imitation (mimema, image) as a thing is not always similar to things in the world as, for instance, a painted portrait in an obvious way is to the person portrayed. But it is necessary that in the perception of the thing imitation a perception resembling a perception of things in the world appears in the mind of the beholder. In reading Homer an inner image of the actions of, for instance, Ulysses and his men in the cave of the cyclops must appear or we don't understand the text. This is a mental event of a particular kind distinguishable from other kinds of mental events as reasoning, day-dreaming, looking at things, understanding arguments, having emotions.

My argument will be in the form of readings of a number of ancient texts where the human ability to form mental images is


discussed in connection with views on the production and apprehension of images and imitations (*mimemata*).

Plato's challenge

In the tenth book of *Republic* Plato discusses the nature of mimesis. It is necessary, he says, to scrutinize mimetic poetry' in greater detail and Socrates puts the question: "Could you tell me in general what imitation [*mimesis*] is ?" (595 C)² and he continues (596 A):

Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name ...

Plato distinguishes between things of a given sort, the name and the idea of them. His famous example is that of couches and tables. There are couches in the world, these existing couches imply the idea couch and we use the word "couch" to denote them and to connote the idea of them. The result is a triad that can be represented in the following way:



To this Plato adds an ontological perspective. There are three ontological levels, or three 'worlds', which Plato ranks to each other with regard to their amount of reality: the world of ideas which is unchangeable and eternal, the world of multiplicities where there is constant change and finally the world of appearances which is the world brought to our minds or our consciousness by the senses, a world that is even more floating and uncertain than the other two worlds.

The idea is most real or the only thing that really is. The idea couch is the real and eternally existing couch whereas couches made

by human hands are "... only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality." (597 B) A couch in the world is temporary, it is made, it exists and it vanishes. It is a contingent thing equipped with many accidental properties whereas the idea is eternal and unchanging. The idea or form is the nature and essence of something, the couchness of couches, for instance. This couchness can also be seen as the couch-function and such a function does not change over time. Wherever or whenever something is used as a couch it participates in the couch-function.

Appearances as mental events constitute the third ontological level. They are even less real than ideas and things. Plato writes (598 A-B):

... Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things?

That is the way of it, he said. It appears other but differs not at all.

Plato uses the word "fantasma" (appearance, phantasm) to denote what appears to us; it is the mental content when we sense and perceive things. When you walk around a couch, for instance, the appearance of it will change continuously as you pass around it but the couch is the same, it does not change because you walk around it and look at it. In this way you could say that the appearance of something as a mental event is less real than the thing itself.

Thus the three ontological levels are, according to Plato: the world of ideas - the world of things - the world of sensation/perception (aisthesis) of things.

On the production of man-made things, couches and tables for instance, Plato has the following to say (596 B):

And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?

The metaphor "fixes his eyes on the idea or form" visualizes the fact that the craftsman knows the essence and function of the thing in question. If a carpenter is asked, to make a couch it is necessary that he is skilled in his craft and knows what a couch is and how we use couches. Suppose he is a very good carpenter but never heard of or saw a couch, then he cannot, in spite of his craftsmanship, make one.

Later on in the dialogue Plato continues the discussion by distinguishing between the user, the maker and the imitator of a thing (601 D - E):

... there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user's art, the maker's, and the imitator's.

Yes.

Now, do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use for which each is made or by nature adapted?

That is so.

It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good and bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him.

In this passage the idea or form of something can be understood as the function of that something which at the same time is its essential characteristics in contradistinction to its contingent properties. These essential characteristics the user and the maker has in mind in making and using the object. These characteristics are not sensuous in character; you cannot sense and perceive them directly. They are abstract and general; they are shared by many contingent things. What you can perceive are individual examples of these functions and what you perceive are the contingent properties of the thing serving its function, i. e. its colours, shapes, smells etc. You can see how a couch is used on a given occasion but not the function itself which is abstract and universal in character.

After stating that the craftsman fixes his eyes on the idea of the thing he is going to produce Plato says that there is another craftsman who can make everything and that very quickly. Anyone can do it with the help of a mirror (596 D). But what is produced in this way is "... the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth." (596 E) Painters belong to this kind of craftsman (596 E) and later on it is argued that the poet is of basically the same sort as the painter (597 E), i. e. both painter and poet is a *mimetes* (imitator). The models of painters and poets are things in the world of multiplicities as they appear to us in sensation and perception (598 B):

Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?

Since *mimeta* (imitations) are man-made things, this argument seems to imply that the *mimetes* (imitator) fixes his eyes on ideas in making his *mimeta*. But Plato emphatically denies this (598 A). However, it must be maintained that the *mimetes* (imitator) fixes his eyes on the idea of *mimema* (the concept and function of imitation) but not on the idea of, for instance, couches when he makes a representation of a couch. As any craftsman the *mimetes* must be skilled in his trade and know about the uses of *mimemata* but this does not imply that he knows i. e. 'fixes his eyes on the idea' of) the things he is representing. It is this latter claim Plato denies. The *mimetes* fixes his eyes on the contingent properties of things even if he has no model outside himself but conceives of it in his mind. The 'inner eye' of the *mimetes* is different from the 'inner eye' of the craftsman which beholds the idea of the thing that the craftsman is producing.

Thus Plato maintains that there are three kinds of couches: the idea couch, the couches in the world and pictorial representations of couches and there are three kinds of producers: "The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches." (597 B) Perceptual appearances are not trustworthy, according to Plato; they can deceive us. Plato continues (602 D - E):

And have not measuring and numbering and weighing proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned and numbered or even weighed. Certainly.

But this surely would be the function of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.

Mimemata address the lower part of the mind, not the part that "reasons and calculates". They are confined to the realm of sensation and perception. Thus only the contingent properties of things are possible to present in the mimema. Since the mimesis (imitation) is concerned with perceptual qualities and appearances the mimetes (imitator) fixes his eyes on the contingent properties of things in this world when he makes his mimemata. The painter "is the imitator of the thing which those others produce" and he is thus the "... producer of the product three removes from nature..." (597 E) The couch made by the painter is thus even less real than temporary couches.

With regard to this outlook it is natural to the mimema below the ontological level of real things. Of course it can be argued that a painting or a theatre performance is as real as any other existing object or event and thus has to be put on the same ontological level as words and things. But in Plato's work it is obvious that mimemata are regarded as less real than ordinary things and that they have to be ranked below ordinary things.

This objection can be met with a distinction between the mimema as a thing and the mimema as perceived by someone i. e. as it appears to a beholder. The mimema as a thing in the world must be put on the same ontological level as words and things. But the appearance of them when we look at them or listen to them belongs to the third level. When we perceive things they appear to us and the mimema is a thing the sole function of which is to make appearances rise in the beholders. In the *Sophist* Plato comments on the difference between images and real objects: "... Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?" ³(266 C)

With this interpretation a second triad appears. The first one is the result of the "customary procedure" with idea, things and word. The second one is then fantasmata (perceptual appearances of things and mimemata), things and mimemata as a particular kind of thing in the following manner still with the couch example:

the world
of ideas

the idea
couch

the world of
multiplicities

the word "couch" — couches — mimemata
representing
a couch

the world of
appearances

aisthesis of
couches and
representations
of couches

This is Plato's challenge: a mimema is a man-made thing that creates appearances of a special sort in the minds of its beholders, appearances that are similar to appearances of real things of the kind represented in the mimema (imitation, image). A painting of a couch creates couch-appearances in the minds of its spectators.

Very often the spectators know that it is just a couch-appearance, not a perception of a real couch. Generally, this knowledge is in most cases necessary for the proper use of the image. Plato maintains that sometimes the mimema or more correctly the image created in the mind of the beholder when apprehending the mimema can deceive him to believe that it is a real thing he has in front of him (598 B-C)

Then mimetic art is far removed from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom; as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsman, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts, but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men, and make them believe it to be a real carpenter.

This idea of deception as a goal for mimetic arts has echoed through history. But if we look at the arts it is seldom the case that paintings, sculptures, theatre performances etc. are made with the intention of deceiving their beholders into the belief that they look at an object and not a representation of it. In almost all cases the beholders know the difference and this knowledge is a part of the use and experience of them. It is, for instance, a necessary condition for an aesthetic experience of them or to learn from them. Suppose you look at a painting representing a ferocious lion close at hand and without ties. If you thought it to be a real lion you would need strong nerves to also appreciate muscular rhythm and beauty of its colours; but if you know that you are looking at a picture you are safe to study and appreciate it.


It is not necessary, which is very often believed, that the thing mimema be similar to (i.e. has properties in common with) other things in the class of objects it represents. The narrative parts of Homer's poetry, whether read or listened to, do not have such relationships. But it is necessary that the appearance created in the minds of the beholders are similar to appearances of the things represented in the mimema. When you read Homer you should be able to visualize in your mind (or 'inner eye') the things Homer tells about.

In some forms of mimema there is a similarity between the thing mimema and things in the world. For instance, paintings and sculptures but also dance and theatre performances representing human actions are similar to (have some contingent properties in common with) human beings. This similarity 'leads' the beholder, in his sensation/perception of the thing image, to create an inner image (fantasia of the thing represented. But you can also create such inner images in other ways, by reading or listening to texts for instance. It is possible to use language in such a manner than inner images perceptual character appear in the mind of the reader or listener. Music is a difficult

case. Both Plato and Aristotle claim that music is mimetic in character but in which way? Is the piece of music similar to things in the world as paintings and sculptures are or does music create their inner images (of human character) in another way like language does?

Psychological assumptions

Over a very long period human mind was believed to consist of a few faculties: Sensation and perception (aisthesis), imagination (fantasia), common sense (sensus communis), reason (cogitativa), memory (memorativa) and the faculty of making judgments (aestimativa).⁵ Aristotle's *On the Soul* was a solid foundation for this common outlook. It is often illustrated in treatises on the soul. The following example is from Aristotle's *Parvula philosophiae naturalis cum comment*, edited by Matthias Qualle and published in Hagenaw in 1513:



Aisthesis (sensation/perception) was seen as the mental ability to receive images of the outside world. Aristotle describes it as a change of quality in which the consciousness is made similar to the outward object.⁶ Thus sensation/perception is regarded as an image receiving faculty. The mental content of sensation/perception is similar to the thing sensed and perceived, sensation/perception is isomorphic in character. The mental image has properties in common with the object sensed and perceived. Sometimes this faculty is called *imaginatio* because it brings images of the outside world to the mind.⁷

Aristotle regards the mind as passive in the process of aisthesis because it receives an image of outward thing without any activity of its own. But the same faculty can also be active. Then it is

called *fantasia*. The fantasia freely produces 'perception' without there being outward objects answering to them. "...To imagine, then, is to form an opinion exactly corresponding to a direct perception" (*On the Soul* 428 b 2 — 3)⁸. Aristotle writes and in another place he comments on the relationship between dreaming and smagining (*On Dreams* 495 a 15-23) in the following way:

.. Since we have discussed imagination in the treatise *On the Soul*, and the imaginative is the same as the sensitive faculty, although the imaginative and sensitive are different in essence; and since activity, and a dream appears to be some sort of mental image for an image which appears in sleep, whether simply or in a special sense, we call a dream); it is clear that dreaming belongs to the sensitive faculty, but belongs to it *qua* imaginative.⁹

Thus there is a 'family' of mental events: the perceptual image (rightly or wrongly representing the perceptual object), the illusion-hallucination, the dream and fantasia. All of them are related to the faculty of aisthesis but distinct in character. Sometimes, however, the borderlines between them are difficult to see. Sometimes one can use this difficulty to play tricks upon appreciators as is the case, for example, with *trompe l'oeil*. The fantasia is, then, the faculty of producing mental images of perceptual character without there being perceptual objects. The same word is used to denote the mental image thus produced. Quintilian writes (*Institutio oratoria* VI. 2. 29): "There are certain experiences which the Greeks call 'fantasiai, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes."¹⁰ Here Quintilian stresses the perceptual character of the fantasia. This inner image is either perceived a memory of something perceived earlier or a compound of elements earlier making up something new. The fantasia is different from the illusion-hallucination in that, among other things, the subject knows that there are no perceptual objects answering to the fantasia.

Now, it is possible to reproduce this mental image in an outward form. Either you 'see something with your inner eye' and try to realize it in the outside world as a real thing or event or you produce it as an image, i. e. a thing the sole purpose of which is to recreate the mental image of the image-maker in the mind of its beholders.

The making of an image (mimema) can be described as the activity to realize the inner image created by the fantasia in an outward form with the end that other persons can, through looking or listening to it, get the same mental image as the creator had. The central thesis of the theory of imitation is not, then, that the production of an image consists of making an outward object to have properties in common with some other things in the world but to make it answer to a mental image in such a way that all beholders of it will share the same mental image.

The crucial role of the faculty of fantasia in making an image is obvious in many ancient texts. Cicero, for instance, comments on Phidias' work in the following way (*Orator* II, 9):

...Surely that great sculptor, while making the image of Jupiter or Minerva, did not look at any person whom he was using as a model, but in his own mind there dwelt a surpassing vision of beauty, at this he gazed and all intent on this he guided his artist's hand to produce the likeness of the god.¹¹

In Latin the word "exprimere" literally means "to squeeze out" and metaphorically "to represent", "to portray", "to form", "to model", "to describe". Most likely it is just the conception of the process of squeezing out the inner image in an outward form that is the conceptual foundation of the secondary, metaphorical use of the word.

To apprehend an image (mimema) on the other hand is to read, look at or listen to it in such a way that the fantasia of the maker appears in the mind of the beholder. Thus there is a chain of communication from the maker of the image to the beholders where the thing communicated is a mental image seen by the 'inner eye' or by the *Oculus Imaginationis*.

Flavius Philostratus claims that man has a mental faculty to see and an ability to make images. The former belongs to human nature and the latter, which is a subdivision of the former and founded on it, is an acquired ability "...man owes his mimetic faculty to nature, but his power of painting to art"¹².

Philostratus also points out that knowledge, earlier experiences and memory play a necessary role in the creation and apprehension of pictures:

...And for this reason I should say that those who look at works of painting and drawing require a mimetic faculty; for no one

could appreciate or admire a picture of a horse or of a bull, unless he had formed an idea of the creature represented, Nor again could one admire a picture of Ajax, by the painter Timomachus, which represents him in a state of madness, unless one had conceived in one's mind first an idea or notion of Ajax, and had entertained the probability that after killing the flocks in Troy he would sit down exhausted and even meditate suicide....¹³

A basic pattern of thought describing the production and perception of mimemata emerges. The pattern is triadic in character basically similar to the 'second triad' in the interpretation of Plato's view on mimesis in the tenth book of the *Republic*: it is an interplay between things in the world, mimemata (as a special kind of things in the world) and sensations/perceptions of things and mimemata.

It is further possible, within this way of thought, to distinguish between the situations of production and reception of mimemata. But the difference between these two kinds of situation was seen from a perspective other than the one we adopt today. A basic difference between the ancient outlook and the modern one is that aisthesis (the mental reception of things and events in the world) was regarded as a passive process whereas the production of *fantasiae* (inner images) was seen as an active process; in both cases the same faculty was believed to be involved. Thus production and reception of inner images were regarded as closely related; the difference is that they occur in reverse order as forms of activity and passivity in the same faculty. The situation of production is also distinguished from the situation of reception in that it involves the skill and craftsmanship of the maker without which it is impossible for him to create the thing mimema.

The assumption that sensation/perception is isomorphic in character, i. e. that the mental content is similar to the thing perceived, was universally accepted. This may explain why these two kinds of situation (the production and the reception situation) are not, in ancient texts, are kept apart according to modern expectations. This does not mean that ancient authors did not see or understand that making a mimema is a different kind of situation from beholding one. For one thing, craftsmanship was required in the production of the outward image and the maker was often a craftsman of low social rank whereas the beholder and user often belonged to the higher levels of society. But in speculations over the nature of mimetic communication the distinction was not very necessary. Under normal and successful circumstances

the fantasia of the producer is communicated without any changes to the receiver, it was assumed.

This outlook on the nature of images and on the production, reception and communication of them which is pointed at in this paper I would like to call "the ancient system of the arts", "system" in the sense of "way of thinking". It is a common sense outlook that sometimes was philosophically articulated and elaborated but that always had a solid foundation in a generally accepted view on the functions of the human mind. It did survive over a very long period. As far as we know it existed in the 5th century B. C. as I believe, exerted a strong influence on aesthetic thought till our own century. It was certainly the foundation from which 'the modern system of the arts' was built.¹⁴ Diderot's "The Paradox of Acting" can, for instance, be seen as an elegant variation of it. When Viktor Shklovsky introduces the Russian formalism in his famous paper "Art as device" he starts out with an attack on the idea that art is a kind of thinking in images; modernism had to get rid of the burden of older conceptions of the nature of art in order to establish art in its absolute autonomy.

Agent and intention in image making

So far I have traced a basic pattern of thought concerning image production and reception that, according to my view, prevailed over a very long period. Plato's challenge made it into a philosophical issue that had to be tackled by everyone interested in the nature of images.¹⁵ Fundamental to this outlook was that the important relation was the one between inner and outer image. But not only fantasmata and fantasiae were believed to participate in the image production and reception; also other factors were involved.

In a letter Seneca discusses the first cause and the causes behind the existence of man-made things (65, 8-9):

Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says: the material, the agent, the make-up, the model, and the end in view. Last comes the result of all these. Just as in the case of the statue, - to go back to the figure with which we began, - the material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker's mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself.¹⁶

When a sculptor works on a sculpture he necessarily has some material to work on, a material with its own particular possibilities

and limitations. He has his own personality so far as this is involved in the production of the sculpture and he has his craftsmanship. The result of this work is that the material has left the state of 'raw material' and acquired a distinct form. In doing this the sculptor has used a model that lends its form to the material and the sculptor has had some end or ends in view in making the sculpture. If you want to map all the causes involved in the existence of, for instance, a sculpture, these are too few, Seneca writes. You have also to include time, place, motion and may be also others.

Of these causes the personality and craftsmanship of the agent, the model in the form of a fantasia and the intention (the end in view) are, at least partly, in the mind of the sculptor and the mimeses when they make their sculptures and mimemata and these groups of causes affect the final result, the sculpture and the mimema. Characteristically, Seneca only mentions craftsmanship as a factor depending on the artist (65.5): "The 'second cause' is the artist; for without the skilled hands of a workman that bronze could not have been shaped to the outlines of the statue." That the personality of the artist can influence the image is not often stressed in antiquity. The romantic view that the work of art is an effluence of a great personality is alien to ancient thought even if the anonymous writer sometimes called "Longinus", maintains that "(s)ublimity is the true ring of a noble mind"¹ (*On the Sublime* 9. 2). It is not, however, the individual personality you meet in reading, listening to or looking at the work of art but what you apprehend is great and sublime fantasiae. The ability to create great and sublime fantasiae is innate, you have it or you don't. But the point is that it is a fantasia, a perceptual visualization of something, an inner image. "Longinus" gives a number of examples of such fantasiae or perceptual-like visualizations. Here is one of them (9. 9):

So, too, the lawgiver of the Jews, no ordinary man, having formed a worthy conception of divine power, gave expression to it at the very threshold of his *Laws* where he says: "God said" - what ? " 'Let there be light,' and there was light. 'Let there be earth, and there was earth.'"¹⁸

It is the concrete visaulization of something non-concrete, the divine power, which he praises as worthy and sublime. This inner image (fantasia), that the power of god is so immense that his mere saying "Let there be light" created light in the whole universe, is a

concrete example of the power of god visualized as an inner perceptual image in the mind of the reader of the texts. It is a visualization of the abstract idea (divine power) which we can 'see' directly and to which we can react emotionally, in this case with a feeling of sublimity. It is a thing brought to our immediate knowledge by 'seeing' (even if it is a text we read) not by arguments and reasons.

The traditional view that the poet/musician, dancer and sometimes the actor and sculptor were seized by divine power in their creations stresses the fact that it is not their individual personalities that are involved in the creative act. What they do are not effluences of their individual personalities but has a source outside of their individual personalities; this source may be Apollo and the Muses or the Christian God spelling out the Evangelists to the evangelists. Or this traditional view can be used just to point out that the creative act is mysterious and does not originate in the normal personality of the poet/musician etc. as is the case when he practises his craft (techné, ars) which is an acquired ability and completely 'human' in character.¹⁹

In an obscure passage in the *Thesmophoriazusai* by Aristophanes the jokes directed against Agathon may be founded on a view that there is some kind of relationship between individual personality and writing which Aristophanes mocks (164 - 170):

And Phrynichus, perhaps you have seen him, sir,
How fair he was, and beautifully dressed;
Therefore his plays were beautifully fair.
For as the Worker, so the Work will be.
Then that is why harsh Philocles writes harshly,
And that is why vile Xenocles writes vilely,
And cold Theognis writes such trivial plays.²⁰

But what these ideas were we don't know.

So much for the relation between personality and image making. It is not enough, as was pointed out by for instance Horace²¹. "Longinus"²² and Philostratus the Elder²³, to be able to create a fantasia in your mind even if it is splendid and sublime. The image maker must have a craft (techné, ars) to be able to realize the inner image in an outward form. A craft is not innate; maybe you are born with some disposition for acquisition of a craft, but it is something you learn by practising it and by looking at and listening to people who are masters of their trades and by reading handbooks. This knowledge

of the craft affects; of course the final result. The craft is partly in the mind and partly in the habits and performing skills of the craftsman.

The intention, the end in view, is described in the following way by Seneca:

The "fourth cause" is the purpose of the work. For if this purpose had not existed, the statue would not have been made. Now what is this purpose? It is that which attracted the artist, which he followed when he made the statue. It may have been money, if he has made it for sale; or renown, if he has worked for reputation; or religion, if he has wrought it as a gift for a temple. Therefore this also is a cause contributing towards the making of the statue....²⁴

The intention or end in view is not just the will of an agent to do something but is a whole net of conceptions, values, practices etc, that are the necessary elements of the situation in which the sculptor works. Suppose the sculptor is a professional craftsman who has got the commission to make a sculpture of a young, male, nude person to be put on the tomb of a deceased warrior. In this situation religious beliefs, economic and social stratification etc, are important. Such things, too, are in the mind of the image maker during his work with the image and they affect the final result and the understanding of it.

Models outside the image maker

a. Platonic ideas.

The model, on the other hand, is the thing that is responsible for the form of the sculpture in the sense that it 'lends' its form to the sculpture. It does not matter, Seneca says, whether the sculptor has this model within or without (65. 7):

To these four Plato adds a fifth cause, - the pattern which he himself calls the "idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon when he created the work which he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has this pattern outside himself, that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself.²⁵

When Seneca maintains that the artist in creating his sculpture 'looks' at a Platonic idea, this is a misunderstanding of Plato's position

in the tenth book of the *Republic* according to the interpretation given above. The craftsman 'looks' at the Platonic idea when he makes his product and so does the mimetes (imitator): he has to have a knowledge of the nature and functions of mimemata or he does not know how to proceed. But Plato denies that the mimetes 'looks' at the idea of the thing he represents in his mimema. He 'makes' an inner image with the help of the faculty of fantasia and eventually he realizes this in an outward form, thus 'lending' the form of the inner image to the outward object. A fantasia is not a vision of a Platonic idea.

Seneca is not alone in his interpretation of Plato's theory of ideas in this way. Before him Cicero held a similar view (*Orator* 11.8-10):

...I am firmly of the opinion that nothing of any kind is so beautiful as not to be excelled in beauty by that of which it is a copy, as a mask is a copy of a face. This ideal cannot be perceived by the eye or ear, nor by any of the senses, but we can nevertheless grasp it by the mind and the imagination... Accordingly, as there is something perfect and surpassing in the case of sculpture and painting - an intellectual ideal by reference to which the artist represents those objects which do not themselves appear to the eye, so with our minds we conceive the ideal of perfect eloquence, but with our ears we catch only the copy. These patterns of things are called 'ideai' or ideas by Plato, that eminent master and teacher both of style and thought...²⁶

Here, too, you get the impression that the sculptor 'looks' at a Platonic idea and uses it as a model in his work. It is said that the painter and sculptor represent things "which do not themselves appear to the eye" which probably means that Platonic ideas are non-perceptual in character. But painters and sculptors manage anyhow to represent them in their works. How is this done? How is it possible to connect the perceptual world with the non-perceptual world of Platonic ideas in such a way that we can apprehend Platonic ideas when looking at the paintings and sculptures? Cicero has no answers to these questions, a version of Plato's challenge.

The view that artists can represent Platonic ideas, which I take to be a misreading of Plato's *Republic*²⁷, has recurred several times in history and sometimes proved to be a fruitful misunderstanding. Plotin writes that "... the arts do not simply imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles from which nature derives..."²⁸ but at the same time he is careful to stress that the only

side of non-perceptual things that can be pictorially represented is their appearance in or influence on the perceptual world. The mimema is bound to what we can perceive and imagine with our senses.

b. Rules and measurements.

Plato mentions that one way of making an image is to put up a mirror and in this way 'produce' many kinds of thing, i.e. appearances of many kinds of thing (*Republic* 596 D-E). What the image maker has in mind in this situation is, most likely, an idea to make an image and thoughts about the means to produce it and why he makes it. In modern times you could claim that the camera is a kind of powerful and sophisticated mirror working within basically the same kind of process. You intend to take a photo and use the camera with the result that a picture is taken. The making of the picture is dependent on the technique or apparatus you use, your skill in handling the camera and the intention you have in mind.

In these examples the outer image, and consequently the inner one (because of the isomorphic character of sensation/perception), is dependent for its form and other perceptual qualities on things and persons in the world that 'lend' their forms and other perceptual qualities to the image. But it is also possible to dispose of even this kind of model. It is enough to have a number of rules and measures that tell the maker how to proceed in his production. Given, for instance, the intention of making a sculpture representing a young, male, nude person to be put on the tomb of a deceased warrior it is enough if the sculptor has the craftsmanship of his trade and rules and measures in order to proceed. The rules prescribe to the sculptor what are the representational elements of man, their measures and composition, what they mean and tell etc. This idea can be seen in the following text by Diodorus Siculus (1.98. 5-9):

Also of the ancient sculptors the most renowned sojourned among them, namely, Telecles and Theodorus, the sons of Rhoecus, who executed for the people of Samos the wooden statue of the Pythian Apollo. For one half of the statue, as the account is given, was worked by Telecles in Samos, and the other half was finished by his brother Theodorus at Ephesus; and when the two parts were brought together they fitted so perfectly that the whole work had the appearance of having been done by one man. This method of

working is practised nowhere among the Greeks, but is followed generally among the Egyptians. For with them the symmetrical proportions of the statues are not fixed in accordance with the appearance they present to the artist's eye, as is done among the Greeks, but as soon as they lay out the stones and after apportioning them, are ready to work on them, at that stage they take the proportions, from the smallest parts to the largest; for dividing the structure of the entire body into twenty-one parts and one-fourth in addition, they express in this way the complete figure in its symmetrical proportions. Consequently, so soon as the artisans agree as to the size of the statue, they separate and proceed to turn out various sizes assigned to them, in such a way that they correspond, and they do it so accurately that the peculiarity of their system excites amazement - 29

What you need is craftsmanship to cut stone, an intention to make an image of a certain kind and the appropriate rules and measures to make it. The result is (if we speculate in the manner of the 'ancient system') an object that gives the informed spectator a man-like inner image to which meaning is attached by rules; a knit hand indicates a female person, straight fingers a male person, one foot forward means motion, dots in the face (tears) mean sorrow etc. What exactly these rules were we don't know but some of them we can figure and state in the form of recommendations how to make the image and how to read and understand it.

What you apprehend is a man-like thing but it is not an individual man in the sense that an existing person has participated in the production process 'lending' his outward forms to the sculpture. It is of course, possible to combine the method of rules and measures with the technique of lending some traits from a model. It is believed, for instance, that some pharaoh sculptures from the Middle kingdom are extraordinarily lifelike but still keeping within the rules and measures of the sculpture technique established early during the Old kingdom.³⁰

Diodorus says that this method is not used among the Greeks at least any longer; in the archaic period the 'Egyptian' way of making sculpture was common in Greece. The Greek way is, Diodorus says, to use the appearance (fantasia) of things as guiding principle in making the picture. The appearance is something mental that the maker has in his mind. He does not deny that the sculptures are 'calculated'

according to principles of a ratio or module but it is the appearance that is decisive. It means only that in creating the fantasia as model for the outward image the sculptor pays due attention to measures which are possible to check up on the outward image. But it is basically the inner image, which is perceptual in character, that 'lends' its form to the outward image and in this way transforms the block of stone into a sculpture.

According to the Egyptian way of pictorial composition the image needs not conform to an appearance of any individual man or some more general, concrete appearance of the notion 'living man'. It is easy to see that Egyptian, Oriental and archaic Greek sculpture deviates from appearances of living men as the Greeks developed the concrete notion in painting and sculpture in the latter part of the sixth and the beginning of the fifth centuries. The composition of the elements, according to the Egyptian way, follows other rules (that can be stated and thus communicated from one individual to another and from one generation to another) than the rules of classical Greek sculpture where the mental image, perceptual in character, of a living creature is the model. In fact, the Greeks also sometimes represented dead persons and animals but then it was just the perceptual quality of being dead that were dominant in these cases. As Xenophon expresses it, the quality of life was the most important characteristic of Greek sculpture.³¹ He also points out the road to reach that goal: to study the appearance of living bodies in given situations: running, sitting, making a speech etc. A basic assumption is that every outward trait of the body is influenced by the particular situation in which the body is involved. And the other way round: when you see these traits represented you can conclude to the particular situation represented, running, feeling joy, making a speech etc. That was an important part of the Greek innovation: the situation and the mental state was made visible directly, not through symbolization.

c. Copies and portraits.

There are also other devices and techniques of image making in which it is not necessary to concentrate on the inner image in the production of the picture. You can, for instance, use persons or things as models and make casts from them. Pliny writes (N.H. XXXV, 153):

The first of all artists to mould an image of a man in plaster taken from the surface [of the body] itself and to institute the


method of making corrections on that work after pouring wax into the resulting mould was Lysistratos of Sikyon, the brother of Lysippos, of whom we have spoken. It was this man who introduced the method of making realistic likenesses; before him they sought to make statues as beautiful as possible. He also invented the technique of taking casts from statues, and this practice increased to such an extent that no figures or statues were made without clay [that is, a clay model].³²

In this case the image maker needs nothing but the intention of making a cast in his mind supplied with the craftsmanship he has in making casts. But, of course, he needs an existing individual model from which he can cast the mould. Thus, in this case the individual existing model lends its form to the final result which is a copy of something made in a chosen material. It is a copy as far as the difference in material permits. This kind of copy can also be called portrait.

It is not a copy in the sense that you make another example of some original. You can take a chair and make another one exactly similar to the one chosen as model. Then you have a copy of the original. Pliny hints at this possibility in the quoted text. He writes that almost all sculptors use clay models when they make their sculptures, i.e. they make a sketch in clay and then transform this clay model with the help of mechanical devices into the finished work in bronze, marble etc. This technique was also used to copy Greek originals for the Roman art market.

Again, in making copies and portraits in this way you need not depend upon an inner image created by the fantasia. It is possible to make them mechanically. What you need is the craftsmanship of the moulding and copying technique. Of course you can combine these methods with the Egyptian or the Greek (i.e. to make the sculpture with help of an inner image) ways of making images but this does not blur the distinction between the differences between the methods of making images. In fact, Pliny also hints at this possibility when he claims that Lysistratos made corrections on the cast evidently in order to make the sculpture more beautiful and thus transgress its individuality and individual beauty.

Another example of this copy or portrait type image making is demonstrated in some woodcuts by Albrecht Durer in his *Unterweisung der Messung* from 1525:



Durer also illustrates other kinds of mechanical device of image making but all of them are based on the theory of central perspective as described by Alberti and others later on in the 15th century. Anyone can learn and use the technique in a purely mechanical way and the result will be a portrait of an individual thing or person. It is a portrait because the image has traits in common with a thing or a person that exists or has existed. The traits in common are such that they can be shared because of the medium chosen and how it has been actually applied in the individual cases. As an ultimate fulfillment of this technique you can see the case in which the perception thus made by the outward image cannot be distinguished from the perception of the model by purely visual means. If you just look at the image you cannot tell whether you are in front of an object or person or in front of a painting of an object or person. This is the *trompe l'oeil*.

This method is not only a device to mechanically help the production of images. It resulted in new demands on the images and the things represented in them. It gave a new form and unit to the space in which the creations of the fantasia could appear. This also affected the things and persons represented in such a way that the new space around them related them to each other in new ways and also incorporated time as a necessary and unavoidable content of the image. For instance, when you define space in this way time will necessarily crop up in a new way.

Models inside the image maker

In mirror images and photographs the model is obviously outside the maker as well as in the case of casts and portraits. But you can

also, as Seneca says, have the model inside yourself. This situation can be exemplified by a sculptor cutting away stone in order to 'reach' the finished sculpture as the final result. Dio Chrysostom expresses this idea in the following way (XII. 71): "...the sculptor must keep the very same image in his mind continuously until he finishes his work, which often takes many years ..." ³³ and Alcinous like this (*Isagoga* IX)

The model must come before [the work of art]; even though it may not be embodied externally for everyone, it is undoubtedly true that every artist carries the model in himself and conveys its form into matter. ³⁴

It is natural to describe the process in such a way that the sculptor has his intended result as an inner image and works towards the realization of it in concrete form. This inner image is produced by the faculty of fantasia and is crucial to the production process which can be seen as the creation of an outward perceptual object to become isomorphic to the inner image. The inner, perceptual image 'lends' its form to the outward image. This outlook on image production is what I have called the 'Greek way' following Diodorus Siculus in his distinction between Egyptian and Greek ways of making sculpture. In the Greek way, he writes, you calculate the "symmetria of statues ... according to the appearances (fantasia) which are presented to the eyes".

Not only sculptors and painters have an inner image of perceptual character in their minds when making their images. The poets, too, have to 'think' in this concrete and perceptual manner when they create their works. Philostratus the Younger writes in the Prooemium of his *Eikones* that

the art of painting has a certain kinship with poetry, and that an element of imagination [fantasia] is common to both. For instance, the poets introduce the gods upon their stage as actually present, and with them all the accessories that make for dignity and grandeur and power to charm the mind; and so in like manner does the art of painting, indicating in the lines of the figures what the poets are able to describe in words. ³⁵

In chapter 17 of the *Poetics* Aristotle writes:

In constructing the plot and working it out with the proper diction, the poet should place the scene, as far as possible, before his

eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness, as if he were a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it, and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies.³⁶

This advice will be common in the poetic and rhetorical traditions. The anonymous author of "On the sublime" has a similar advice and he also comments on the use of terms (15. 1):

Weight, grandeur, and energy in writing are very largely produced, dear pupil, by the use of "images". (That at least is what some people call the actual mental pictures.) For the term Imagination is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind from any source and engenders speech, but the word has now come to be used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your audience.³⁷

Again, it is the concrete and perceptual conception, the inner image, which is the important thing for the making of the mimema. The mimetes conceives in his mind something and then he has to realize this in a sensuous medium. If it is accepted that the mental faculty of fantasia is the origin of these inner images they must, as Aristotle says (and he is not contradicted for a very long period), be perceptual in character. They either are memories of things seen or heard which fantasia brings up in the consciousness or something new, something created by the fantasia out of things perceived earlier. What we 'perceive with the inner eye' are persons and things and we 'see' them with their contingent, perceptual qualities. They are not abstractions or other non-perceptual entities. They appear to the beholders as individual things and persons with individual, perceptual qualities but at the same time they can be seen and understood as related to abstractions and non perceptual entities. This is a part of Plato's challenge: what relations do images have to things not heard or seen?

a. The concrete universal: a pictorial composite of perceptual qualities

Lysistratos worked in the middle of the 4th century B.C. Thus, during the classical period neither the 'Egyptian' method nor the technique of making casts from individuals were used. Instead, as Pliny says, the Greeks tried to make the sculptures as beautiful as possible.

One way to reach this goal is to use not one individual as model but several as Xenophon lets Socrates remark in a discussion with a

sculptor (*Memorabilia* III. 10. 2); "... when you assimilate your beautiful figures you collect from many individuals what is most beautiful in each of them, because it is not easy to hit upon a person that has everything without blame, and make in this way the bodies appear to be beautiful all over."³⁸ Both Cicero (*De inventione* II. 1. 1-3) and Pliny (*N.H.* XXXV,64) tell an anecdote about the painter Zeuxis how he chose five beautiful girls out of all the young and beautiful girls of Croton to use as models for a painting of Helen which the Crotonians had hired him to make. Cicero comments on Zeuxis' way of handling the case (II. 1. 3):

.. For he did not believe that it was possible to find in one body all the things he looked for in beauty, since nature has not refined to perfection any single object in all its parts

Maximus of Tyre expresses a similar view (*Or.* XVII. 3):

Painters gather beauty from every detail of every human body; they collect them artistically from different bodies into one representation and in this manner they create one beauty which is healthy, fitting and internally harmonized. In reality you would never find a body precisely like a statue, since the arts aim at the greatest beauty.⁴⁰

Even if you take individual traits from a number of models there must be some guiding principle in the selection. You cannot just add one detail to another without some organizing principle or vision of the final result. If you do, you will have the ridiculous thing Horace scornfully describes in the beginning of his *Ars poetica*. You have to have a vision of a whole and good taste in your choice and construction of that whole.

The faculty of fantasia was regarded as the mental agent that could provide the image maker with such a guiding principle or vision, an inner model which is perceptual in character. It is characteristic of fantasia that it can produce images of things and persons that do not and even cannot exist. The fantasia is free to combine elements in a way that leaves the existing world behind. In the *Republic* (472 CD) Plato writes about the possibility to inquire about the nature of the ideal justice and of the perfectly just man. "Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals" but of their nature:

Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter, who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist ?⁴¹

If we adhere to the interpretation given above of the nature of Platonic ideas, this "pattern of the ideally beautiful man" is not a Platonic idea, because Platonic ideas are not visible; they do not belong to the world of things and cannot appear to the senses as things and actions do. They are non-perceptual entities. Even if you agreed to the view that we 'see' Platonic ideas with the 'inner eye' this 'inner eye' is different from the *oculus imaginationis* because the latter works within the range of perceptual qualities and limitations and Platonic ideas themselves do not appear in the worlds of things and appearances. Furthermore, the qualities that are accessible to our senses, which is the realm of images, are contingent qualities that does not say anything about the essential qualities which constitute the Platonic ideas.

Thus the "pattern of the ideally beautiful man", whether it is an inner or outer image, is a kind of concrete and perceptual image of something non-individual. It is not a copy or a portrait of some individual. It demonstrates to the spectator a conception, within the boundaries of perceptual qualities, of something general, for instance, youthful, male, bodily beauty. This image is universal in the sense that it is not a copy or a portrait of an individual young, male, beautiful person but transgresses the limitations of individuality and operates on another level, on an abstracted level in some sense; the elements are abstracted from this perceptual world and compounded into a new unit that does not have counterparts in individual things or persons. Individuals may resemble or share some of the characteristics of the 'concrete universal' but they have also their own particular qualities that make them into individuals.

When the image transgresses the individuality of this world it may become general, typical or ideal. It is of course possible to let the faculty of fantasia put together an inner image and let your craft make an outer image that looks like a portrait without there being a model answering to it. The point is, however, that we in most cases see the difference when we have a portrait in front of us and when we have a 'concrete universal'. The beholder sees and knows

that he has something general, typical or ideal before his senses. That the spectator knows this can partly be described as a practice developed in the social handling of images.

The concrete universal can, then, be an ideal of a given class or a type of a given class of things showing their perceptually characteristic traits. It is the kind of universal the faculty of fantasia can produce. It is a compound of perceptual qualities conceived in the mind and eventually rendered in some material in order to make it accessible to others. It is the work of the image maker to conceive of what is perceptually most characteristic, typical or ideal of a given class, youthful, male nude for instance, and then by his craft exhibit this inner image to the rest of mankind.

To make images in the form of concrete universals is not something unique for the Greek way of making images. You will find it in many pictorial traditions, the Egyptian for instance. What distinguishes the Greek way is, again, their attempt to render the very essential quality 'being alive' which they did by calculating their images from the appearances of persons and animals.

A common technique of making 'portraits' in another sense than used here is to 'individualize' a concrete universal by putting names to it. You make an image representing the concrete type 'philosopher' and put the name Plato to it and you have a portrait of Plato. Or you can use attributes: a body with a cock in his arms means Ganymed and a person with writing tools means 'this man is a scribe'. These are non-perceptual properties attached to the concrete universal by means of outward signs and symbols. When you see the sign or symbol you 'see' the non-perceptual property provided you are familiar with the symbolic conventions.

The concrete universal is not necessarily connected with what is better or more beautiful but with what is typical. A basic distinction in Aristotle's *Poetics* says that it is possible to conceive of persons that are better or worse or equal to ordinary people (chapter 2). Further Aristotle maintains that poetry is more philosophic than history because it deals with what is typical and general and is not tied to how 'things really are' as history is (chapter 9). Thus poetry, too, can show 'concrete universals' to the audience, types of characters and actions. Poetry is not 'portraiture' as history is. The model is not outside the image maker 'lending its form to image'. The poet follows an inner image or vision. (Chapter 17)

This means, for instance, that the audience did not look at *Oedipus Tyrannus* by Sophocles, Aristotle's favourite example, as an image of what actually happened to Oedipus but as typical or ideal of something. Probably there was an established social practice that when you go to the theatre you expect to see something general or typical as you do in front of sculptures and paintings. And the poets and actors made poems and plays in such ways that it helped the audience to see something general and typical in the poem and in the play. There was an expectation and a 'habit' to look for something universal and that universal something was the essential lesson you could learn from dramatic poetry: some general or universal insights in the conditions of human existence.

How do you know that the 'concrete universal' you have in front of you is the best one possible or the right one (not to use the word true)? Galen, for instance, has the following answer (*De Temperamentis* I. 9):

Modellers and sculptors and painters, and in fact image-makers in general, paint or model beautiful figures by observing an ideal form in each case, that is whatever form is most beautiful in man or in the horse in the cow or in the lion, always looking for the mean within each genus. And a certain statue might perhaps also be commended, the one called "Cannon" of Polykleitos; it got such a name from having precise commensurability of all the parts to one another.⁴²

This passage is obscure because it seems to point in different directions, a statistical and a mathematical-religious. The 'mean within each genus' can be reached either by measuring a sample of individuals and thus in a statistical manner calculate the numbers that are typical of a given class of things or you define the relationships between the measures in other ways. Pythagoras, for instance, founded his view on beauty on mathematical and religious grounds making it depend on proportionality as certain relations between holy numbers. Or you refer to taste and decorum, as Horace does, or to consensus. Polykleitos "Canon" was probably not made according to statistical principles. A Pythagorean background is possible but we can see that it was calculated in the 'Greek way' according to a fantasia and measures and we know that there was a Greek consensus that Polykleitos had visualized the concrete universal 'youthful, male, bodily beauty' better than any other sculptor.

b. Phidias and the transgression of the boundaries of the existing world.

Another consensus concerned Phidias. He had better than anyone else visualized the nature of the gods, it was believed. He is also often used as an example to show that the (good) mimema is not just a copy or a cast of something individual but made according to some inner image or vision. The gods belong to another world which is not accessible to human beings directly through their senses; the gods 'live' in a world outside our sensible one. Then, how is it possible to represent them at all when images are tied to the world of appearances? Proclus writes (*Comm. in Tim* 81 C):

He who creates in accordance with reality, assuming he is really looking at it, does not of course create beauty, for reality is full of disharmonies and is not the prime beauty. Therefore, that which arises modelled upon reality is the more removed from beauty. Phidias, too, executed the statue of Zeus not by observing reality but by contemplating Homer's Zeus, and if he could have reached to the god himself apprehended with the mind, he would of course have made his work the more beautiful.⁴³

Strabo tells a similar story about Phidias and from where he got his inspiration when he created his sculpture of Zeus in Olympia (VIII. 354):

... And they recount this tradition about Pheidias: when Panainos asked him what model he intended to employ in making the image of Zeus, he replied that it was the model provided by Homer in the following lines:

Thus spoke the son of Kronos and nodded his dark brow and the ambrosial locks flowed down from the lord's immortal head, and he made great Olympos quake. /Iliad I. 527-530/44

Thus Phidias' 'model' is a few lines from Homer but it is Homer's visualization of the power of Zeus. When Homer wrote these lines he had to visualize with his inner eye the power of Zeus, which is something abstract, and he did so in a perceptual form since *fantasia* works within the boundaries of sensation/perception. In his turn Phidias had to visualize within his own medium the same thing as Homer did. It is the conception of the divine power which he tries to visualize in his sculpture. Basically, Homer and Phidias were in the

same situation as the 'lawgiver of the Jews'; all of them tried to visualize the conception of divine power within their respective mimetic medium.

When Dio Chrysostom speaks in Olympia 97 A. D. on the threshold of the temple of Zeus his subject is our conception of the nature of the gods and he refers to Phidias as a source (XII. 44):

Now that we have set before us three sources of man's conception of the divine being, to wit, that innate, that derived from the poets, and that derived from the law-givers, let us name the fourth that derived from the plastic art and the work of skilled craftsmen who make statues and likenesses of the gods - I mean painters and sculptors and masons who work in stone, in a word, everyone who has held himself worthy to come forward as a portrayer of the divine nature through the use of art...⁴⁵.

What kind of model did Phidias use in his visualization of the power of Zeus? Did he climb the Olymp or did he meet and 'see' the gods in a concrete way? Or expressed in another way: what are the limitations of the trades of poets, sculptors and other kinds of mimetes? What is possible to visualize and what is not in poetry, sculpture, music and other forms of mimema?

Maximus of Tyre (Or. II) writes that god needs no statues and symbols but that "men, in their boundless weakness... have invented these signs in order to deposit within them the names of, and their knowledge of, the gods." and he continues:

There is a god; above time, eternity and the whole mutable nature, not susceptible to being named by a law-giver, expressed in language or beheld with the eye. Unable to grasp his essence, we seek support in words, names, animals, likenesses in gold, ivory and silver, in plants, rivers, mountain peaks and sources of rivers. We wish to embrace him in thought, but all our weakness allows us to do is to describe his nature in terms of what appears beautiful to us...⁴⁶

And he comments on the Greek way of solving this problem: "The Greeks have recognized that the gods ought to be praised with whatever is most beautiful on earth; pure material, human shape and perfect art."⁴⁷ This is exactly what Phidias did. He used the most beautiful and expensive material possible for sculpture; gold and ivory. He envisaged Zeus in the most beautiful and dignified human

forms ever seen and he was in full command of his art so that the material and his inner vision could be completely rendered justice; and his perfect craftsmanship was a wonder in itself. But his sculpture is not a copy or portrait of Zeus. He is pictorially represented through some kind of similarity. Zeus, being the highest god, must be conceived of in the best and most beautiful terms possible whenever you try to visualize him. Again, this is what Phidias did and Maximus of Tyre pointed out. The most beautiful things in this world is, then, to the Greek mind, pure material, human shape and perfect art. If you want to represent Zeus by means of perceptual qualities you have to follow in Phidias' footsteps and use the most beautiful sensuous things to represent the most beautiful in the non-sensuous world. The relation between the sensuous world of the gods is, then, based on a similarity in quality: in both realms the best possible quality is necessary. Thus the mimema is a kind of simile or metaphor combining the two worlds through a similarity in quality.

Dio Chrysotom (Or. XII. 59) discusses, the same question but answers it somewhat differently:

...For mind intelligence in and of themselves no statuary or painter will ever be able to represent; for all men are utterly incapable of observing such attributes with their eyes or of learning of them by inquiry. But as for that in which this intelligence manifests itself, men, having no mere inkling thereof but actual knowledge, fly to it for refuge, attributing to God a human body as a vessel to contain intelligence and rationality, in their lack of a better illustration, and in their perplexity seeking to indicate that which is invisible and unportrayable by means of something portrayable and visible, using the function of a symbol...⁴⁸

Dio maintains that the relation between the world of gods and the human world of appearances is symbolic. Suppose this relation is different from the metaphorical one pointed out by Maximus of Tyre and is of the form discussed by Plato in the *Cratylus* (433 E); the relation is conventional i. e. it rests on a convention or a habit to connect two different things, the one as a sign or symbol of the other. If so, anything can serve as a symbol of the gods provided that the relation between god and symbol is established. In the case of the pictorial simile or metaphor this is not possible; there must exist a similarity between sign and signified and not just an established practice to connect them. Even if you could maintain that Phidias' Zeus represents Zeus because of a convention or established practice (among

other things, Phidias was hired to make an image of Zeus in a social process) the sign function is not solely based on convention or practice but also on something you can see: 'pure material, human shape and perfect art' as metaphorical properties of the gods.

An important text in this context is Philostratus' *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*. During a visit to Egypt Apollonius had a discussion with Egyptian priests on the nature of the gods and the possibility of representing them in sculpture. He rebukes the Egyptians for their practice of representing the gods in animal forms and says that "in other lands statuary has scrupulously observed decency and fitness, you rather make ridicule of the gods than really believe in them."⁴⁹ (VI.19) The decent way of representing Zeus, for instance, is according to Apollonius to "envisage him along with heaven and seasons and stars, as Phidias in his day endeavoured to do, and if you would fashion an image of Athene you must image in your mind armies and cunning, and handicrafts, and how she leapt out of Zeus himself "It is an offence to let gods appear in the forms of animals. The Egyptian priest answers that Apollonius has misunderstood their practice and maintains "... that they fashion their forms as symbols of a profound inner meaning, so as to enhance their solemnity and august character." Apollonius does not understand this possibility which is representation through symbolization. He rejects it with a lough. It is against his Greek conception of pictorial representation and how the human mind can conceive of the nature of gods; the gods have to be conceived as beautiful and powerful as possible and then to be represented in this way. When you conceive of the gods you do it with the faculty of fantasia. The Egyptian priest asks:

"Your artists, then, like Phidias," said the other, "and like Praxiteles, went up, I suppose, to heaven and took a copy of the forms of the gods, and then reproduced these by their art, or was there any other influence which presided over and guided their moulding?"

"There was," said Apollonius, "and an influence pregnant with wisdom and genius."

"What was that?" said the other, "for I do not think you can adduce any except imitation."

"Imagination," said Apollonius, "wrought these works, a wisher and subtler artist by far than imitation, for imitation can only

create as its handiwork what it has seen, but imagination equally what it has not seen; for it will conceive of its ideal with reference to the reality, and imitation is often baffled by terror, but imagination by nothing; for it marches undismayed to the goal which it has itself laid down..."⁵⁰

Since the fantasia is perceptual in character the conception of the gods has to be within the range of perception and the image of the gods must be as good as possible within perceptual terms. Beauty and mightness you can see with your eyes and this is attributed to the gods by the representation. Apollonius seems to have a view which is close to the one Maximus of Tyre offers: there is a similarity between the two worlds which makes the representation into a pictorial simile or metaphor. The Egyptian priest has another point of view. Maybe it is not merely symbolization in the sense of the word used here: rules, habits and conventions as the foundation of the sign function. In such cases anything can serve as symbol. But the Egyptian priest does not think it is without importance how the sculptures are formed, one thing serving as well as any other thing as symbol. The sculptors "... fashion their forms as symbols of profound inner meaning, so as to enhance their solemnity and august character" he says. He may have a contrast in mind. The solemn and august character of the gods are enhanced by the contrast of the baseness of the images of them and their loftiness. It may work as some kind of inversed simile or metaphor. In pictorial representations the foundation is a recognized similarity, in the inverse simile it is dissimilarity or contrast. The text does not tell how to read it and the important thing in this context is the Greek outlook as it is represented by Apollonius.

Plotin, too, uses Phidias and his sculpture of Zeus as an example (V.8.1). Again it is obvious that the sculptor can make portraits of individuals but that the important sculptures are those where the sculptor has used a mental image as model. Now, what is this mental image according to Plotin? It is often believed that it is a Platonic idea because Plotin writes that *mimemata* "... run back up to the forming principles from which nature derives..."⁵¹ But on the other hand he maintains that the sculpture must represent Zeus in a visual form, the "...form Zeus must take if he chose to become manifest to sight..." The inner image, the fantasia, is not of an individual thing, but something compounded out of perceptual qualities. Platonic ideas, on the other hand, are not apprehendable to our senses even if the

sensuous world is related to the world of ideas, emanating from it or going back to it. Most likely, Plotin adheres to the Greek outlook on images and mimemata as hinted at in this paper. Zeus must be conceived of within the boundaries of sight when you make paintings and sculptures representing him.

Zeus did not appear to sight, if you don't count his mythological appearances as a bull, a swan or a golden rain. Those appearances were disapproved of for theological reasons; a god should not use a disguise which is below his status. A bull and a swan, even if they are magnificent and beautiful animals, are nevertheless infinitely lower in rank than Zeus as the ruler of the Olymp and the world.

But the Christian God showed himself to this world in the shape of an ordinary human being of low social rank. Christ is both God and human being; he has a double nature. He did not appear in the most splendid form possible, as emperor of Rome, for instance. The double nature of Christ transgresses the frontier between the visible and the invisible worlds. This opens up new avenues for the discussion of the representation of the invisible; the invisible is in the visible.

c. The pictorial representation of the invisible.

The two worlds of gods and Platonic ideas are not accessible to human perception and it is thus impossible to represent them directly in images. But there are other things, too, that are non-perceptual in character and the problem of pictorial representation of non-perceptual things was a major challenge to the image-maker and an important topic in the theory of imitation: how is it possible to transgress the border between perceptual worlds and establish connections between them?

So far we have seen texts demonstrating possible ways of pictorial representation of non-perceptual entities. In the representations we have called 'concrete universals' types or ideals are directly perceivable and gods can be represented symbolically or metaphorically in images.

There are also two other ways discussed in antiquity: you can represent symptoms of non-perceptual entities and you can show concrete examples of abstract things in images. Emotions, for instance, we cannot perceive. Xenophon puts the question in his *Memorabilia* (III, 10, 3-5);

Well then, Socrates said, do you also represent the most winning, pleasing, friendly; welcome and desirable disposition of the soul; or is it impossible to represent this?

Certainly, Socrates, he answered, for how could such a thing be represented that has neither proportion nor colour nor anything of that which you mentioned just now and that which it is not even possible to see at all?

But, Socrates replied, does it not happen that a man sometimes looks at some other man in a friendly manner and sometimes in a hostile manner?

Well, I think so, Parrhasius answered.

Then, is it not possible to represent this, at least, in the faces [of your paintings]?

Certainly, he replied.

Do you think that they have the same [expression in their] faces to the well-faring and to the ill-faring of their friends whether they care for it or do not care for it?

Good Lord! Of course not, he answered, they show a cheerful countenance at their well-faring but a sad countenance at their ill-faring.

Well, then, Socrates said, is it possible to make images representing that too?

Obviously.

Further, nobility and high-mindedness, baseness and narrow-mindedness, moderation and prudence, insolence and vulgarity, are visible in the persons' faces and in the positions [of their bodies] both when they are still and in motion.

You are quite right, he said.

Thus, these too can be represented?

Certainly.⁵²

Even if it is not possible to represent abstract things or things known but not perceived it is possible, it is argued, at least to represent the symptoms of abstract things so far they have symptoms that are open to our senses. We cannot see anger but we can see anger in the face of a person. Thus we conclude from outward signs to inner states that are not perceptible in themselves. We don't just see the

signs but conclude and 'see' also what they are signs of by means of our knowledge of the relation between the symptom and its cause. This is particularly the case in concrete universals because they are conceived and made to demonstrate the typical in persons and situations. It is possible to concentrate on the symptoms of anger, happiness etc. without the distracting individual characteristics in given, historical situations. The typical symptoms can be gathered and presented to the beholder.

The Pseudo-Aristotelian text *Physiognomica* puts the basic question of the relation between inner and outer state. is it possible to know the inner states by looking at the outward states? The question is answered in the affirmative: certain outward characteristics are symptoms of inner states: " a specific body involves a specific mental character ... " (805 a 15) Most of the text consists of enumerations of such relations between inner and outer states, for instance (808 b 3-6):

Gluttony is indicated when the distance from navel to chest is grewater than that from chest to neck

Lasciviousness is indicated by a pale complexion, heavy growth of straight, thick, black hair over the body, a heavy growth of straight hair on the temples, and small, lustrous, lewd eyes.⁵³

Maybe also the Characters by Theophrastus can be seen as descriptions of the characteristics of human types. When we se a person's look and behaviour we conclude about his inner state and character.

Aristotle claims in the ninth chapter of the *Poetics* that poetry is more philosophical than history because "poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts." And he continues: "By a 'general truth' I mean the sort of thing that a certain type of man will do or say either probably or necessarily."⁵⁴ 'General truths' are not visible or audible and cannot thus be pictorially represented directly. But they can be represented through exemplification. For instance, the thought and moral insight that 'human happiness is fickle' is something abstract and not open directly to our senses. But it is possible to show an example and even a typical example of such a human fate that demonstrates the truth of this moral conviction. The chorus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* ends the tragedy by the following lines.

And of no mortal say
"That man is happy", till
Vexed by no grievous ill
He pass Life's goal.⁵⁵

In the drama Sophocles has exemplified this 'general truth'. What can be more evident from the tragedy than that human happiness is fickle? In the beginning of the tragedy Oedipus boasts over his happiness and a few hours later he recognizes that he has committed the most horrible crimes a human being can commit. The picture we see at the theatre shows and exemplifies the general truth and the audience learns this general truth not through arguments but through an emotional identification (pity and fear at work) with Oedipus. The audience 'sees' and feels the general truth 'human happiness is fickle'. Possibly the katharsis can be seen as this emotional non-conceptual process of learning through apprehending an image showing an example of a general truth.

We can 'see' things not visible through their symptoms but we also conclude from an example to something general or universal. Thus the human mind is capable of not just perceiving things but also to draw conclusions from the things perceived as symptoms or examples of something invisible. These conclusions are not arrived at through arguments but through an immediate beholding and understanding of the thing or image. 'Concrete universals' as described above show types to the beholder in the sense that they invite the beholder to see not only the several perceptual details but also the 'whole', the type or the 'general truth' or universal as Aristotle calls it. We see youthful, male beauty, greediness or the fickleness of human happiness.

When we say that something is typical we refer to some kind of universal, an idea or thought which is one and that can appear in many forms. Greediness is one but we can find many greedy people or people showing characteristics we think are the signs of greediness as demonstrated by Theophrastos.

The connection between perceptual and non-perceptual things is established by our knowledge about the world (we know about the relations between something and its outward signs) or our recognition of something as an example of something general or universal which is also based on our knowledge of the world.

Thus things outside of our immediate perception (wherever this boarder is to be located) can be represented, according to ancient views, either by symbolization or by metaphors or we can see them directly in representations called 'concrete universals' in this paper or we can conclude from what we see or hear to something non-perceptual by seeing it as a symptom or an example of something general or universal.

These several examples all show that the mimema (imitation) and the image were not discussed and thought of in antiquity primarily as things in the world made in the likeness of other things in the world or as incomplete copies of them. It is the relation between inner and outer image that is important, a relation based on a typically human ability to create inner images and to 'squeeze' them out in a material form in order to share them with other human beings.

Notes and References

1. In the third book of the *Republic* Plato has distinguished between such poetry that is dramatic impersonation, which he called mimetic, and such that is descriptive. When he brings up the discussion again he does so on another level: it is not just dramatic impersonation that is in focus but poetry in general. Cf. my book *Mimesis and Art*. Studies in the Origin and Early Development of an Aesthetic Vocabulary. Upsala 1966, p. 129-131.
2. The translation used here is by Paul Shorey, *Plato: The Republic*, in Loeb Classical Library, London & Cambridge, Mass. 1956,
3. Transl. by Harold North Fowler, *Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist*, Loeb Classical Library, London & Cambridge, Mass. 1961.
4. In antiquity no distinction between sensation and perception was made. Cf. P. W. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception. A History of the Philosophy of Perception*. London: Reutledge & Kegan Paul 1961.
5. Cf. Edwin Clarke & Kenneth Dewhurst, *An Illustrated History of Brain Function*, Oxford; Sandford Publications 1972.
6. *On the Soul* 417 a 20-21: "for the unlike is effected, and when it has been affected it is like." and 418 a 3-6: "As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually, that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it," Transl. by J.A. Smith in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. The Revised Oxford Translation. Ed. by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press 1984.

7. The view that aisthesis is isomorphic in nature may to some extent explain why it is less important to ancient authors to distinguish between the outward thing and the appearance of it. They were basically similar to each other and particularly in the respects that concern mimesis: the contingent and sensuous qualities of things.
8. Transl. by W. S. Hett in *Aristotle: On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath*. Loeb Classical Library. London, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.
9. Ibid.
10. Transl. by H. E. Butler, *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.
11. Transl. by H. M. Hubbell in *Cicero: Brutus, Orator*. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass., 1962.
12. *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, ii, 22. Transl. by F. C. Conybeare. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
13. Ibid.
14. Cf. Paul Oscar Kristeller, "The modern system of the arts". *Renaissance Thought II. Papers on Humanism and the Arts*. New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965.
15. A difficulty in the understanding of the theory of imitation is the lack of a generally accepted terminology. My hypothesis is that there was a rather unitary outlook on the nature of imitation (mimesis) as a human activity but that there was a large number of terms used to describe and discuss this human activity. It is necessary, I believe, to go beyond terminology and to look at the system of thought they refer to. The terms "mimesis" and "eikon", for instance, are not so interesting as the way of thought they represent.
16. Transl. by R. M. Gummere, *Seneca: Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass., 1967.
17. Transl. by W. Hamilton Fyfe in *Aristotle: The Poetics; "Longinus": On the Sublime and Demetris: On Style*. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
18. Ibid.
19. These two activities do not exclude each other. The imitator can be both inspired and in command of his trade. Plato hints at this in the *Ion* (535 E) and mentions it explicitly in the *Laws* (719 C).
20. Transl. by Benjamin Bickley Rogers in *Aristophanes*. Vol. 3, Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge Mass., 1955.
21. *Ars poetica*, 408-411.

22. *On the Sublime*, for instance chapter 2 and 36. 4.
23. *Lif of Apollonius of Tyana*, 2. 22.
24. Epistle 65. 5-6, Transl. cf. note 16.
25. Ibid.
26. Transl. cf. note 11.
27. Cf. also my book *Mimesis and Art*... pp. 133 - 138.
28. V.8.1. Transl. by A.H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*. Vol. V. Loeb Classical Library. London, Cambridge, Mass. 1984.
29. Transl. by C. H. Oldfather, *Diodorus of Sicily*. Vol. I. Loeb Classical Library, London; Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
30. Cf. for instance Cyril Aldred, *Middle Kingdom Art in Ancient Egypt*. 2300 - B. C. London: Alec Tiranti Ltd., 1950, pp 23-24.
31. *Memorabilia* III. 10.6. Cf. my book *Mimesis and Art* pp. 93-94.
32. Transl. by H. Rackham, Pliny. *Natural History*. Vol. IX. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass, 1961
33. Transl. by J. W. Cohoon in *Dio Chrysostom*. Vol. II. Loeb Classical Library, London Cambridge, Mass., 1961
34. Transl. in Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, *History of Aesthetics. Vol. I. Ancient Aesthetics*. The Hague, Paris: Mouton 1970, p. 298.
35. Transl. by Arthur Fairbanks, *Philostratus: Imagines; Callistratus: Descriptions*. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
36. Transl. by S. H. Butcher. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* with Critical Text and Translation of the Poetics. 4th ed. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1951.
37. Transl. see note 17.
38. Transl. by Goran Sorbom in op. cit. pp. 83-84.
39. Transl. by H. M. Hubbell, *Cicero: De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, Topica. Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge Mass., 1950.
40. Transl. in Tatarkiewicz op. cit. p. 302.
41. Transl. see note 2.
42. Transl. by J. J. Pollitt in *The Art of Greece* 1400 - 31 B. C. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1965, p. 89.
43. Transl. in Tatarkiewicz op. cit. p. 297.
44. Transl. in Pollitt op. cit. p. 73. Cf. also Dio Chrysostom XII. 25-26, Valerius 3. 7. 4. and Plutarch *Life of Amilius Paulus* 28.2
45. Transl. see note 33.
46. Transl. in Tatarkiewicz op. cit. p. 306.
47. Ibid. p. 305.
48. Transl. see note 33.
49. Transl. see note 12,

50. This passage shows a contrariety between imitation and imagination. It is an example of the fact that there is no established terminology in antiquity. In II. 22 Philostratus mentions to kinds of mimesis, the faculty to create inner images and the craft to make the outward ones. It is possible to combine these two passages in such a way that there is no clash between them: man has a faculty to create inner images and can acquire the skill of realizing them in outward form. If you only rely on the latter, you have to follow what you have seen. But imagination can transgress these limitations and create new units. In this way imitation and imagination harmonize within the same model of thought, a model that got its

basic shape by Plato and Aristotle as far as we know. Maybe imagination was more stressed in late antiquity on the cost of imitation, but there is no contrariety between them as some authors want to see in this passage.

51. Transl. cf. note 28.
52. Transl. by Goran Sorbom, op. cit. pp. 84-85.
53. Transl. by T. Loveday & E. S. Forster, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. The Revised Oxford Translation. Ed. by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press 1984.
54. Transl. cf. note 17.
55. Transl. by George Young, *Sophocles' Dramas*. Everyman's Library no. 114, London, New York 1957.

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The Resemblance Theory Revisited

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Aesthetics has its problems with the resemblance model of pictorial art. The resemblance theory, so it seems, harkens back to the long tradition of *mimesis*. Thanks to modern semiotics, art-as-imitation has become superfluous. If one accepts Goodman's theory of the arbitrariness of all symbols, then resemblance is irrelevant, despite what our common sense may tell us.

I think one of the problems of the debate between semiotics (or the conventionalism of signs) and resemblance (or the non-conventionalism of pictorial elements) must be sought in the tenet that semiotics and resemblance are mutually exclusive. In short, I am *not* trying to argue that art is resemblance. I would like to show that the pure arbitrariness of pictorial signs does not satisfy the philosophical mind as a necessary cause for the reference factors of an artwork. There must be more necessary causes, not to mention sufficient ones, to base the genesis of the artwork on.

Nelson Goodman's position on resemblance is well known. For Goodman, the languages of art are symbol systems.¹ Goodman considers the most "naive" concept of representation, namely that of resemblance, incorrect. Similar objects such as cars cannot represent one another. Thus resemblance is not a sufficient cause for representation.² If a picture is a symbol, then it must denote an object; resemblance is irrelevant.³ We always denote in creating an artwork, whether an object exists or not. If an object does not exist, we nevertheless denote, having pictures with so-called zero-denotation, also known as "representations - as"⁴ or as-if representations. Goodman concludes his case by stating that representation can never be concerned with imitating objects. Representation is a matter of classification.⁵

Starting with Goodman, I want look at some of the objections to the resemblance theory in detail and then conclude with an evaluation.

Goodman criticized that one car does not represent another car, even if it is identical with the other car (same marque, colour, year of construction etc.). This objection is incontestable. A tree indeed does not represent another tree, a twin does not represent its sister, a car does not represent another car. However, Goodman's criticism is only valid within an everyday context. Taken out of the everyday context of given objects, a car by Duchamp or Picasso can very well represent another car by virtue of its resemblance. In other words, without a context it is impossible to know whether resemblance is at all aesthetically relevant. Warhol's Brillo box, Danto's favourite example, can represent all other Brillo boxes by virtue of its resemblance to them.

Other objections to the resemblance theory are more concerning. Until now, there has been no discussion of what resemblance actually is. What makes the picture of a Campbell's soup can look like a real Campbell's soup can? As Pitkanen remarked, we are obviously lacking a concept of resemblance which could help us to measure the degree of similarity. We have no criteria of resemblance whatsoever. Monroe Beardsley's version of the resemblance theory tries to counter this justified view which has been stated often. Beardsley writes that a picture P can represent an object O if it "looks more like" O as a member of the class of objects O than any other objects.⁷ Pitkanen's objection to Beardsley's endeavour to salvage the resemblance theory seems valid. We don't know, Pitkanen writes, what "looks like" really is; the reduction of resemblance to an abstract class instead of basing it on concrete objects in fact obstructs any verification of the resemblance model.⁸

Until now, Pitkanen's objection to the resemblance theory still stands. There is no circumventing the fact that we do not possess a concept of resemblance in order to be able to grasp "resemblance" theoretically. However, one does not have to possess a concept of a thing in the perceptual sphere or in interaction with the perceptual sphere to recognize something as existing. Without having a concept for "man", an uneducated perceiver can immediately and correctly perceive the face of a man - and not that of a dog, a locust, or an elephant - in one of Rembrandt's self-portraits. It seems as if Pitkanen confuses knowledge with perception. If we do perceive the picture of an old man without the shade of doubt as the representation of an old man, this does not imply

that we must have a concept of resemblance to accept a certain resemblance. In short; Pitkanen's objection does not refute the resemblance theory. However, Pitkanen did show that Beardsley's last - ditch effort to salvage the resemblance model for aesthetics was, perhaps, not really necessary and tended to obscure the issue that is at the heart of the matter.

Max Black objected to resemblance as a criterion for representation for a different reason. Black argued that the logical surface structure of the verb "to resemble" makes any idea of resemblance implausible. For if P resemble O, then O resembles P, and both resemble one another. In analogy, every tree could resemble the representation of any naturalistic picture of a tree.⁹ This is logically true. But the logical - semantic structure of the statement says nothing about the context of resemblance. Black's analogy is logically correct but incorrect from a contextual point - of - view. As we have already seen when dealing with Goodman's objections: In the context of contemporary art, a tree in fact can represent another tree. In addition, the picture of a tree exists in a different context than a forest. In a forest - and in a different context - one tree does not represent another tree, even if birch no. 1 resembles birch no. 2 more strongly than birch no. 3 which is represented in a picture. In fact, birch no. 3 represents the other birches, not because it resembles birch no. 2 more strongly than birch no. 1 resembles birch no. 2. Birch no. 3 represents the other birches because, due to a certain yet unclear resemblance, it for one is perceivable as a birch at all. And for another it represents in the context of a picture. Let me take another example, Goya's "Saturno", perhaps his most ferocious *Pintura negra*. One perceives an obviously agitated man. He has disheveled grey hair and his eyes are wide - open. He has grabbed a much smaller human figure. The big man is about to stick a red (bloody) arm into his mouth. This representation - as resembles a real old man. He possesses hair, has two eyes, a mouth, arms and legs. The smaller human figure or man consists of a torso, two legs and an arm. His head and one arm is missing. In the context of this picture we infer that the head and left arm have already been eaten by the larger male figure. In short, before we infer anything, we perceive a man - picture which shows one man being eaten by another, larger man. To perceive the picture as Saturn devouring his child it would have been impossible for

Goya to depict a dolphin eating a rabbit. Because he wanted to represent the classic Saturn alias Chronos scene, he had to depict a double - man - picture with an at least vague resemblance to two real male figures. This vague resemblance is a prerequisite for perceiving the picture as a Saturn painting. The required resemblance thus constitutes the (or: a) *necessary but not sufficient* cause for perceiving the double - man - representation as a Saturn picture at all. Of course this resemblance does not suffice to establish the double - man - representation as a picture of Saturn. The pictorial specifics come in next - the act of devouring, the colours, the composition, the overall context of Goya's *Pinturas negras*. The obviously symbolic context permits the deciphering of the double - man - representation as a symbol. It can be viewed as an icon sign with zero - denotation. If one interprets Charles Marris's terminology liberally, an icon sign - whether it possesses the zero - denotation of a unicorn picture or the object - denotation of a represented tree - must always have some resemblance to the things we know as necessary but not sufficient causes for representation. The main determining factor is the context of the individual representation. Thus all arguments about the subject of how portrait resemblance or unreal resemblance (e.g. a unicorn) are to be differentiated are superfluous. *We* give the picture the context in which the as - if - picture of the cannibal cannot mean anything else but Saturn. The logical - semantic weakness of the resemblance theory becomes insignificant as soon as the context determines resemblance as the (or: a) necessary cause for representing a certain subject matter.

Max Black's final objection to the resemblance theory does not dispute the fact that indeed some pictures do look like their objects. Black objects to the fact that if resemblance is granted, then so little is said if only this is said. The resemblance theory lacks the quality of information. Instead of insight the resemblance theory offers but a trivial ersatz.¹⁰

Black's objection is incontestable if resemblance is misunderstood as a criterion of representing, or, even worse, if it is misused as a norm of "correct" or naturalistic representation. In the visual arts resemblance is irrelevant in very many instances, for instance in the case of abstract expressionism. Therefore resemblance can be only *one* of the necessary causes for our Saturn representation. This necessary cause may not be applied to the whole of art. And this cause of course can never be a criterion which enables a value judgement on Goya's Saturn. The necessary

cause of resemblance is no more than a requirement for perceiving the Saturn picture in the context of the highly symbolic *Pinturas negras*.

The problem of resemblance depends upon the answer to the following question: Which degree of importance and aesthetic relevance does one allow the resemblance theory? The paucity of information of the resemblance factor that Black referred to becomes irrelevant if one expects only a very basic kind of information. This basic information stemming from a picture must not be allowed to become a criterion for representation, nor can it explicate pictorial significance. Resemblance is thus relevant only as basic data.

Until now, all objections to the resemblance theory have been contestable. If one accepts resemblance as a minimum requirement for representation *in certain cases*, then all objections raised against the theory as *the* theory of representation become irrelevant. In certain cases representations without a minimum of resemblance to beings, objects, or events are impossible: An Upper Paleolithic cave painting of a bison resembles a bison and not a snake; Rembrandt's "Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer" resembles a man and not a Dutch farm house; Otto Dix's portrait of Heinrich George resembles Heinrich George and not an antelope; and Warhol's Brillo box does resemble Brillo boxes.

These resemblance constitute no more and no less than basic data. Because this information is naturally perceived, it seems irrelevant. Speaking from a strictly aesthetic viewpoint, resemblances in fact are unimportant because they are solely necessary prerequisites (which is a perhaps more precise and less philosophically bloated term than the concept of cause). They do not allow an interpretation. But they do make an interpretation possible insofar as resemblances are basic for perceiving and recognizing represented beings, objects, and actions. In short, the resemblance theory is not a genuinely aesthetic theory. The aesthetic limits of the resemblance theory are obvious.

The resemblance theory is especially problematical because we still have not found an answer to the question: What makes P resemble O? According to Pitkanen, the resemblance theory must be deemed naive if it demands the whole of an object as a criterion for resemblance.¹¹ A little moustache on an egg in a picture is enough to perceive a Hitler representation. A few green strokes are enough to indicate grass. Thus realism is realism in a purely relative respect.¹² Resemblance evades all

generally valid criteria. It is important not to expect a concept of resemblance. "Resemblance" need not concern an object as a whole, which would imply setting up norms. Depending upon the context, resemblance can be given when P hardly resembles O, or if only one, two, or three facets of an object are represented. This would nevertheless fulfill the minimum requirement for speaking about resemblance, no matter how distorted P may be. It now should become clear why resemblance doesn't possess a general concept: Resemblance is bound to context. In addition, it is perceptually - and thus biologically and psychologically - conditioned and adheres to the conventions of seeing, thinking, and depicting.

The weakness of the resemblance theory is its conceptual inaccuracy. Perhaps it is impossible to give the concept of resemblance greater accuracy. Carney, for instance, endeavoured to do just this by referring to Wittgenstein and trying to define the logical form of resemblance,¹³ But will the contextuality of resemblance permit an operative philosophical concept ? This must be doubted.

I am not trying to establish the concept of resemblance as a vital aesthetic theory. Lacking a better concept, the theory of resemblance can at least assist in discussing the basic requirements of representation. If one limits the inoperable concept of resemblance to the scope of a necessary prerequisite for *some* representations, then this modified understanding could perhaps be acceptable. However, the resemblance theory is too vague and too aesthetically irrelevant to base any aesthetic theory on. Art is not resemblance.

And yet there *is* an element of resemblance in many pictures which seems undeniable. Various reasons make this conclusion probable.

1. Resemblance is necessary in certain contexts whereas in other ones it is irrelevant.

2. Resemblance and semiotics need not exclude one another. Could resemblance constitute one element of semiotics, something similar or identical to icon signs in Morris's terminology ? For example, Vermeer's "View of Delft" would be considered an icon sign whereas an abstract painting by Rothko would be an index. James Heffernan also opts for the contextual approach to resemblance when he concludes his perceptive essay with the following statement: We must stop thinking of resemblance and signification as mutually exclusive terms.¹⁴ Art is too

complex to allow one sided simplifications. Why can't a painting represent via resemblance and simultaneously denote ? The resemblance element would account for at least part of the perception aspect and the denotation element would account for the semiotic aspect. And I presume that even this scheme hardly does justice to the complexity of an artwork.

3. The problem of visual art perception is unsolved and highly controversial. Without trying to take the usual sides of Gombrich vs. Goodman, one can simply say at the present state of the debate that perception is a complex and frail thing. If pictures do resemble objects, then perhaps in the end only "by virtue of failures in discrimination."¹⁵

Notes And References

1. Cf. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 1968 (Sprachen der Kunst, Frankfurt am Main 1973, p. 9/10).
2. Ibid., p. 15/16.
3. Ibid., p. 17
4. Ibid., p. 32-38.
5. Ibid., p. 42.
6. Cf. Risto Pitkanen, "The Resemblance View of Pictorial Representation", *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 1976, p. 322.
7. Cf. Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, New York 1958, p. 270.
8. Pitkanen, ed. cit., p. 315/316.
9. Cf. Max Black, "Wie stellen Bilder dar ?", in: Ed. Ernst H. Gombrich, Julian Hochberg, Max Black, *Kunst Wahrnehmung, Wirklichkeit*, Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 137.
10. Ibid., p. 241
11. Pitkanen, ed. cit., p. 320.
12. Cf. Roger Scruton, *Art and Imagination. A Study in the Philosophy of Mind*, London 1974, p. 204.
13. Cf. James Carney, "Wittgenstein's Theory of Picture Representation", in: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (J.AAC)*, Vol. XL, No. 2. Winter 1981, p. 181.

14. Cf. James A.W. Heffernan, p. 178.
"Resemblance, Signification, and
Metaphor in the visual Arts",
in: *The JAAC*, Vol. XLIV,
No. 2, Winter 1985,
15. Cf. Donald Brook, "Painting,
Photography and Representa-
tion", in: *The JAAC*, Vol. XLII,
No. 2, Winter 1983, p. 180.

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A Causal Theory of Pictorial Representation

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I

In a recent paper entitled "Two Theories of Representation", Jenefer Robinson raises the question whether Fregean and Kripkean theories of reference can be used to construct a theory of pictorial representation.¹ Robinson develops a descriptive theory out of Frege's notions of sense and reference, and a genetic or causal theory from Saul Kripke's account of reference of names and natural kind terms. She concludes that neither theory alone nor a pooling of the best features of both theories can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all kinds of pictorial representation. In particular, the combined theory fails to provide an adequate account of metaphor and misrepresentation. In what follows, I shall attempt to show how recent work by Dennis Stampe on causal theories of linguistic representation can offer further insight into those problems of pictorial representation raised originally by Robinson and left unsolved by subsequent analyses.

It is generally acknowledged that Goodman's *Languages of Art* provides a basis for all subsequent discussions on pictorial representation. So before looking at Robinson's attempt at filling in the details of his theory, let's review the general structure of Goodman's view as found in chapter one of *Languages of Art*.

II

An account of pictorial representation must address two general questions:

1. What, if anything, is represented by a given picture, and
2. How is the putative object represented, which amounts on Goodman's view to asking what kind of representation it is. (This

characterization will be modified some what in the second half of the paper).

The answer to the ontological question deals with certain classical problems of reference. In a frequently quoted passage, Goodman claims that "a picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite relationship of reference".² The arguments in support of his claim are well known.

A. Resemblance is reflexive — representation irreflexive. Simply put, an object resembles itself more than any other thing, but one would not generally say that an object represents itself, at least not if it is part of the concept of a representation that it be in some way distinguishable from its object.

B. Resemblance is symmetric — representation asymmetric. While it is not too much of a strain to admit that Napoleon resembles his portrait as much as the portrait resembles Napoleon, it would be wrong to say that Napoleon represents his portrait.³

C. Finally there are countless examples of pairs of objects that are nearly identical in appearance, but neither object represents the other. One thinks of adjacent cars coming off an assembly line, or perhaps of identical twins, neither of which would be said to represent the other. The conclusion is that no degree of resemblance is going to be sufficient for representation.

Goodman in fact goes on to argue that resemblance is not necessary for representation either. Almost anything, he contends, can stand for anything else. "A picture that represents — like a passage that describes — an object refers to and, more particularly, denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance."⁴ Thus, denotation (which Goodman apparently takes to be a primitive, since he gives no analysis of the concept) forms the central notion around which an analysis of the relation between a picture and what is depicted is conducted in a way analogous to that of a predicate and what the predicate applies to.

But representation is not simply a matter of denotation or a case of mere reference. A representation may frequently present its object in a certain light, as being a certain way. This is what Goodman calls *representation-as* and what we shall see is akin to the Fregean *sense*, or in more contemporary terms, the content expressed by a representation. Representation-as plays a classificatory role in the Goodmanian scheme,

determining how we refer to the representation as a type of representation. A picture of Napoleon in full battle array denotes Napoleon (the object of representation) and represents him as a soldier. It is, Goodman would claim, a type of picture falling under a large class of pictures referred to as soldier-pictures. Similarly, a picture of Reagan as clown would be, *inter alia*, a clown - picture denoting Reagan.

Thus, a picture can perform both denotative and classificatory functions. The former serves to fix the object of representation, while the latter depicts the state of affairs with respect to the object, characterizing things as being a certain way with respect to the object.

This brief summary leaves open a number of questions concerning how pictures get the particular denotative and classificatory features they supposedly have, as well as questions concerning how one could determine that a picture has the features it has. It is at this stage that we may ask what theory of reference one would need to capture both the denotative and classificatory aspects of pictorial representation. We'll begin by looking at Robinson's attempt to apply Frege's theory to pictorial representations.

III

Robinson divides Frege's view of referring expressions into two large categories: (a) singular terms, that is, proper names and definite descriptions, and (b) general terms or indefinite descriptions. A singular term has both a sense and a reference and refers to a thing by virtue of its sense. If the singular term has no extension, then it has a sense but no reference. About the Fregean sense, Robinson says that it "seems to be the set of properties 'expressed' by the name or description".⁵ Thus, the sense of a proper name such as "Aristotle" is the set of properties belonging to Aristotle, given expression in the term "Aristotle", and sufficient for uniquely referring to the individual named by the singular term in question.

The most obvious pictorial analog to the proper name is the portrait. Applying the Fregean theory to this type of picture, one gets the result that a portrait refers to the portrayed by means of its "pictorial sense", i.e. the set of properties "expressed" by the picture. (It should be noted that the scare quotes appearing around the word

"expressed" belong to Robinson. When discussing pictorial representation, "represented in" is used as a synonym for "expressed by"). Given this way of applying the Fregean theory of names, a picture of Aristotle functions very much like a proper name or definite description. Robinson, however, inserts the proviso that the properties represented in a picture will depend to some extent upon the symbol system in which the picture occurs. This, she claims, is analogous to the way sense varies according to what language the linguistic expression occurs in. Unfortunately, Robinson gives no examples of how the pictorial sense might vary from context to context. I suppose a plausible distinction might be between a realistic symbol system where conventions of depicting correspond closely to those of projective geometry and a religious-iconographic symbol system where the means of depicting certain people or associations might rely more on an established set of relations or associations sanctioned by an independent set of religious beliefs and teachings.

The second general category of referring expressions, general terms and indefinite descriptions, brings together terms like "eagle" or "blonde-haired biped", terms that refer to whatever it is that satisfies the expression. The similarity between the functioning of words and pictures in the context of indefinite descriptions is brought out by Goodman's example of pictures used in reference books. The picture of an eagle that one finds with a dictionary definition of "eagle" refers not to some particular eagle, but distributively to every eagle. Likewise, the descriptive illustration of a creature with light yellow hair and two legs refers to every creature satisfying the pictorial description. It should be remembered, however, that general terms and pictures, like singular terms, may refer to no thing and yet have a sense. A picture of a man with three heads, like the expression "three-headed man", has a sense, i.e. a set of properties "expressed" by the terms or the picture, but does not designate an existing thing.

Finally, two descriptions may have a single reference and multiple senses. "The Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" both refer to Venus but each description is related to a different set of properties, each set constituting the difference in sense between the two terms. Robinson argues that pictures share this feature with linguistic expressions. Thus, two pictures of Venus may represent different properties, viz. those

associated with appearing in the evening sky and those associated with its appearing in the morning sky. "In general, it seems that a picture which represents *a* as a *b* is a picture the represented properties of which are those of a *b* yet determine the reference of the picture to be *a*. For example, a picture of Venus as the Morning Star represents Venus via the represented properties of the morning Star. It attributes to Venus certain properties, such as 'appearing in the morning' which would not be attributed to her by a picture of Venus as the Evening Star."⁶

Having seen the range of situations that can be captured, one may ask whether the theory as outlined can account for all cases of pictorial representation? Robinson claims it cannot and cites three major problems.

(1) If pictorial sense determines reference, then it follows that a picture represents whatever the represented properties belong to. If a portrait of my grandfather looks just like your grandfather, then the portrait represents both grandfathers. The reason why we fail to get singularity of reference, on Robinson's modified Fregean account, is that pictures do not necessarily express the essential, or uniquely individuating, properties of the object represented. "It might, for example, be an essential property of Aristotle and part of the sense of the name 'Aristotle' that he was the most famous pupil of Plato. But being the most famous pupil of Plato is not a property that is easily picturable."⁷

Now a number of objections should be response to Robinson's criticisms here. First of all, on her reading of Frege, a sense is a set of properties represented in a picture. Her first objection takes the form of a conditional: If sense determines reference in the way outlined, then a picture represents whatever the represented properties belong to. As it stands, I would not object to the conditional. However, one cannot conclude so quickly that portraits are likely to be ambiguous. what Robinson leaves out of her objection is the important point that she made on the previous page, viz, that the properties that may be taken to be represented *depend on the symbol system in which the picture is used as a character*. This is roughly equivalent to saying that the rules governing the interpretation of the pictorial statement have some bearing on the representational features of the work. This is an important point and one Frege urges with respect to language. And while it may be acknowledged that ambiguity can arise in portraiture, it is surely a problem that

is not unique to pictorial representation. Consider "Kennedy's wife lived with Aristotle", a sentence used to express the fact that Jackie lived with Onassis. Frege held that even in such cases, sense does determine reference; that context a) always determines sense, and b) that even in sentences like the above example, the context determines the sense of "Aristotle" to be *surnamed Onassis*.⁸ Robinson, however, objects that a picture of an identical twin will represent both twins on a strictly Fregean view. Even if she were right about this I don't see how the objection has any more bite than the objection that "Paul Smith" taken out of context may refer to more than one person. So even if the range of pictorial representations fails to match that of linguistic representations, the problem of singularity goes to the heart of *any* theory of reference. Looking at *pictorial* ambiguities only serves to distract one from this more basic issue.

Robinson finds similar problems with the representational strength of general terms like "eagle" and their pictorial counterparts. While she seems content with the linguistic term as a means of referring to any eagle whatsoever, the same feature found in pictures strikes her as problematic. Since "the essential properties of eagles are not easily picturable", she claims the analogy with general terms breaks down. But, one wonders, what is there in a merely formal, linguistic sense to a term like "eagle" that makes it refer to any eagle? The expression of essential properties are, it seems to me, no more readily found lurking in a term with the form "eagle" than they are in a simple line drawing of an eagle. Surely if there is a problem unpacking the merely physical properties of a Fregean sense, it will apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to pictorial and linguistic expressions alike.

(2) A Fregean theory of pictorial representation fails to account for representation as. A picture which is purported to represent Churchill as a lion would be a picture with a set of properties belonging to lion and which refers to Churchill by virtue of those properties. Thus it has the sense constituted by leonine properties but refers to a man, not to a lion. Robinson claims such a position cannot be sustained since a picture of a lion is not a correct pictorial description of Churchill. Likewise, a correct picture of Churchill cannot be a correct pictorial description of a lion. Thus, in the case of metaphorical pictures with contrary properties, sense fails to determine reference.

(3) Another related problem is that it is not at all clear how one could misrepresent an object and yet succeed in referring to it. One may be tempted to say that a picture of the Parthenon with the wrong number of columns represents the Parthenon, even though some of the properties expressed in the picture are not those of the Parthenon. The picture is commonly said to *misrepresent* the Parthenon. A Fregean theory, Robinson claims, cannot account for the reference of such a false picture. A picture is a representation of its object precisely because it gives *true* information about it. Frege's theory thus rules out cases of reference due to inaccurate representations, as well as cases of accidental reference.

In summary, the Robinsonian version of Frege's theory of reference fails to satisfy the needs of a pictorial theory of representation. Its main defects are:

(a) It fails to account for the singularity of reference, i.e., how it is a particular thing is represented as opposed to some other thing sharing many of the same properties.

(b) Many important, if not essential, features of persons and things are describable but not picturable and, therefore, cannot be referred to by pictures.

(c) It fails to account for representation-as. If a picture represents an object by virtue of the fact that it expresses a set of properties belonging to one object and one object alone, then metaphorical representations with properties belonging to no one object end up referring to nothing.

IV

A modified Fregean approach to pictorial reference highlights a number of important features but falls short of providing a complete theory of pictorial representation. The remainder of Robinson's paper is devoted to exploring the possibility of adding Kripke's causal account to the classical theory of reference with a view to solving the problems left open in the previous analysis. This tack appears, *prima facie*, to have a good deal to offer.

First of all, we'll look briefly at Kripke's causal account of reference. Next, we'll see how it helps answer the singularity problem but fails

to address the problem of representation-as. Given that Robinson has already rejected Frege's view of representation-as, we'll conclude, with her that neither theory alone nor a combination of the two theories can provide the theory of representation that we seem to need. In the last section, I'll attempt to show how Stampe's theory succeeds where the previous theories have failed.

Once again we assume that pictures behave like singular or general terms. In the case of proper names, reference to a particular individual such as Aristotle succeeds if the appropriate causal connection obtains between a particular use of the term "Aristotle" and the individual so named. This causal chain is established at what Kripke calls a "baptismal ceremony" where an object or individual acquires the name which is to be associated with it and used to refer to it in the future. Thus, since Aristotle was given his name let's say at birth, the word "Aristotle" attaches to the individual and is used to refer to him by anyone who intends to do so. It is not necessary to know anything essential about the man so named, nor to be aware of the essential properties or sense of the name "Aristotle". One merely uses the name one has come to know via the historical chain formed by teachers, acquaintances, books, etc. As long as one holds the belief that there exists a man named "Aristotle" and uses the name to refer to him, reference to the individual succeeds. For example, when my reference is to the Stagirite and not to Jackie's late husband, it is simply because it is the philosopher who I intended to single out and not the shipping magnate. This intention is what hooks me up to the particular causal chain.

Applying the analogy of singular terms to pictorial reference, we look once again to portraiture. What makes the artist's portrait a picture of Twin A and not twin B is just the causal link between the painter and twin A. The reference is determined historically by the fact that it was Twin A who sat for the picture and not Twin B, and that the artist intended the picture to be a portrait of Twin A. In general, the singular term of picture turns out to have both causal and intentional features.

What about general terms or indefinite descriptions? These are handled by analogy with Kripke's theory of natural kind terms. On this view, a paradigm case is picked out and used to fix the reference of the

general term. For example, when one uses the term "eagle" there is a definite class of creatures that gets singled out or referred to. A given speaker may not be able to provide a complete account of what differentiates eagles from other closely related species, but that knowledge is not essential to his using the general term to refer to such creatures as a group of natural kind. In a similar way, Goodman's picture of an eagle accompanied by a dictionary definition of "eagle" manages to refer, via a paradigm case, to every eagle rather than to one particular eagle. It is not necessary for this picture to be true of all and only eagles.

At this point one should begin to suspect that the Kripkean view, while not sufficient in itself, may prove adequate if combined with the Fregean, since the former provides us with a solution to the singularity question while the latter accounts, via sense, for the way in which the properties of a representation determine *how* a given picture represents its object. Thus, relieved of the onus of answering the singularity question, the Fregean sense may be put to good use in accounting for representation-as. Putting the two theories together, we get that if A represents B as a C, then A "expresses" the properties of a C, i.e. has the sense of a C, but is caused in the relevant way by B in virtue of the fact that B served as a model or that it was the artist's intention to represent B. Putting off for the moment the usual problems of accounting for "relevancy" in causal stories, it appears that this description gives a more complete theory of pictorial representation. However, as Robinson shows, more careful scrutiny reveals that even our hybrid theory will not give sufficient conditions for representation. Robinson suggests two kinds of problems that remain. What follows is an embellishment of her counterexamples.

The first problem arises in the face of gross incompetence and deviant causal chains. Suppose a painter intends to paint a portrait of Margaret Thatcher and uses her as a model. During the execution of the portrait, something goes completely haywire in the artist and totally disrupts his hand to eye coordination with the result that the properties of the picture do not correspond *in any way* to the properties of Thatcher. Thus, the causal and intentional links are in place-- the artist intends it to be a picture of Thatcher and uses her as his sitter---so that the picture, on a strictly causal view, would be a portrait of Thatcher, even though there is *nothing* about the formal qualities of the picture that would allow one to reach such a conclusion. Our intuitions may lead us to say

that it is not a picture of Thatcher, despite the causal link to her. Support for our intuition is provided (albeit rather incompletely) by Robinson. "For a picture to represent the (sitter), there must be a mapping from its pictorial properties to the represented properties of the (sitter) ..." Robinson, however, does not explain how, in general, such a mapping could occur nor what constraints need be placed on it. So while we may agree that the Frege/Kripke model would fail to give satisfactory results in the present case, if we were to stay within the domain of classical theories, we would need a fuller explanation of the object to image mapping.

Secondly, Robinson argues that the Kripkean theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for representation-as. This objection turns on the notion that it would be wrong to think that anything can represent almost anything else. On the Kripkean view, a straightforward picture of a lion which was intended by the artist to be an inspiring portrayal of Churchill and given an appropriate title, would qualify as a picture of Churchill as a lion. "But this cannot be the whole story. The only reason we accept a picture of a lion as a picture that represents Churchill is that it is both meaningful and apposite to regard Churchill as a lion. A picture of a vase of flowers entitled Churchill on the Eve of the Normandy Invasion is likely to be merely puzzling unless we supply a context in which it might be appropriate to regard Churchill as, say, a vase of snapdragons as opposed to a vase of forget-me-nots. In other words, *what* is represented is not determined independently of *how* it is represented." ¹⁰ And just where the Fregean theory should be brought to the rescue, Robinson argues that it reveals itself as inadequate to the task after all. In order to understand a metaphorical picture, we need to know what it is that makes the metaphor appropriate, which is to say, what properties Churchill and the lion have in common. But it is just that information which seems to come, if at all, from a source external to the picture. If the point is that Churchill is fierce and courageous, that has not been represented by the picture. What has been represented is a lion and perhaps a very odd lion at that. The picture may have a sense, but its referent is not the object supposedly aimed at, at least not within the present theoretical structure.

V

As a general rule, any account of pictorial representation must address two general questions: (A) The question of its *object*--What, if

anything, is represented by a given picture (drawing, photograph, etc), and (B) The question of its *content*--How is the putative object represented; what is it represented *as*, or, what is represented as being true of it. Stampe provides an explanation in terms of the causal connections needed for a thing to be the *object* of a representation, as well as the causal and counterfactual relations that determine the *content* of a representation.¹¹ The primary concern in the determination of what object a picture represents is the specification of an *essential* causal link between the actual properties of a pictorial representation and the existing properties of the represented object. Unlike the traditional Fraegean account of reference wherein an expression essentially refers to whatever particular object instantiates the properties expressed, the present view insists that it is the fact that the properties of the object are *causally* related to the pictorial properties that forms the essence of the representing relation. Thus, the kind of relation we seek is between a set of properties (F) of the thing represented (O), and a set of properties (G) of the representation (R). It will normally be the case that the relevant causal relation preserves an isomorphism between O's being F and R's being G.¹² For example, consider a portrait of your Grandpa Harold painted in honor of his eightieth birthday. The picture, we want to say, has the properties it has only because your grandfather has the properties he has. Your grandfather's physical properties *cause* the portrait to have the properties expressed therein. The nature of this hook-up is expressed in the following way. "Ordinarily, if O's being F causes R to be G, R is G *only* because O is F, and R wouldn't be G were it not for the fact that O is F. Where this ordinary situation obtains, it will be possible to acquire knowledge of the thing represented from the representation of it. Specifically, it will be possible to tell, from the fact that R is G, that O is F (that is, to know *of* O that it is F). There being such a causal relation as this can be made to account for the central fact about representation--that is, that representations provide information about what they represent."¹³ By looking at the portrait of your grandfather, it will be possible, under certain conditions, to tell what he looks like, to know *of him* that he has certain properties.

Of course, it is not a necessary feature of a picture that it look like what it is a picture *of*. But in the case of poorly executed (realistic) portraits, for example, it seems natural to say that *if* the portrait had been accurate (had it been *well* executed), it would have shown what the

sitter looks like. Such an analysis applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to systematic distortions found in cubism, mannerism, and other stylized works as well, insofar as they *are* representations. The critical, underlying assumption here is that if the picture is a representation of something, there is a route, however circuitous, that one could conceivably trace from the features of the picture to the features of the object represented. This route or mapping as accounted for by means of the counterfactual covariation between the picture and its object. Furthermore, it should be allowed that, in the case of portraits that are not merely bad or distorted but, let's say, *mad*, there is no rational method of reconstructing the features of the sitter from those of the picture. If one were to explain why the particular configuration appears on the canvas, one would not be able to give this account in terms of the features of the sitter. There would be no essential causal relation of the kind specified above that would provide a mapping of properties from O to R and vice versa, and the picture would fail to represent the sitter. The picture is a representation of an object only when the two are related in the appropriate *causal* way.

Such is the case for the object of representation. What is it that constitutes the *content* of a representation--what the representation *expresses*? To know what a representation (R) expresses is to know what would be the case if certain conditions obtained. On a causal view, these are conditions having to do with the causal background of the representation. So, to know what R expresses is "to know what would be the case were certain conditions to govern the *production* of the representation. The conjecture is this: if certain conditions do characterize those processes, the production of the representation would be caused by that state of affairs that the representation represents as being the case. That is to say, it is exactly the fact that would make the representation an accurate one, that would also cause the representation to be produced, provided that this particular set of conditions governs its production. If, however, those conditions do not obtain, then it is not to be produced.¹⁴ The conditions referred to are called "fidelity conditions" and are generally understood to be conditions that identify well-functioning or normal systems. A thermometer, for example, may be used to tell what the temperature is. Its function is to represent the temperature, and it will do this if it is in normal working order. Similarly, in a realistic portrait, the function of the painting is to represent the portrayed--to show what the sitter looks

like. Our understanding of a particular kind of representation generating system or mechanism (e. g., realistic portraiture, naturalistic landscape, etc.) determines the range of potential representations acknowledged as the appropriate output relative to a particular system or mechanism. This is central to understanding how to look at pictures and to our specification of the content of a picture since content amounts to what would cause the representation under the relevant conditions of fidelity.

For example, if one encounters a picture that goes by the title "Portrait of Ronald Reagan", one would ordinarily expect it to have been produced by an artist who intended to show what Reagan looks like and intends that the picture be taken in that way. Sincerity and some level of competence are expected or presupposed by the viewer. That is, one assumes that those things that would make the picture an accurate picture of what Reagan looks like form a part of what brings the picture into existence. To know how to look at the picture, how to understand it, is to know what would be the case if these conditions obtained. Without such knowledge, it would not be possible to form an interpretation of the picture. It should be noted here that fidelity conditions might hold even for inaccurate representations. Fidelity conditions are those under which an interpretation of the representation would be *reasonable to accept*. They are conditions governing the *production* of the representation and are not to be identified with conditions governing the accuracy of the picture. So to specify the content, one forms the conditional hypothesis that if fidelity conditions hold, a thing's having the properties it does would cause the representation to have the properties it does. Altering the conditions for fidelity, however, would significantly alter the set of reasonable interpretations. If a shop assistant were taken off the job and used as a model for St. Eloy in the painting by Petrus Christus, then the religious and iconographical system of fifteenth-century netherlandish painting would dictate which properties are to be understood as expressed by the work of art. Knowing how to look at such a picture is to understand the functional role that pictures of this kind play within a system of such representations. In this case, those things that would make the picture an accurate representation of St. Eloy are what play the relevant causal role in the production of the picture. If fidelity conditions obtain, it would be reasonable to accept "Eloy was a goldsmith" as true. In general.

interpreting a picture amounts to forming a conditional hypothesis that if fidelity conditions hold, then O's being F would cause R to be G.

We are now in a position to see what would constitute an inaccuracy or misrepresentation. First off, there is a true subjunctive conditional, viz., if fidelity conditions hold, then O's being F would cause R to be G. But a correct interpretation will not necessarily reflect the actual *causal* explanation. All the interpretation provides is an hypothesis concerning what state of affairs would cause R if fidelity conditions hold. The representation is accurate if and only if that of affairs obtains. It is not necessary that the state of affairs *cause* the production of the representation. "Representations may quite by chance or accident be accurate, as statements may merely chance to be true."¹⁵

Suppose I draw a picture of the Temple of Fortuna in Rome and operate within a realistic representational system, which means that as an artist I am (to put it roughly) depicting the way the Temple looks to a typical observer under relatively normal viewing conditions. Furthermore, assume the Temple has thirteen columns. but that my picture, which otherwise looks just like the Temple of Fortuna, represents it as having only twelve columns. Now you, as viewer, have available the following true hypothesis: If fidelity conditions hold, then the Temple's having twelve columns would be cause the picture to show twelve columns, and it would be reasonable to accept "The Temple of Fortuna has twelve columns" as true. But in this case, fidelity conditions have failed us, I have made a mistake, and as consequence we are left with a misrepresentation of the Temple. By way of contrast, suppose that under the influence of my superstitious beliefs I intended to represent only twelve columns but miscounted and accidentally gave the picture the correct number of columns. The picture then would correspond to the actual state of affairs but only by chance. Furthermore, the cause of the picture's expressing "The Temple of Fortuna has thirteen columns" would not be due to the Temple's having thirteen columns, at least not in any straightforward kind of way. Nonetheless the picture would be accurate independent of the causes of its production. "Accuracy can only be that property a representation has if and only if the thing it represents has the properties that it represents it as having (that is, the properties it expresses)."¹⁶

So much, then, for accuracy. But what is it for a property to be *expressed* by a picture? The properties a representation expresses are the

properties that would be instantiated by something that would cause the productions of that representation, provided that certain set of conditions obtained. And recall that the set of conditions (fidelity conditions) referred to are not the conditions under which the representation would be accurate, but rather they are conditions governing the *production* of the representation.

So to summarize:

(A) Accuracy is a property R has if and only if the object of representation has the properties expressed in R.

(E) Expressed Properties are those properties of an object that would *cause* the production of R under fidelity conditions (FC).

(FC) Fidelity Conditions are conditions under which an interpretation (I) of the representation would be reasonable to accept, as being true.

And for the form of an interpretation, we have said that (I) If fidelity conditions hold, then O's being F would *cause* R to be G.

What we have here is an account of how one can tell from the content of a representation what its object might be, in such a way that explains both representation and misrepresentation. Like the Fregean view, the content is seen to play a central role in the theory but, unlike the Fregean view does not *determine* the object of representation. That would, of course, be a fatal error in a causal account. The object of representation, if one exists, is a purely extensional matter, as we have seen. Recall that R has properties G only because O has properties F and R would not be G if O were not F. The content, on the other hand, is due to counterfactual relation between properties of a thing that would cause R to be G if fidelity conditions were in order. This, of course, allows for representations of objects that do not, in fact, exist and is consistent with both fictional and metaphorical representation. What remains to be done is to check the theory against the kinds of examples frequently encountered in the literature.

Let's start with an easy one. Suppose A and B are identical twins. Twin A has his picture taken by Twin B. The resulting picture is a picture of Twin A since the physical properties of A cause the picture to have the properties it has. The picture looks the way it does only because A looks the way he does and the picture would not look the

way it does if it were not for the fact that A looks the way he does. If Twin A is wearing a Cub's uniform at the time the picture is taken, then the picture will express properties of A in conjunction with properties of a baseball player. Suppose the photograph is a straight forward picture—a snapshot taken around home plate in Wrigley Field. Then relative to an interpretation determined by the function of such pictures, e.g. photos on baseball cards indicating a player's affiliation, one concludes that it is a picture of Twin A the professional baseball player and it is reasonable to accept "A is playing for the Cubs this year" as true. If it is true of A that he is playing for the Cubs, then relative to the interpretation offered, the representation is an accurate one. However, if the situation had been different and the same photograph had been used in a news story reporting on the man who has been posing as Thad Bosley, the picture might represent A as the notorious impostor. The interpretation might be: If fidelity conditions obtain, A's being the guilty party would cause the picture to have the properties it does. And if A is, in fact, the impostor, the picture is an accurate representation of that state of affairs.

What does the theory say about the picture of an eagle that accompanies a dictionary definition? What are the properties expressed by the picture and to what do they belong? In this case, it appears there is no one thing O that is F, but rather a class of things, a *kind* of creature that one can roughly identify on the basis of a certain morphology. Application of the theory gives us that R is G only because (the species in question) is F and R wouldn't be G if O weren't F. This case as well seems unproblematic, provided one is willing to admit a type or natural kind as the object of a representation.

Let's turn to a harder example suggested by Jenefer Robinson -- a representation of Churchill as a lion. There are two important cases to consider, viz., straightforward pictures of lions and pictures of odd-looking lions that smoke cigars and sit on the Front Bench of Commons. As far as the straightforward picture of a lion goes, it seems clear that, apart from *any* contributing context, the question whether or not it represents Churchill would not even arise. I think that squares with what one would want. It can't be the case that one can simply present any image willy-nilly and expect it to take on any arbitrary meaning or refer to any individual solely because one

intends it to. However, in an appropriate context, the lion could conceivably be taken as a metaphorical representation of Churchill. For example, a lion might be pictured running in front of the troops toward the German border on the night following an inspiring speech by Churchill, indicating that Churchill is to be thought of as acting like a lion. And it is because he has acted thus and so that the expressed properties are leonine as opposed to bovine. A conceit might even take hold if artists repeatedly used the image of a lion in a visual context where one would ordinarily *expect* to see a picture of Churchill, e.g. on the Front Bench of Commons. Fewer and fewer clues would be needed in subsequent illustrations for pictorial reference to succeed. Such examples are familiar in the history of iconography.¹⁷ What is essential to the present story is that there be some plausible explanation for Churchill's behavior causing the picture to express the properties it does. Churchill's speech tonight might have been sufficient to cause the staff artist to pull his favorite drawing of the raging lion out of his file and paste it up for tomorrow's editorial page.

On one interpretation of the latter case of a composite depiction, i.e. the lion/man, we see that the picture is not intended *simply* to represent Churchill's physical appearance. That would be to miss the point. Much like the case above, one wants to represent Churchill *as fierce* and courageous. On our causal theory we don't have a problem of *who* is referred to by the picture. That gets handled in the usual way, i.e., by the rule for the representation of actual object. A subset of Churchill's physical properties fixes the *reference* (it is only because Churchill looks the way he does that this lion has some of the features that it does), while the leonine properties determine (at least a part of) the *Content* viz., the fierce and courageous aspect. Now this is not a trivial problem, this representing the properties of being fierce and courageous, even if one uses the King of Beasts to do it. Lions have a multitude of properties of which the sought after are only two. On the other hand, the problem is surely no *more* difficult than that of representing Churchill himself as fierce and courageous. The problem, in any case, is reduced to one of *expression*, not of *reference*.

Now the expressed properties are those that would be instantiated by something that would cause the productions of the representation under

fidelity conditions. But the fidelity conditions are conditions under which an hypothesis about the cause of R would be reasonable to accept. I submit that Churchill's literally being part man/part lion is not among the reasonable options. So one looks for an interpretation that does seem reasonable. Suppose for the sake of argument that there is an established practice in the history of art of using lions to represent various psychological states such as courage, strength, leadership, etc. On this basis, one may reasonably conclude that the representation is of Churchill as a man with such qualities. Of course, the picture may be ambiguous with respect to which particular qualities are represented. (I said it was no easy task to represent psychological states pictorially). If the depiction is of Churchill-as-a-lion-roaring, perhaps the field of reasonable interpretations may be more tightly constrained. Obviously, a lot more needs to be said about the problems of interpretation, but this would take us well beyond the scope of the present discussion. All we need for the moment is the assumption that reasonable interpretations could be found. As far as accuracy is concerned, it would of course be determined by whether the expressed properties were in fact qualities that Churchill possessed.

Finally, the problems of fictional reference can be handled by identifying the thing represented with whatever it is that explains the production of the representation.¹⁸ To be represented, an object need not actually exist. This is not to suggest that every non-existent object can be represented. 'It seems that non-existent can be represented so long as there is a correct specification of what is represented in which a reference to that object occurs within an intensional context, which context is created by an expression (such as 'proposed' or 'alleged') which identifies an actual occurrence which can appropriately enter into the projection of the representation. Thus we may have representations of the alleged assailant, the predicted eruption, the mythological unicorn.'¹⁹ The identity of objects such as Don Quixote or Pan are fixed within an iconological or historical tradition which gives to these fictional objects certain determinate and distinguishing properties. These properties, when expressed, are properties that *would* cause the production of the representation under fidelity conditions. What is essential once again is that there be sufficient historical basis for the determinateness of the putative object. The interesting question here has to do with the conditions determining what kind of context one needs in order to *establish* a fictional character. Again, one might want to look at the

historical conventions surrounding so-called "baptismal rights" as discussed in Kripke.²⁰

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- * I wish to thank Don Crawford and Dennis Stampe, both of whom read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper.
- (1) Jenefer Robinson, "Two Theories of Representation", *Erkenntnis* 12 (1978)
 - (2) Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976, p. 5.
 - (3) I think the intuitions here are determined by the difference in the role causality plays with respect to resemblances and representations. At the risk of getting too far ahead of ourselves, let it be said just briefly that if R represents S, it is due roughly to R's being caused by S. Given that causes must precede their effects, it follows that representation is asymmetric. Note, however, that this is not the case for resemblance relations, which accounts for the intuition that the portrayed resembles his portrait as much as the portrait resembles the portrayed).
 - (4) Ibid.
 - (5) Robinson, p. 38.
 - (6) Ibid., p. 39.
 - (7) Robinson p. 39
 - (8) Ibid., p. 46
 - (9) Ibid., p. 49
 - (10) "Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, II; reprinted in P. French, et. al., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1979.
 - (11) Ibid., p. 85
 - (12) Ibid., p. 86
 - (13) Ibid., p. 88
 - (14) Ibid., p. 89
 - (15) Ibid.
 - (16) Ibid.
 - (17) See Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconography*, New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
 - (18) See Stampe, Appendix to "Show and Tell", in *Forms of Representation*, Bruce Freed, et. al. (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1975.
 - (19) Ibid.
 - (20) Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.

The Nationality of Sublimity: Kant and Burke on the Intuition and Representation of Infinity

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There can be little question that both Kant's and Burke's theories of the sublime directly affected the way contemporaries saw and represented nature.¹ What has not been sufficiently emphasized, however, is the distinctive *nationality* of the sublime the extent to which Kant changed Burke's ideas from an identifiably German cultural perspective, and how German landscape painters inspired by Kant opened up radically new possibilities for the depiction of the sublime by executing canvases that explicitly (if not consciously) contradicted Burke's definition. My argument has three steps: in the first, I examine Kant's revision of Burke by comparing their ideas on what I see as the paradigm of the sublime, the intuition of infinity. In the second, I turn to the strong contrast in the (physical rather than mental) representations of infinity that result from their respective theories. Finally, I will suggest how the interaction of science with theories of landscape stimulated the unique depictions of the sublime that we find in German landscape painting c. 1800, depictions that are significantly different in appearance and conception from their British and French² counterparts. By putting Kant's theories in their cultural context, I seek to make the additional point that our everyday distinction between "theory" and "practice" needs to be rethought. Kant's *Critique of Judgement* is normally held to be "theoretical," to have little to do "practically" with the arts. Landscape painting is thought to have little to do with "theory." My claim, however, is that because Kant's theory of the sublime so informed German landscape painting, and because the

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visual nuances of these works can be seen to construct (and, because of the artists' familiarity with current debates about the sublime) even "argue" for new possibilities in the realm of sublimity, the division between theory and practice can be dissolved. The written and visual presentations of the sublime should not be considered in mutual isolation because of an unexamined idea of the boundaries between theory and practice.

1. Intuitions of Infinity

Kant acknowledges his debt to Burke during his discussion of the sublime in the *Critique of Judgement*³ "Burke," he claims, "... deserves to be called the foremost author" concerning the "physiological... exposition of aesthetic Judgments" (CJ, 130). This praise, however, turns out to be rather backhanded, since Kant in the same breath condemns the approach to the sublime Burke had taken in *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* of 1757 as "merely empirical" (CJ, 130). This is serious criticism indeed, because for Kant (though not for Burke) empirical data cannot command the universal assent requisite for a judgment of taste. Burke argues that the three "natural powers in man . . . , the Senses; the Imagination; and the Judgment" (E, 13) must be the same in all humanity because we must normally assume that physiology is constant. Following Locke, he posits sense data as fundamental, claims that "bodies present similar images to the whole species" (E, 13), and concludes that the imagination and Judgment, since they are based on sense, are also universal. But Kant cannot find security in physiology: if aesthetic judgments are to be universally applicable then they must be grounded "upon some *a priori* principle" (CJ, 132). Kant of course is positing the necessity of the "transcendental examination" (CJ, 132) that drives his critical philosophy

Kant's critical investigation of judgment yields one well known modification of Burke's notion of the sublime: where Burke finds that this quality can be predicated of objects themselves, Kant defines the sublime as a function of our own mind that results from the interplay of the "imagination" and "reason" under certain circumstances.

But I want to concentrate on a more subtle but perhaps more influential distinction, the presence of which is signalled by the specific timing of Kant's reference to Burke. Near the beginning of the "Analytic of the Sublime," Kant speaks of a "double mode of representing an Object as sublime" (CJ, 94), either "mathematically" or "dynamically." His nod to Burke appears in the context of the dynamically sublime, and not by accident, since it is here that Kant's ideas are closest to Burke's. "Nature considered in an aesthetic judgement as might that has no dominion over us, is *dynamically sublime* . . .," says Kant. "If we are to estimate nature as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as a source of fear . . ." (CJ, 109) This movement or agitation of the mental faculties when fear or terror is sensed is fundamental to Burke's definition of the sublime: "whatever is qualified to cause terror, is a foundation capable of the sublime" (E 131). For both thinkers, fear must be genuinely felt yet aesthetically controlled for the sublime to obtain. Burke develops his entire theory around these ideas, but Kant envisions another alternative, the "mathematically sublime." His discussion of this type precedes and radically augments the possibilities of the sublime-as-fear model.

The sublime, Kant writes, "is the name given to what is *absolutely great*" (CJ, 64), great without comparison. The estimation of this greatness, and thus of the mathematically sublime, necessarily involves *measure*, but measure of a unique kind, since Kant claims that it employs no "principle of cognition" and is thus a "concept of judgement" rather than a function of either sense or reason (CJ, 95). The measurement of greatness is not logical, since it would then require comparison; it is aesthetic and is accomplished "by the eye" (CJ, 98). At this point in the argument it seems that the Kantian notion of reason has been left behind in the adjudication of the sublime. But the opposite proves to be the case: reason and aesthetic judgment interact harmoniously to produce both that feeling which we call the sublime and to discover the ultimately transcendent nature of humanity itself.

"The idea of the comprehension of any phenomenon whatever," we are told, ". . . is an idea imposed upon us by a law of reason, which recognizes no definite, universally valid and unchangeable measure *except the absolute whole*" (CJ, 105 *Italics added*). The aesthetic estimation of

magnitude that results in the feeling of the sublime, then, must present an intuition of the absolute as one unit. This is often impossible for the mind, of course, but through a typically Kantian use of paradox, we are led to see that it is this very striving and "failure" of the imagination that produces the feeling of the sublime itself and lets us glimpse the noumenon.

The feeling of the sublime is . . . at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its estimation by reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from this very judgement of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with ideas of reason. . . . Therefore the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with reason's laws, and a displeasure that makes us alive to the feeling of the supersensible side of our being . . ." (CJ, 106).

The reference here to the concomitant pleasure and displeasure (pain) of the sublime is only superficially close to Burke. Kant's mathematical sublime relies on measurement, which, I would argue, implies a notion of perceptual clarity or distinctness and is thereby antithetical to Burke's idea of the sublime as the obscure and mysterious. For Burke, obscurity is requisite for terror, so, conversely, "when we know the full extent of any danger," he claims, "when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes" (E, 58 - 59). We can see from this that the essential difference between Kant and Burke turns ultimately on their respective intuitions of the infinite, which is the essence of the sublime for both men. Burke asserts, for example, that the idea of the infinite is "among the most affecting we have" (E.61), while Kant employs it as one of his (many) definitions of sublimity. (CJ 103). Where for Burke "to see an object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing [and] a clear idea is therefore another name for a small idea" (E.63), for Kant, measure and its attendant clarity can *help* us perceive the infinite and therefore lead us to the mathematically sublime. Kant acknowledges the potential impact of obscurity in his section on the dynamically sublime, but not before he has expanded the scope of Burke's theory. In

order to underline the potential this broadening of the category of the sublime had for artistic representation, I want at this point to examine Kant's own examples of the mathematically sublime. Both instances emphasize the perception of clarity in the estimation of magnitude and both are drawn from the realm of art.

Kant lays the groundwork for these examples by explaining that any calculation of size involves two mental procedures, apprehension and comprehension. Apprehension can proceed indefinitely and so presents no theoretical or practical difficulties. But comprehension runs into problems with duration and memory, since it must always strive for a totality or whole.

If the apprehension has reached a point beyond which the representations of sensuous intuition in the case of the parts first apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination as this advances to the apprehension of yet others, as much, then, is lost at one end as is gained at the other, and for comprehension we get a maximum which the imagination cannot exceed. (CJ. 99)

In other words, the balance has to be perfect; this can only happen in the perception of objects if we as observers station ourselves corporeally in just the right place. Kant's first example is based on experiences of the pyramids in Egypt related by "Savary," one of Napoleon's generals.

In order to get the full emotional effect of [their] size we must avoid coming too near just as much as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the representation of the apprehended parts (the tiers of stones) *is but obscure*, and produces no effect, . . . In the former, however, it takes the eye some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the summit; but in this interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the imagination has taken in the last, and so the comprehension is never complete. (CJ, 99-100. Italics added)

The feeling of the mathematically sublime is engendered by the imagination's attempt and pleasurable failure to estimate absolute greatness, to grasp the seeming infinitude of the pyramid's individual parts and overall extension. Kant also uses what he has been told of St. Peter's in Rome to emphasize this point. Here too the observer realizes "the inadequacy of

his imagination for presenting the idea of a whole within which that imagination attains its maximum, and, in its fruitless efforts to extend this limit, recoils upon itself, but in so doing succumbs to an emotional delight" (CJ, 100). The mind is presented in both cases with an intuition of the infinite through a process of (attempted) measurement. As Kant's examples show, this measurement requires a clarity of presentation that was anathema to Burke's conception of the sublime. Here too Kant inscribes the all-important human observer as the locus of judgment and sublimity.

Burke does offer a possible modification of his ideas on clarity and obscurity in two brief passages concerning what he calls the "artificial infinity." "Succession and *uniformity of parts*" (E, 74) define this type, he says, and from it "a species of greatness" (E, 139) (i. e. sublimity) can arise. The need for succession and uniformity here might seem to entail measurement, and clarity as well, but the pejorative appellation "artificial" and Burke's own definitions and examples of the sublime, which invariably emphasize the generalness and suggestiveness that follow from obscurity, make it clear that Burke's interests do not include the specificity of Kant's mathematically sublime. "The images raised by poetry are always of [an] obscure kind," he says, "... and even in painting a judicious obscurity ... contributes to the effect of the picture" (E, 62). Indeed, as I will argue more fully below, characterizations of the sublime by Kant and Burke respectively follow what was a largely German emphasis on particularity in art versus the usual British preference for the "great" (and general) lines of the ideal. We find this contrast exemplified by two of the most important art theorists of the day, Reynolds and Goethe. As Reynolds put it in his third address to the London Royal Academy, "the whole beauty and grandure of ... art consists ... in being able to get above all singular forms, local customs, particularities, and details of every kind."⁵ Goethe's scientific concerns cause him to invert the relation between universal and particular found in Reynolds' definition: "the artist," he says should "familiarize himself with inorganic matter, and with the ... operations of nature. ...

If we should form a true conception of art, we must descend to details, and to details of details."⁶ This and similar statements by Goethe offer us a key to the uniqueness of Kant's mathematical sublime and to its representation in German landscape painting.

II. Representations of Infinity

It is often said that Kant's third critique is not really about art but rather its *a priori* possibility in the faculty of judgment. While this is certainly true, we should not therefore assume that Kant's discussion of the pyramids and St. Peter's is meaningless or that his theory of the sublime was either uninformed about or uninfluential for contemporary art. The context of his references to art gives us both sides of this issue. We are shown first that the sublime may be *engendered* by aesthetic objects. On the other hand, Kant immediately recoils from his own (unusual) enthusiasm to warn that the sublime cannot (contra Burke) actually inhere in "works of art, e.g. buildings, statues and the like, where a human end determines the form" (CJ, 100), or even in natural objects that are "objectively purposive" or teleological. The one source he does allow here is "rude nature merely . . . involving magnitude" (CJ, 100), but this too is at best an occasion for the sublime, which in itself must always be ascribed to the aesthetically judging subject. But Kant has done nothing less than make it possible for us to consider art objects and those of nature *as if* they are sublime. Properly speaking, it is the effect of the mental representation given by intuition in the subject's mind that is sublime, but Kant demonstrates here that a physical representation--art--or nature itself can stimulate the process of apprehension and comprehension needed for sublimity to occur. My point is that contemporary German artists could easily have been inspired by Kant's notion of the mathematically sublime to create works that in their detail and clarity look very different from those British paintings that followed the Burkean model. Because of the applicability of Kant's theory to external nature, and because of the other specific examples he gives of the sublime--"mountain masses"; the "thunderous ocean" (CJ, 104)--it should not be a surprise that it was in the genre of landscape painting that the Germans augmented the vocabulary of the sublime. To establish the differences between Kant's mathematically sublime and Burke's notion and to underline the effect these differences had on contemporary landscape painting, I will compare two representations of the sublime that are typical, both of the approaches habitually taken by their respective schools of landscape painting--German and British--and of the focus on the Kantian (mathematical) versus the Burkean sublime. The Tyrolean Joseph Anton Koch's *Schmadribachfall* of 1823 (original version, 1811)

(Fig. 1), and Turner's *Snow Storm: Hannibal and His Army Crossing the Alps*, 1812, (Fig.2) are conventionally cited and even classic examples of the landscape sublime that are nonetheless radically dissimilar in appearance and conception. Using one painting as a synecdoche for an entire national tradition forces me to overlook distinctions and exceptions to the trend I set out, but more importantly in this context, this approach allows us to see vividly a strong and unremarked contrast between theories and representations of the sublime, a contrast that would be buried in a cross section examination of landscape paintings.

The *Schmadribachfall* by Koch (Fig.1) can be seen as an incarnation of Kant's mathematical sublime. According to the artist, this landscape is "a true portrait after nature," and he is proud of the amount of visual detail presented.⁷ Koch's claim comes from a detailed written description of the work that he supplied to a prospective buyer; his words capture the picture's most significant characteristic--and that which filiates it with Kant's mathematically sublime--the fact that each part of the surface is remarkably and equally visible. The scene, he writes,

presents a view in the Swiss Alps [A] magnificent wilderness with glacial cascades, [and] clouds--which in part veil the mountains--make up the background. In the middle you find an impenetrable forest of firs and other wild vegetation, and rock fragments intermixed with rushing water. The foreground is the depth of the valley . . . into which the water pictured above rushes.

But the traditional fore, middle, and background mentioned by Koch do not function in the usual way by leading the observer into the picture. Instead, the robust diagonal lines created by the riverbanks, the edges of the forest, and the cliffs in the upper center of the canvas form a zig-zag pattern that leads our gaze from bottom to top (or *vice versa*) in planimetric fashion, rather than moving into depth volumetrically, as the then conventional use of one-point and aerial perspective in the composition of landscape paintings would dictate. The supposedly distant mountain peaks are depicted in as much detail as the ducks in the immediate foreground, and as a result, some of Koch's contemporaries as well as more recent commentators have found his rendering of space confusing.⁸ But the clarity and visibility of Koch's *Schmadribachfall* is the touchstone of a new, and thus potentially unintelligible, aesthetic of particularity. Like the figure in the foreground, we as observers of the painting view

nature's detail; once again, the aesthetically judging subject is central. And just as in Kant's lesson about the pyramids, we are able to see everything *and* at least attempt to see it whole. Our perception of Koch's landscape then mimics the ideal conditions that Kant prescribed for the experience of the mathematically sublime. Clarity ensures that no part is missed and that we can also try to comprehend the whole in one intuition. The amount of visual information captures the idea of infinity often associated with the magnitude of the Alps, yet this same plenitude leads to the pleasurable defeat of the imagination that in turn spawns the feeling of sublimity. In addition, the visual and rational control over infinity that ultimately arises from the experience of this picture--because Koch allows us to visualize the seemingly incomprehensible multiplicity of nature--at the very least parallels Kant's doctrine of the imagination and reason working in harmony to produce the sublime. For Kant, the imagination must strive to present an intuition of infinity as one unit. In Koch's *Schmadribachfall* it is as if the exact delineation of natural phenomena makes this possible by facilitating the progressive alternation of apprehension and comprehension. As in Kant, reason operates in Koch's picture by responding to the demand for measurement by making the elements of the picture clearly visible. Finally, the interpretation of Koch's painting in terms of Kant's theory is made even more compelling by the fact that the artist attended lectures on the critical philosophy given by his friend the critic Carl Ludwig Fernow at the Villa Malta in Rome in the winter of 1795.⁹ As I will argue in the section of this paper, this intersection of ideas and individuals was no coincidence, since Fernow, Koch, and Kant were all part of a characteristically German attention to the exact details in nature and landscape painting that arose in large measure from the contemporary advent of the science of geology.¹⁰

Before turning to factors that I think help to explain the definition and pictorial representation of the mathematically sublime, however this type should be contrasted with the image of a very different sublime introduced earlier, one that trades on the darkness and obscurity favored by Burke, Turner's famous *Snow Storm: Hannibal and His Army Crossing the Alps* of 1812 (Fig. 2). As a recent critic puts it, "here indistinctness is the essence of the sublime," (Wilton. 72). The vortex of cloud engulfs Hannibal's troops, whose disarray and terror is barely seen even though it is daytime because the storm has obscured the sun. For Burke, darkness

"is terrible in its own nature," (E,144) and would have served here to heighten the sense of danger that precedes the experience of the sublime. Too much visible detail would spoil the effect, as many other British commentators contemporary with Turner also claimed. William Gilpin--one of the main theorists of the picturesque--wrote in 1791 that "many images owe their sublimity to their *indistinctness*; and frequently what we call sublime is the effect of that heat and fermentation, which ensues in the imagination from its ineffectual efforts to conceive some dark, obtuse idea beyond the grasp. Bring the same within the compass of its comprehension, and it may continue *great*; but it will cease to be *sublime*" (Wilton, 72). Obscurity was often associated with the seemingly infinite extension of mountain ranges. The Reverend Richard Warner, who published two travels through the Snowdonia region of Wales in the late 18th century, describes his descent down Mt. Snowdon in terms that also apply to Turner's *Hannibal*: "We . . . proceeded through the gloom, following the steps of our conductor, who walked immediately before us, as we literally could not see the distance of a dozen feet. The situation . . . produced an effect that was very sublime. Occasional gusts of wind . . . swept away the pitchy cloud . . . and discovered immediately below us . . . an immense descent of vacuity and horror . . ." (Wilton, 44).

By contrast, Koch's *Schmadribachfall* is totally visible; in its almost obsessive clarity it seems to invite measurement and thus to represent Kant's innovation over Burke--the mathematically sublime--while Turner's picture captures the notion of the dynamically sublime that the two thinkers had in common. I am not suggesting that representations of the sublime had to follow one or the other direction completely but rather that this somewhat polarized view allows us to see what comes down to a difference in national approaches to the sublime in landscape painting. Where almost without exception British artists will exploit the fear attendant upon indistinctness, German painters achieved the sublime by overwhelming the viewer with detail. These alternate tendencies inform all types of landscape depiction in both groups, not just that of the sublime. Until Constable, Britain's outstanding landscapists--Wilson, J. R. Cozens Gainsborough, and Turner in most of later his work¹¹--stayed away from their detail in landscapes, at least partly because they sought to make landscape like Reynolds' vision of history painting, that is, to idealize it in accordance with Renaissance and Baroque models from

Italy. British artists saw this form of idealization as both different from and superior to what they decried as a German predilection unimportant detail. The welsh landscape painter Thomas Jones, for example, upon visiting the studio of philipp Hackert (a very successful German landscapist who was a slightly older contemporary of Koch) complained that he, "Like most German artists, stud[ies] more the *Minutiae* than the grand principles" of art.¹² This judgment has persited in recent criticism, where for example, Hackert is compared unfavorably with J.R. Cozens by the editor of Jones' memoirs: "Cozens' style and manner are totally different from the dryness, pettiness and niggling detail which Hackert shows in his watercolors and the stilted elegance of his monochromes. Cozens aims at breadth and simplicity, while Hackert prided himself on the detail which he studied on the spot in his effort to reproduce faithfully the variety of nature, though he therby confused his planes and obscured the larger lines of the landscape."¹³ Another otherwise astute British commentator underlines the fact that opinion continues to be divided along national lines when he boasts that "Turner does not attempt, like a club bore, to recount endless little incidents in detail" (Wilton, 74). What is missed in these remarks is the fact that the German artists were responding to new ideas about their natural environment, not just painting detail out of ignorance.¹⁴ Kant's mathematical sublime and its embodiment by Koch are both reactions to an increasingly scientific knowledge of the physical world, a knowledge that demanded precise deliniation in a theory of the sublime and its depiction alike.

III. Science, Landscape, and the Kantian Sublime

Most of those who study Kant's *Critique of Judgement* today focus on the first part of the book, the "Critique of Aesthetical Judgement," and its discussion of the beautiful and sublime while ignoring or at best puzzling over the very inclusion of the lengthy second part, the "Critique of the Teleological Judgement." The result is often a de-contextualized reading that can impair our interpretation of Kant's thoughts on aesthetics, since as one of Kant's more perceptive contemporary readers—Goethe—discovered, the two sections are interdependent. "Here I found my two most disparate interests juxtaposed", Goethe writes, "the results of both art and science were discussed, and aesthetic and teleological judgements were mutually clarified It pleased me that poetry and comparative natural science were closely related, subject to the same standard

of judgement.”¹⁵ Kant’s critique of the faculty of judgement does indeed bring nature and art into proximity; all that divides them is the crucial but tenuous ascription of “purposiveness” to nature that Kant then applies by dividing the third critique into examinations of “aesthetical” and “teleological” judgment. And even though Kant explicitly states that aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and sublime must remain “pure” by excluding the notion of teleology, the very examples he employs show just how important purpose is to aesthetic determinations. He cannot quite exclude the possibility of human beauty, even though it “presupposes the concept of an end . . . [that] mars its purity” (CJ, 73). The same purity forces him to try to ban “works of art . . . where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude” (CJ, 100). But since Kant’s caveat appears immediately after his enthusiastic description of the pyramids and St. Peter’s that I discussed earlier, the admonition to exclude art objects from the category of the sublime is like that of the trial judge who instructs a jury to ignore a particularly juicy piece of evidence just heard. Despite his distinction between “subjective” and “objective” purposiveness in art and nature respectively, these realms are united in the makeup of the judging subject who sees them both *as if* they are teleological. Kant’s idealism allows him to discuss art as sublime even though it strictly isn’t, and it grounds the possibility of scientific investigation by permitting the *use* of teleology—of design that underlies the assumption of continuity in nature that in turn is necessary for empirical science—’ by reflective judgement as a regulative conception for guiding our investigation” (CJ, 11, 24). Nature, Kant concludes, reveals teleology to us, which is in turn an organic principle “analogous to art.”

My own end in showing the affinity between Kant’s aesthetic and teleological judgments is to bring art and science together in relation to both the mathematically sublime and its representation by Koch. Like Goethe, Kant was an important philosopher of science, so we should not wonder if his interests in this sphere informed his ideas on aesthetics. He wrote and lectured on geography and related sciences, and it is clear from his reference to Benedict de Saussur (whose *voyages dans les Alpes*, 1779-96, Sought to embody geological information in both texts and pictures) during the discussion of the sublime in the *Critique of Judgement* that Kant understood the potential for interaction between art and science.¹⁶ Both Kant and Koch were part of what a contemporary, the natural philosopher

Heinrik Steffens, identified as a foundational interest in geology that was "thoroughly German in origin."¹⁷ In Kant's case, I would argue that the concern for the specifics of geographical/geological investigation found its outlet in his idea of the mathematically sublime, that transporting feeling that could result from the knowledge and presentation in imagination of nature's details. For his part, Koch witnessed a passion for the nascent and particularly German earth sciences by citing a work on geography, A. F. Buesching's *Neu Erdbeschreibung*, 1766-69, as one of his two favorite books (the other was the Bible).¹⁸ More importantly, his *Schmadribachfall* depicts erosion caused by the falling water and glacier.¹⁹ And there is further evidence that Koch articulated controversial theories about the earth in this landscape. The picture's detail allows us to see the clouds that hang near the mountain's summit. In his *Italian Journey* of 1786-88, Goethe offers an explanation for this phenomenon: "When we look at mountains . . . now shrouded in mists or wreathed in storm-tossed clouds . . . we attribute all these Phenomena to the atmosphere . . . But for a long time I have felt convinced that the most manifest atmospheric changes are due to [mountains'] imperceptible and secret influence."²⁰ Goethe's theory of a gravitational force that holds clouds around mountains adds another scientific dimension to Koch's painting. Though we cannot be sure that the artist knew of Goethe's theory, he often noted the interactions of mountains and atmosphere in his own travel records; on one occasion, he exclaimed over the great clarity of vision caused by a cool mountain zephyr.²¹ I would claim further that the *transparency* of Koch's *Schmadribachfall* is a metaphor for a metaphysical visibility whereby these particulars operate as signs²² of man's transcendental or noumenal essence in the way prescribed by Kant's theory of the sublime.

Goethe's words once again provide a new entrance to our understanding of both Kant's and Koch's interest in scientific detail and measurement. "Look not only for something behind the phenomena, "for these are themselves the theory."²³ The very visibility found in Koch's incarnation of the mathematically sublime leads us to a realization of our own supersensible nature. For Kant, "this idea of the supersensible . . . is awakened in us by an object the aesthetic estimating of which strains the imagination to its utmost, whether in respect to its extension (mathematical), or of its might over the mind (dynamical)" (CJ, 120). The

transcendent does ground phenomena and in this Platonic way stands "behind" them, but we *discover* the noumenal sphere in the sublime precisely by looking at, rather than past or through, nature's plenitude. Art, through the sublime, makes possible what should seem beyond human capacity, contact with the noumenon. The phenomenal world pictured by Koch is ultimately but a sign for its ontological antecedent, and is transparent in this way. But even more importantly, phenomena are transparent in the sense of initiating our vision of the noumena. We could say that "visibility" makes "vision" possible.

Kant discusses the relation of man and the noumenal in the experience of the sublime under the concept of morality. "Moral ideas" are requisite for the *control* of the terror that would otherwise exist when the reason—through its laws—allows sensibility to "look out beyond itself into the infinite, which is for it an abyss" (CJ, 115). He reiterates that "human nature" itself is the seat of the sublime and argues that the "practical" sphere revealed in the aesthetic experience has ultimate dominion over nature: the "sublime in external nature . . . is only represented as a might of the mind enabling it to overcome this or that hindrance to sensibility by means of moral principles" (CJ, 124). This is said in the context of the dynamically sublime, but the reference to overcoming hindrances to sensibility applies equally to the mathematical variety. Because he has arrived at this set of assertions through *a priori* reasoning, Kant holds that man's control and superiority is universal, where Burke's notion of the sublime turns on pain and fear, and is thus merely empirical and individual. As a conclusion, I want to show briefly how this final dimension of Kant's sublime is mirrored in contemporary German landscape paintings.

Our "moral" dominion over nature is implied by the observer in Koch's painting: he surveys and in this aesthetic sense controls the seemingly infinite plenitude of nature. Looking at Koch's picture, we can do the same. Koch's knowledge of science plays a role here too, since we are able to see the great—and ultimately transcendent or noumenal—themes of the earth's dynamism through the water cycle and erosion that Koch makes visible, or the contemporary scientific theories of mountain building pictured by this and other German landscape painting.²⁴ Kant's own example of the prospect of a stormy ocean "threatening to overwhelm

and engulf everything" (CJ, 122) brings another famous image of the sublime to mind, Caspar David Friedrich's *Sea of Ice* of 1823–24 (Fig 3). While we cannot know whether or not Friedrich used Kant's theories, the painting can be fruitfully re-interpreted in terms of the mathematically sublime.

For Kant the feeling of the sublime leads to the anthropomorphic idea of morality, yet in the context of the example just cited, he is still at pains to avoid teleological thinking in order to preserve the uniqueness of the aesthetic. Thus we cannot see the ocean's sublimity in terms of its (potential) harm to man. Friedrich's painting, I would claim, is both sublime and about man as the seat of this transcendental feeling, but it is not teleological. The picture is better interpreted as an *Erdlebenbild*, an "earth-life-picture," that relies on and embodies the geognostic theories of Friedrich's close friend and art pupil, Carl Gustav Carus.²⁵ The earth-life-picture was a new category invented by Carus to replace landscape painting with a new genre that was explicitly cognizant of geological science. What is most visible in Friedrich's picture is the unstoppable force of the ice flows that, like the rock strata²⁶ that they resemble, crush the ship and its cargo. The image has traditionally been called either *The Lost North Pole Expedition* or *The Lost Hope* (the ship has been called the "Hope")²⁷ titles that emphasize the allegory of human mortality. But the original title, *The Sea of Ice*, should focus our attention in the first instance on the natural phenomena themselves. The blocks of ice move slowly but relentlessly, destroying anything in their path. The reference to man's life and hopes is quite clear from the ship, now swallowed by the ice. Man and nature are in a sense antagonists, and we can understand why a pessimistic interpretation like the following is habitually given to the image:

The blocks of ice turned skyward are an expression of the divinity of nature, and the debris of the boat represents the vulnerability of man and his inevitable failure to attain godliness; the wrecked ship itself represents the end of the 'navagatio vitae' The frozen wasteland is [also] an allusion to the paralysis that characterized German politics under the despotic administration of Metternich, and the ship is the coffin of liberty.²⁸

without denying the viability of this reading, it is possible to refine and augment it in mathematical sublime and of the scientific awareness that

defines the earth-life-picture. The allusions to the earth's history presented in Friedrich's *Sea of Ice* proclaim a much extended timeframe in which to understand the relationship between man and nature. In this context, what we see is simply the ongoing cycle of life itself. Change is visible everywhere in what might at first seem to be a frozen and immobile landscape. Our individual lives are part of an eternal rhythm of disintegration and rebirth, just as water, for example, can be seen in its various states, from solid ice and melting snow in the foreground to the saturated mists and clouds in the distance. The sublimity of this canvas does not arise only from Burke's idea of fear, but also—and equally—from Kant's theory of the pleasure attendant upon the mind's aesthetical use of reason to control nature even in its apparently infinite power and extension.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The literature on this topic is vast. For the most complete discussion and bibliography, see Andrew Wilton, *Turner and the Sublime*, exh. cat., Yale Center for British Art and The Art Gallery of Ontario, 1980. Subsequent references to this work, abbreviated Wilton; are included in the text.
2. French landscapists concerned with the sublime by and large followed Burke, often as he was interpreted by Diderot. See Ian J. Lochhead, *The Spectator and the Landscape in the Art Criticism of Diderot and his Contemporaries* (Ann Arbor, 1982): 12-13. My focus in this paper is on the contrast between British and German theories and representations of the sublime.
3. I. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford, 1928). References to this work, abbreviated CJ, will be included in the text.
4. Ed. by J.T. Boulton (Notre Dame, 1958). References to this work, abbreviated E, will be included in the text. Kant knew the German trans. published by Hartknock in 1773.
5. Sir Joshua Reynolds, *Discourses on Art*, ed. Robert Wark (New Haven, 1975): 44.

6. Goethe, "Introduction to the Propylaen," in *Goethe on Art*, ed., trans. by John Gage (Berkeley, 1980): 6, 14. The new and especially German attention to the particular is discussed by H. Dieackmann in "Aesthetic Theory and Criticism in the Enlightenment," in *Introduction to Modernity, A Symposium on Eighteenth Century Thought*, ed. R. Mollenauer (Austin, 1965, 65-105): 66.
7. This and the following passage are from a letter to Johann Peter von Langer, in O. R. v. Lutterotti, *Joseph Anton Koch 1768-1839*. (Berlin, 1940): 148, my trans.
8. See R. Zeitler, *Klassizismus und Utopia Figura 5*, (Stockholm, 1955): 178-79.
9. See C. L. Fernow, *Romische Studien*, (Zurich, 1806).
10. This is not to suggest that British artists were not interested in science, but that their concern tended to the atmosphere rather than to the earth, as witnessed by Luke Howard's famous cloud studies.
11. Wilton insists that Turner's indistinctness is actually a form of "realism," a way to capture a scene persuasively. (74) While I think this is right, the contrast with the typically German attention to visible detail still holds.
12. Jones, *Memoirs*, *The Walpole Society* (XXXII, 1946-48): 117.
13. A. P. Oppe, *Alexander and John Robert Cozens* (London, 1952): 142.
14. I have examined the art historical aspects of this point in greater detail in "The Taste for phenomena: Mount Vesuvius and Transformations in Late 18th-Century European Landscape depiction," *Wallraf-Richartz-Jahrbuch* (XLV, 1984, 131-44) and "The 'Only School' of Landscape Revisited: German Visions of Tivoli in the 18th Century," *IDEA* (IV, 1985, 133-46).
15. Goethe, "Influence of the New philosophy" (1817) in *Botanical Writings*, trans. Bertha Meuller (Honolulu, 1952): 230.
16. A great deal has been written on this general interdependence in recent years. See especially Barbara M. Stafford, *Voyage Into Substance: Art, Science, Nature and the Illustrated Travel Account, 1760-1830* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984) and the two special issues of the *Art Journal*, Summer and Fall, 1984.
17. Steffens, *Geognostische - geologische Aufsätze als Vorbereitung zu einer innern Naturgeschichte der Erde* (Hamburg, 1810): 147. My trans. Historians of science generally agree.
18. Lutterotti, *Koch*: 4.

19. I have discussed Koch's knowledge of geology in greater detail in "Revision and Exploration: German Landscape Theory and Depiction in the Late 18th Century" (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1982). More recently, and independently, Timothy Mitchell has discussed related issues in "Caspar David Friedrich's *Der Watzmann*: German Romantic Landscape Painting and Historical Geology," *The Art Bulletin* (LXVI, No.3, Sept., 1984, 452-64).
20. Goethe, *Italian Journey*, trans. W.H. Auden and E. Meyer (Harmondsworth, 1970): 31-32.
21. See Thomas Musper, "Das Reissenskizzenbuch von Josef Anton Koch aus dem Jahre 1791" (*Jahrbuch der Preussischen Kunstsammlung*, 1935, 167-93) 189.
22. For an excellent discussion of semiology in the German Enlightenment, see David E. Wellbery, *Lessing's LAOCOON: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge, England, 1984).
23. Goethe, *Maximen und Reflexionen*, No. 488, in *Goethes Werke* (Hamburger Ausgabe, 1960), Band 14. 432. My trans.
24. See notes 14 and 19.
25. I have argued this point in detail in "Revision and Exploration," and "The Taste for Phenomena." Corroboration comes from Mitchell's article, cited in note 19.
26. Friedrich's depiction of the ice was based—following Carus' suggestion—on specimens seen along the banks of the Elbe river near Dresden. The sediment that would have been mixed with this ice during spring breakup accounts for the fact that the blocks in Fig.3 look more like earth or rock than ice.
27. See W. Stechow, "Caspar David Friedrich und 'Der Griper'" *Festschrift für Herbert von Einem* (Berlin, 1965. 241-46).
28. *German Masters of the Nineteenth Century*, exh. cat., (N.Y. and Toronto, 1981): 112.

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On Rorty on Derrida on Heidegger on Representation with a Parable on Sending by Kafka

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The proper task of this paper, in compliance with the Editor's kind mandate, is to represent to the readers the "philosophical background of the modern concept of representation as developed by Derrida, Rorty, Foucault and others." To do so in full might very well amount to rehearsing or rewriting the entire history of Western philosophy, which is surely more than I can deliver or you wish to be burdened with. A background, however, cannot maintain its proper rear or marginal position without the foregrounded contour, at least, of a central figure, here that "concept of representation" itself as "developed by Derrida . . . and others." The title I chose represents the centrality of these figures to my present concern. It also represents some mediations, antecedents and detours with regard to these central figures and the original assignment, as well as abstentions and omissions (but can omissions be represented ?)

Thus it is not the false modesty conventionally required in alluding to one's own contribution which prevents me from adding my own name at the head (actually the chronological tail) of the list heading my title. You will by now of course have begun reading Ron on Rorty and so on (a rather alluring alliteration), but convention dictates that this fact should be indicated by the signature of the undersigned (or someone else's attribution of authorship) which belongs at the bottom of the text and outside of it rather than in the title. If this is so it is perhaps because a title, presumed to be provided by the author, counts as an integral part of the text, whose purpose is to name its theme or present its contents. This consideration already lets loose a hornets' nest of Derridean questions. Is it

true that signatures are extraneous to the texts to which they must be appended ? For what reason, under what conditions and what sanctions must the trace of the signatory be effaced from the text proper ? Are titles really names, or are they to be construed differently ? And if, as I have pretended to have complacently assumed above, they are integral to the text which they name and head, then why should a text name itself ? Why should it in addition to naming (describing, representing etc.) its object, also double itself within itself with a suspended name ? How does the extra spacing which keeps the title hovering over the actual body of the text make this doubling possible or perhaps necessary ? And if the title is not integral to the text proper, why should it be odd for the author's name to figure in it ? Are signatures and titles then two different modes of externality ? of integrality ? Of liminality ? How different ? And what of forewords, prefaces, footnotes, appendices, editor's notes, blurbs, epigraphs, quotations, plagiarisms, marginalia, epilogues, codas, *envelopes* ? What of potential items withheld but actually discussed in the text itself by way of digression ?

If the concept of title can give us so much trouble, (as it should, if we are as serious as Derrida about what is at stake in the integrity of the text), then what can we make of the concept of representation, the modern one, specifically ? What ultimately (but is that really the end ?) of the concept of concept ? This would raise the specter of Hegel, and if my head list does not extend further ahead, from Heidegger back to him, it is not merely because he is too heavy a figure for the alliterative symmetry to be in good taste. And it is not because of *false* modesty or even just lack of space that I fail to survey not only Hegel but also Kant, Descartes, Aristotle and Plato on representation, to name but the principal parties to the adventures of representation in the West. Apart from any question of competence to take on this formidable tradition, it would be merely following Derrida's example to ask what guarantee we might have for there being such a thing as a concept of representation, whether ancient or modern, for all or some of these authors to have written on. For if such a concept there be, must it not be a *unitary* one ? Should it not maintain a certain essence, ground or core, its own fixed identity, through thick and thin, Greek and Latin, French and German, ordinary and philosophical usage ? This type of problem, though phrased with less rhetorical *elan*, would undoubtedly seem more familiar to readers of recent English philosophy than quibbling about titles.

Somewhat surprisingly, although finally not quite unexpectedly, we have been witnessing especially during the past decade an interesting convergence between some radical trends Anglo-American philosophy and equally radical outgrowths of the Continental European tradition. There exists by now a whole mini-tradition of attempts at a *rapprochement* between the later Wittgenstein and Derrida.¹ Particularly effective in bringing Derrida's impact into line with current philosophical concerns in the English-writing world has been Richard Rorty, who identifies himself as a Wittgensteinian and a Pragmatist.²

In his major book to date, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: University Press 1979), Rorty set out to debunk the claim of mainstream "normal" philosophy, especially since Kant, to be the foundational discipline adjudicating the claims to knowledge of all branches of cultural activity. According to this view, says Rorty, "to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense to do so.)"³ The "analytic" philosophy stemming from Frege and Russell is, in this respect, one more variant of Kantian philosophy, "a variant marked principally by thinking of representation as linguistic rather than mental."⁴ The hyperdevelopment of Anglo-American philosophy of language in our century has led in fact to a growing segregation of philosophy as a specialized academic discipline. Much the same fate befell the attempt of Husserl's phenomenology to ground the study of the mind in equally procedures (with possibly the exception of Ingarden's application to literary theory, which has been found useful by a number of literary theorists). "The result was," says Rorty, "that the more 'scientific' and 'rigorous' philosophy became, the less it had to do with the rest of culture and the more absurd its traditional pretensions seemed."⁵ The Law was being laid where those for whose sake it was presumably necessary could not gain access to it.

What is to blame for this situation is the notion, prevalent at least since Descartes, that a set of presuppositions determining the nature of the knowing subject is discoverable *a priori*. This assumption is what gives

rise to the search for a general theory of representation, "all representation, in familiar vocabularies and those not yet dreamed of, "emphasizes Rorty.⁶ Carried one step further towards the absurd one might say that the theoretical project of systematic philosophy amounts to a desire to discover "representations which cannot be gainsaid," a single vocabulary which would definitively wear its truth-value on its sleeve. To go beyond what Rorty has chosen to make explicit, the mainstream search for a general theory of representation may thus seem as not so remote from the wacky attempts at constructing a foolproof universal language.

Over against this conception of philosophy Rorty sets the example of what may seem at first a rather odd threesome of major figures: "If we have a Deweyan conception of knowledge, as what we are justified in believing, then we will not imagine that there are enduring constraints on what can count as knowledge, since will see 'justification' as a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between 'the knowing subject' and 'reality.' If we have a Wittgensteinian notion of language as a tool rather than a mirror, we will not look for necessary conditions of the possibility of linguistic representation. If we have a Heideggerian conception of philosophy, we will see the attempt to make the nature of the knowing subject a source of necessary truths as one more self-deceptive attempt to substitute a 'technical' and determinate question for that openness to strangeness which initially tempted us to begin thinking."⁷

In the concluding section of his book Rorty sets out to restore dignity to this type of anti-philosophical philosopher by introducing a distinction between two kinds of philosophers, "mainstream" or "systematic" on the one hand and "peripheral" or "edifying" on the other. This is how the latter kind are characterized: "These peripheral, pragmatic philosophers are skeptical primarily about *systematic philosophy*, about the whole project of universal commensuration. In our time Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger are the great edifying, peripheral thinkers. All three make it as possible to take their thought as expressing views on traditional philosophical problems (...). They make fun the classic picture of man, picture which contains systematic philosophy, the search for universal commensuration in a final vocabulary. They hammer away at the holistic point that words take their meaning from other words rather than by virtue of their representative character, and the corollary that vocabularies acquire their privilege from the men who use them rather than from their transparency to the real."⁸

Derrida clearly belongs in Rorty's class of "peripheral" philosophers. an epithet he would most likely not be inclined to disown, even though not always for the same reasons. He is perhaps the most prominent such philosopher currently active on the Continental scene. It comes as no surprise then to learn that his views on representation (insofar as they entitle him to have anything called 'views') are intensely critical, not to say heretical. There is hardly an item in his already-voluminous production which does not in some way bear upon the problem(s) of representation and related notions, the most important of which, in the present context, will be those of translation and communication. Simplified in the extreme on the classic concept of representation his position might be summarily presented as follows: to represent is to make present again, i. e. restore a lost presence; representation is nothing if not adequate to its object; the possibility of adequate representation depends on the accurate, safe and permanent encapsulation of a word, an idea or a thing, it is in this that their ideality consists and only this can guarantee the possibility of their retrieval; translation is the transfer of a retrievable presence from verbal representation into another, from one language into another, from one medium to another; communication is the successful sending and receiving of properly encapsulated presences (=messages) by subjects competent to pack and unpack them. BUT, argues Derrida, again, this ideal encapsulation *never takes place*, is impossible, inconceivable. Hence an utterly reductive hypersimplification of his stance might say bluntly: no representation, no translation, no communication. Not really. That is to say, not ideally.

But this is a gross misrepresentation, for reductive simplification and bluntness are utterly foreign to Derrida's temperament as a writer. The truth of this statement will be borne out by a reading of any of his exemplary texts. For starters (for further reading) one might suggest "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Philosophical Text"⁹ or "The Double Session,"¹⁰ whose richness and subtlety defy any attempt at summary presentation. More conveniently to our purpose is a more recent text entitled in its abbreviated English translation (the text was curtailed; the title actually got expanded) "Sending: On Representation."¹¹ This was delivered as the opening paper in a congress of French-language philosophical societies held at Strasbourg in 1980 and devoted to the theme of representation. It is entirely characteristic of Derrida's procedure to take in as the legitimate scope of his address the entire history of

Western philosophy as well as the actual circumstances of its delivery, Typically, again, he begins his sliding attack on the topic with a truncated quote (but can a quote be whole?), this time from "the French philosopher Henri Bergson" dated 1901: "Our word¹² representation is an equivocal word which ought never, according to its etymology, to designate an intellectual object presented to the mind for the first time. It ought to be reserved . . .' etc."¹³ Reserving further commentary much further in his presentation, Derrida thus somewhat ironically introduces the most original motif of his early philosophical work, the insistence on the non-originality of all that counts as origin in Western philosophical systems. Already in his first book he challenged Husserl's principle of the privilege of the present moment, a major premise of the latter's phenomenology, by arguing that "the presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse."¹⁴ This, as Edward Casey reminds us, "derives from the rules that 'absolute ideality is the correlate of indefinite repetition.'" "Intellectual objects presented to the mind for the first time" would be among the easier casualties of Derrida's general offensive against the singularity, simplicity, indivisibility etc. of origins (provided, of course, that this offensive is judged to be successful).

On the one hand, then, Derrida insists that repetitions doubling is always insidiously at work in the heart of the same. On the otherhand, however, he no less insidiously insinuates that the same in its absolute ideality is never quite reproducible. The principle invoked here is that no word, concept or thing ever makes its appearance except in an absolutely different context which no description can exhaust nor any code fully determine.¹⁵ Thus from the early stages of his address he introduces the word 'representation' and its grammatical derivatives in a variety of idiomatic uses whose nuances defy translateability (certainly, on some occasions, the generally able translators of this particular text). The semantic unity of the concept thus put in jeopardy might seem to be in some part saved by the orderly distribution of themes among sections of the congress proposed by the organizers in order "to avoid too great a dispersion." But here Derrida reminds his colleagues of a standard by which this orderly division is already judged fatal to any genuine philosophical pretension. 'You must imagine Socrates arriving in the early dawn of this Symposium, tipsy, late and asking: 'You tell me that there is aesthetic, political, metaphysical, historic, religious and epistemological representation (. . .), but in the end (. . .), you have not answered

the question: what is representation in itself and in general? What makes all these representations representations called by the same name? What is the *eidos* of representation, the being representation of representation?" Having said this Derrida pulls the ground from under the platonic question by commenting that "Socrates would never have been able to ask this kind of question about the word representation" because this word "translates no Greek word in any obvious way, leaving nothing aside." A metaphysical somersault is completed with the very next sentence declaring that "this is not one problem of translation among others, it is the problem of translation itself."¹⁶

It would seem then to be Derrida's standard procedure in addressing a congress of French-language philosophical societies, whether in Strasbourg or Montreal, to chip away at the ideality of the proposed theme concept by attacking its semantic unity and stability, while at the same time multiplying references to the actual context in which the discourse is being uttered. Thus in addition to the cognitive sense of representation, which is the one that usually gets discussed in philosophical gatherings, he strategically highlights another important sense of this word, a legal or political one: "We are mandated, in one way or another, under some degree of legitimacy, to represent those [philosophical] societies here. We may be considered more or less explicitly instructed representatives, delegates, ambassadors, emissaries, I prefer to say envoys."¹⁷ He goes on to recall that "the event takes place in a city which, while it does not, as it once very symbolically did, lie outside of France, is nevertheless not just a French city. This frontier city is a place of passage and of translation . . ." Is this a gratuitous historical or geographical digression? No, it leads right back to the big two-hearted river which is the subject itself (actually more Heraclitus' than Hemingway's): "It will be neither possible nor legitimate to overlook the enormous historical stake in this question of Latino-Germanic translation and of the relation between representation and the Stellen of *Vorstellung* or *Darstellung*. For some centuries it has been the case that as soon as a philosopher, of no matter what linguistic habits, engaged in an inquiry into *representatio*, *Vor-* or *Darstellen*, he finds himself on both sides of the frontier, on both banks of the Rhine. . ."¹⁸ Part of the trouble seems to reside in the prefix which provoked Bergson's condemnation (and which Derrida submits to a subtler and more learned discussion than can be reproduced here): "As represen-

tation,' in the philosophical code or in ordinary language, *Vorstellen* seems to mean simply, as Heidegger emphasizes, to place, to dispose before oneself, a sort of theme or thesis. But this sense of being-before is already at work in 'present.' *Praesentatio* signifies the fact of presenting and *repraesentatio* that or rendering present, of summoning as a power-of-bringing-back-to-presence."¹⁹

An implication of the prefix is the only thing which prevents Heidegger from figuring as the unqualified hero of Derrida's "Envoi." It is out of the latter's essay "The Age of the world Picture"²⁰ that he "lifts out," as he says, the "most palpable articulation" of the problem(s) of representation and the history of philosophy: "the Greek world did not have a relation to what-is as to a conceived image or a representation (here *Bild*). There what-is is presence; and this did not, at first, derive from the fact that man would look at what-is and have what we call a representation (*Vorstellung*) of it as the mode of preception of a subject. In a similar way, in another age (and it is about this sequence of ages or epochs, *Zeitalter*, arranged to be sure in a nonteleological fashion but grouped under the unity of a destiny of Being as fate [*envoi*]. *Geschick*, that I would like to raise the question later on), the Middle Ages related itself essentially to what-is as to an *ens creatum*. 'To be something that-is' ('*etre-un-etant*') means to belong to the created order; this thus corresponds to God according to the analogy of what-is (*analogia entis*), but, says Heidegger, the being of what-is never consists in an object (*Gegenstand*) brought before man, fixed, stopped, available for the human subject who would possess a representation of it. This will be the mark of modernity. 'That what-is should become what-is in representation (literally in the being-represented, in der *Mor_estelltheit*), this is what makes the epoch (*Zeitalter*) which gets to this point a new epoch in relation to the preceding one.' It is thus only in the modern period (Cartesian or post-Cartesian) that what-is is determined as an object present before and for a subject in the form of *repraesentatio* or *Vorstellen*."²¹

Taking a deep breath after this lengthy quote we might pause to note that the modern conception of representation was, according to this view, the work of men like Descartes and his rationalist and empiricist followers during the 17th and 18th centuries. Rather than seek to modernize it even further, or replace it with a better, updated concept of representation, men like Heidegger, Derrida or Rorty propose to deconstruct it as thoroughly and as definitively as they can.

But has Heidegger's epochal model done the job for representation in all its senses without residue? Derrida seems to adhere to this model so closely that he feels inclined to apologize to his colleagues and compatriots for his quasi-reverential treatment of Heidegger. He notes approvingly that the latter does not view the modern reign of representation as a mere accident in the history of the West; and he warns against the illusion that undermining the authority of representation might or should accomplish "some rehabilitation of immediacy, of original simplicity, of presence without repetition or delegation."²² And yet if neither by accident nor by teleological design, how could the modern age arise? "Now if for the Greeks, according to Heidegger, the world is not essentially a *Bild*, an available image, a spectacular form offered to the gaze or to the preception of a subject; if the world was first of all presence (*Anwesen*) which seizes man or attaches itself to him rather than being seen, intuited (*angeschaut*) by him, if it is rather man who is taken over and regarded by what-is, it was nevertheless for the world as *Bild*, and then as representation, to declare itself among the Greeks, and this was nothing less than Platonism."²³ "The world of Platonism would thus have given the send-off for the reign of representation, it would have destined it without itself being subjected to it."²⁴

It is thus through this original reading of the seamless web of *Anwesenheit* by the Platonic idea that Derrida's critique of Heidegger begins to emerge. Only such a reading of Platonism, he seems to suggest, enables Heidegger to detach the modern age and single it out from the Greek and yet keep them, however secretly, still unified. Heidegger is thus seen to maintain the restitutive value of the *re-* of representation, which thus tempts one to say, as Derrida puts it, that "it is itself detached, sent, delegated, taking the place of what in it dissembles itself, suspends itself, reserves itself, retreats and retires there, namely *Anwesenheit* or even presence."²⁵ But Derrida, as Edward Casey notes helpfully in this connection, does *not* view representation as any mode of restoration of the same at all: "As repetition is the production of difference within the same—and not at all a return to the strictly self-identical—the 'originary' activity of representation qua representation is disseminative rather than gathering or unifying. With this programmatic point in hand, Derrida can add that Heidegger's epochal interpretation of the age or representation as derivative from the era of Greek presence—however admirably indirect

this derivation may be — itself depends on an unanalyzed model of representation as delegation-of-power."

Derrida summarizes this epigrammatically by writing that "everything begins by referring back (*par le renvoi*), that is to say, does not begin."²⁶ One consequence is that "we shall not be able to assign periods or have some period of representation follow upon these *renvois*. As soon as there are *renvois*, and it is always already, something like representation no longer waits and we must perhaps arrange to tell this story differently"²⁷ But according to what other narrative paradigm, what law? And can the law itself be represented, or is it irrepresentable, the product of what is not representable in the endless back-referencing of back references or its cause through the prohibition of representation? With such formulations Derrida place himself in the vicinity of questions long debated in the Judaic tradition, and he finds/no better way to slide to a stop then by summarizing his reading of Kafka's parable from *The Trial*, "Before the Law" "The guardian of the law and the man from the country are 'before the law,' *Vor dem Gesetz*, says Kafka's title, only at the cost of never coming to see it, never being able to arrive at it. It is neither presentable nor representable, and the 'entry' into it, according to an order which the man from the country interiorizes and gives himself, is put off until death."²⁸

I have now successfully concluded my refutation of Derrida on representation (communication and translation). If you now for sure know what his views on this subject are, then they must have been translated, represented and communicated to you through the agency of my reference-studded text. There is, of course, the alternative possibility that you have no clear and distinct idea of Derrida on representation. But then I would ask you to take my text as the illustration of a successful act of communication Derrida's success in communicating to me his convictions about irrepresentability, his skepticism, his mannered obscurity perhaps, a success which his views (if they did not rule out his having something called 'views') presumably rule out. So, if I have abused of the Editor's kind mandate. I shall not continue to do so by pressing any further the ludicrous claim to have been in any sense duly delegated to represent before you the truth on Rorty on Derrida on Heidegger.

As to the parable on sending by Kafka, it is to be introduced by a brief narrative: in May 1983 Derrida visited Jerusalem and read at the Van Leer Institute a text entitled "Before the Law," Called upon the next day

as one of four commentators to comment on Derrida's commentary of Kafka's parable gave a representation, which is hereby reproduced: knowing I was to speak last, and knowing that by then, that is now, all relevant comments will have been made, I decided simply to repeat to you Derrida's message so as to offer my own insignificant refutation of it. What I have in mind is not only the message contained in the speech he uttered last night in that other auditorium with the spacious and loftily-mounting open staircases (I mean at the Van Leer Institute, of course), but also, if possible, the message he has been whispering to me personally over some years, on several occasions when I saw him in 'live' performance as well as many others when his masterly presence had to be supplemented as best it could by written texts.

Yet sitting at my desk by the window, as this beautiful Jerusalem evening was falling (but this is perfectly ordinary in this town). I had great difficulty figuring out that message to myself. I also had to figure out a way of representing it to you, which would be both appropriate for the occasion and, at the same time, fail entirely, if possible, to disfigure the message brought us by our distinguished visitor from another country.

It occurred to me at last, that since Derrida has told me time and time again, that a message cannot ever simply be figured out and represented in the original splendor of its ideal identity, I simply could not tell you WHAT he said (in any event I suppose that you have heard *that* as well as I did). But this does not mean that he is utterly immune to any form of repetition.

To show that one has grasped Derrida's meaning, I thought, one would have to *do*, however humbly, what he did, for instance last night. So instead of presuming to speak about something I decided to present you with another text, my own message.

That I cannot do so *properly*, of this I am sorely aware. For if I wished to do it properly, for instance, cater to the special communicative needs of a privileged addressee, our guest then I would have had to whisper his message back to him in his own (or his mother's) tongue, in this case "the language of Racine." But in French I would necessarily have been, in the words of King James (*Exodus*: 6:30), "of uncircumcized lips" (although true to my name). En plus, plusieurs des spectateurs assembles dans cette belle sale spacieuse sans murs en serait reduits, pour citer les mots

qui ne figurent pas dans la traduction de King James (*Exodus*: 20:18), a "voir les voix" sans les entendre.

שזה מה שהיה קורה לוורידה עצמו אילו החבקשתי עכשיו
לדבר דווקא עברית. אני חושב

As soon as I reached the decision thus to proceed, my worst problem became a terrible sense of insecurity. This led me to cast about for authorities to protect this poor miserable brainchild of mine, my little public oration on ideal representation. I was quite ready to give up in despair when an old friend of mine, an ex-con of hispanic (some say Jewish) origin (and this information rules out pierre Menard) gave me the common-sense advice to go ahead and dream up my authorities, if I found their presumed protection so necessary.

The reality principle then directed me to the work of Jacques Lacan, an authority if there ever was one, because I thought I could sniff out, in last night's address, especially around the hairy spots, some traces of his "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'" — Poe's, that is. But there again, the way was blocked as far as this short short-notice Presentation was concerned, for I know — having helped to carry over to America "The Purveyor of Truth" and being dimly aware of Barbara Johnson's contribution to this subject — I know, alas, that, to do that properly I would have to fight my way through a huge crowd of arguments, crammed to bursting with their own refuse.

Having thus broached my message the back way, as it were, I can finally place it before you. It is an imperial message, Kafka's imperial message, it starts out as an event incontestable in its eventness, taking its origin in a bed before being carried up through loftily-mounted staircase, it is seen but not heard, repeated but most likely not understood, its content is irretrievable although its context is as transparent as the space of this auditorium, its signatory becomes dead upon sending it off, its addressee would be dead if it could ever reach him, out there, in the country, where he cowers in deference to a word which is law. To conclude, let me point out that Kafka's "Imperial Message" reproduces rigorously the problematic of an earlier paper of Derrida's, a paper entitled "Signature événement contexte," which shares with last night's address the

common feature of having been produced for a foreign audience on a foreign continent, where to all intents and purposes the Anglo-American mode of philosophizing is

law. You may overhear now, as Kafka's message is being whispered back to Derrida.

AN IMPERIAL MESSAGE

The Emperor, so it runs, has sent message to you the humble subject, the insignificant shadow cowering in the remotest distance before the imperial sun; the Emperor from his deathbed has sent a message to you alone. He has commanded the messenger to kneel down by the bed, and has whispered the message to him; so much store did he lay on it that he ordered the messenger to whisper it back into his ear again. Then by a nod of the head he has confirmed that it is right. Yes, before the assembled spectators of his death—all the obstructing walls have been broken down, and on the spacious and loftily-mounting open staircases stand in a ring the great princes of the Empire—before all these he has delivered his message. The messenger immediately sets out on his journey; a powerful, an indefatigable man; now pushing with his right arm, now with his left, he cleaves a way for himself through the throng; if he encounters resistance he points to his breast, where the symbol of the sun glitters; the way, too, is made easier for him than it would be for any other man. But the multitudes are so vast: their numbers have no end. If he could reach the open fields how fast he would fly, and soon doubtless you would hear the welcome hammering of his fists on your door. But instead how vainly does he wear out his strength; still he is only making his way through the chambers of the innermost palace; never will he get to the end of them; and if he succeeded in that

nothing would be gained; he must fight his way next down the stair; and if he succeeded in that nothing would be gained; the courts would still have to be crossed; and after the courts the second outer palace; and once more stairs and courts; and once more another palace; and so on for thousands of years; and if at last he should burst through the outermost gate—but never, never can that happen—the imperial capital would lie before him, the center of the world, crammed to bursting with its own refuse. Nobody could fight his way through here, least of all one with a message from a dead man—But you sit at your window when evening falls and dream it to yourself.

Notes and References

1. Of. Newton Carver's preface to *Speech and Phenomena Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); Marjorie Greene, "Life, Death and Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein and Derrida," *Partisan Review* 43 (1976), pp. 265-279; Joseph Margolis, "vs. (Wittgenstein, Derrida," which the author has kindly allowed me to see in manuscript.
2. He has written three essays on Derrida: "Derrida on Language Being and Abnormal Philosophy," *The Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1977), pp. 673-681; "Philosophy as a kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," in *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982); "Deconstruction and Circumvention," forthcoming in *Critical Inquiry*, which he has kindly permitted me to read prior to publication.
3. *Mirror of Nature*, P. 3.
4. *Ibid.*, P. 8.
5. *Ibid.*, P. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, P. 9.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, P. 368.
9. In *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago

- University Press, 1982), pp. 207-271.
10. In *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1981) pp. 173-285.
 11. Trans. Peter and Marry Ann Caws, *Social Research* 49 (1982) 294-326. The full original text is "Envoi," *Actes du XVIIIe congrès des sociétés de philosophie de langue française* (Paris: Vrin, 1982) pp. 5-22. I am grateful to Tom Paper of Yale University for making available to me this hard-to-get publication.
 12. That is to say, *their* word 'representation' Could the same be said of *ours* ?
 13. "Sending," p. 295.
 14. *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 52. This quotation with Casey's comment come from the latter's unpublished paper "Origin(s) in/of Heidegger/Derrida," which he has graciously let me read.
 15. In Derrida's first period the ambivalent status of representation within the metaphysics of presence was paradigmatically represented by the "classical concept of writing." In "Signature Event Context" (*Margins*, pp. 307-330) he enumerates three "essential predicates in a minimal determination of this concept": "1. A written sign, in the usual sense of the word,

is therefore a mark which remains, which is not exhausted in the present of its inscription, and which can give rise to an iteration both in the absence of and beyond the presence of the empirically determined subject who, in a given context, has emitted or produced it (. . .). 2. By the same token, a written sign carries with it a force of breaking with its context, that is, the set of presences which organize the moment of its inscription. This force of breaking is not an accidental predicate, but the very structure of the written. (. . .). No context can enclose it. Nor can any code (. . .). 3. This force of rupture is due to the spacing which constitutes the written sign: the spacing which separates it from other elements of the internal contextual chain (. . .) but also from all the forms of a present referent (. . .) that is objective or subjective" (p. 317). The text from which this passage is extracted was originally (?) in its own (?) words, "A communication to the Congrès international des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française, Montreal, August 1971. The theme of the colloquium was 'Communica-

- tion'." Delivered in this bilingual city, Derrida's address began by an attack on the supposed unity of the meeting's theme concept, and then went on to engage a radical thinker from the other side of the Channel (J. L. Austin).
16. "Sending," p. 302.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
 20. In *The Question of Technology and Other Essays*, trans: Willeam Lovitt (New York. Harper, 1971), pp. 115-154.
 21. "Sending," pp. 306-7:
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
 27. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

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Music and Representation

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The title is a neat one, but it is yet another key that opens a semantic Pandora's Box. As must be so in all theorizing about music, an instrumentality appropriate to one modality of human discourse— language—is invoked for the analysis of an altogether different modality. That language can be a snare and a delusion, whether it attempts to explicate some territory within its own domain or makes excursions (bold or tentative) into remoter realms, was generally recognized and acknowledged long before the Derridean revolution, which further compounded the uncertainty that is endemic in aesthetic theory.

"It is the business of philosophy to make sense of experience," said Susanne Langer. What an old-fashioned ring this has! Ironically, despite her aim of clarification, her hypotheses have engendered a great deal of controversy: and, even among her supporters, have been widely misunderstood. Yet she has contributed more seminal insights to musical theory than any other savant of our century. Her arguments identifying music as a unique (and "non-discursive") symbolism have "made sense," especially to many practicing artists, whom philosophical writers seldom bother to address directly. As for seeking out those persons most intimately engaged in music-making—and this would seem to be the most promising course for philosophers of music: a course which Langer, virtually alone, has followed—this has obviously never occurred to most of them.

But musicians, even more than painters and sculptors, are conscious of the limitations of written and spoken language and indeed know the impossibility of "representation" of music in words. (Poets, too, are more

likely than philosophers to understand, from direct experience, where words "leave off." Though they exercise a rightful hegemony over words, it is within the power of poets, at best, to communicate something other than, and more than, information.) "Reading (or speaking) between the lines," then, comes naturally to artists, who, through their production of hand and eye and ear are accustomed to moving through terrain where the word is a stranger. When they talk of their work, as they do, characteristically, with zest and penetration, they use words as pointers, nothing more: to be understood in the context of whatever is taking shape. Very little of this spontaneous talk is ever recorded. (Philosophers, therefore_____unless they are among the fortunate ones who enjoy unmediated experience of an art_____remain ignorant.) Langer has aptly described such vivid, informal use of language as "studio metaphor."

The making of music_____like the hearing of it_____is an empirical business, and its manifestations are ephemeral. The musician, like the poet, is keenly aware of "perpetual perishing." If the convoluted theorizing of Jacques Derrida could somehow be translated into a more accessible, less esoteric, idiom, the perceptive musician would be likely to get the drift. But in contrast to the philosopher, who must hold to the word even in the face of deconstruction, the musician can get along without words altogether.

In writing an essay, however, one must have recourse to them. And the writing, certainly in traditional terms, is logocentric: which music, essentially, is not.

This has been a necessary prologue.

Every proposition is open to question. In the past, any challenge has presumably been made in the interest of some "truth-value," in the expectation_____to employ a terrible philosophic jargon which is nevertheless widely understood_____of determining to what extent something "is the case." And undoubtedly, in many instances, this is still... the case. But the multiplying and wide dissemination of theories is likely to induce a certain passivity, and at times even a sense of hopelessness, in the truth-seeker. It is impossible, of course, for any individual to keep abreast of the prolific outpourings: and the heartening spectacle of an Aesthetic Renaissance is accompanied by profound psychological fatigue.

At a cultural juncture such as ours, Edgar Allan Poe might *well* ask, once again, "Is there balm in Gilead?"

What I want to suggest is that the speculative literature in its quantity and range may undermine any residual impulse to seek answers _____ or partial solutions to problems. Are we doomed merely to play with ideas which enjoy roughly equal status in the intellectual community, all tenacious of life, brutally attacked and defended, but none _____ more than any other _____ representing "the case?"

Finality, to be sure, is no desideratum. Defensible hypotheses, however, are another matter. In science, theories come and go, are tested: and those adopted are later superseded, *pace* flat-earth precepts and Creationism. But in the arts, doctrines which are patently false are perpetuated far beyond their natural lifespans, and fervently defended: not only by those who might be dismissed as superstitious or simply deluded, but by persons with impressive professional credentials.

In illustration, let us take the most obvious example of alleged "representation" in music: *program music*, so-called, in its various manifestations. Any music to which some verbal agenda is attached will qualify as a member of the genre. Now the alliance of music and extra-musical association may be eminently successful, artistically. This is undeniable, and does not relate to the argument, although it is relevant to point out that no "program," however excellent in itself, will redeem inferior music.

But widespread disagreement continues between proponents of *referentialism* and *non-referentialism*, respectively: the former holding that music can express outside, or "extrinsic" meanings, as well as embodied, or intrinsic ones; while the latter, not denigrating the extra-musical associations *per se*, maintain that music communicates its essential meaning independently through its peculiar tonal modality; whatever is superimposed, then, may be an enhancement; but different constituents have nevertheless been brought into juxtaposition and there is a distinction to be made between them. This is obviously the stronger argument.

Yet Leonard Meyer, in his *Emotion and Meaning in Music*, equates the genres when he refers to "designative" and "nondesignative" meanings. Yes, he says: music can and does communicate both kinds of meanings. But the crucial question, which he does not address, is *how* each kind of meaning is apprehended by the listener. In the same way? Obviously

not : nor is this flat denial an instance of question-begging, incontrovertible evidence being always at hand. For essential musical meaning is accessible only through hearing, is a private experience, and cannot be communicated through any outside agency. (In contrast, knowledge *about* music——its formal structure, for example——can be transmitted verbally.)

"Designative," or extra-musical meanings, are arbitrary. But when they appear to make a close "fit," as they invariably do in the best examples, one easily *believes*; and so great is the power of association, the connection seems to be inherent. Yet the likelihood of envisaging Don Quixote or Don Juan on a first hearing of those tone poems by Richard Strauss, bearing their names, is as remote as the probability of one's travelling to another galaxy in this century. The crucial point is that *one has to be told*. Then, and only then, may one member of the artistic dyad be said to represent the other.

The foregoing distinction is demonstrable, and may be tested and confirmed by anyone who wishes, at any time. But that clarification, which continues to elude not only the general public, but many otherwise philosophically astute observers, deals with representation in the most elementary way only. The problem is not so easily disposed of.

Clearly, there is "representation" in music : and representation of a kind, to borrow Wordsworth's phrase, "far more deeply interfused," accessible to the sensitive listener, and available on its own terms. Anyone who speaks of "getting something out of" music is acknowledging the presence of meaning, or "import." Such testimony as evidenced by that cliché, is ordinarily concomitant to recognition and the desire for repetition. We are now outside the logocentric confines, but not beyond concept : because there is something "there," however fluctuating its lineaments; and *meaning*——unless indeed we surrender our view of language as an instrumentality of human discourse and elect, instead, to regard ourselves as victims of a sovereign Linguistic——signities, in any humane vernacular, a keenly intuited, if not readily identifiable, *substratum* of apprehension. The indispensable human context invalidates Hanslick's dictum that "music means itself."

The connection between music and human emotion, as yet but little understood, is constantly remarked upon, and it has ever been so : composers, performing musicians, and myriad listeners have given

impressive testimony to *some kind* of relationship there. But any inference based on this consensus, to the effect that music *represents* emotion, requires a very close scrutiny. If music does have such a function, what is its *modus operandi* ?

Nothing so simple as a direct correspondence between fleeting "feelings" and a work of musical art is observable. Inevitably, then, the report between music and human emotion——affirmed, albeit vaguely, so universally——must be of a general kind: a complex symbolism for which the term *representation* is inadequate.

Symbolism, in any of its guises, is representation. But representation of the most obvious kind, though it undoubtedly qualifies as a symbolism, is neither interesting nor apposite to our purpose. The complex way in which music may be construed to depict "the life of feeling" is, in contrast to the simplicity of one thing's "standing for another," a challenge to both hemispheres of the brain :——and to human intuition as well, wherever *that* may reside.

In order to get off the ground, as it were, let us consider Langer's nice distinction between "sign" and "symbol," wherein she ascribes the fundamental utilitarian uses of symbolism to the former, and the more recondite aspects to the latter. The existence of such hierarchical structure in symbolic representation is apparent even to those who do not subscribe to her terminology. The distinction is useful, moreover, not only in reading Langer, but in setting aside the numerous examples of symbolism which do not, in this context, merit our attention. Among these are such well-known devices as text-painting; the intricacies of musical numerology (whether exhibited in the isorhythmic motet, instances of "dynamic symmetry" in Bach chorales, the Schillinger system, or——indeed——the various manifestations of serial technique), or mechanically induced "imitations of nature." All these, whether arcane or easily accessible, are in the domain of sign language and must be understood discursively or not at all.

Adamant philosophical opponents of the "non-discursive" symbol remain ignorant, inexplicably, of the long tradition which that concept represents. But perhaps it isn't inexplicable, after all, in view of the *literary* nature of that tradition in the nineteenth century. (But why

should philosophers, incorrigible truthseekers, be so befuddled by obstacles that are nothing more than terminological ?) For Goethe, the symbol was a "concrete universal." Carlyle compared the *symbol* to an iceberg; partly revealed, largely hidden. More broadly, nineteenth century literati conceived of the symbol as "any formal unity." And the French symbolist poets, for whom Mallarmé was the leading theorist, sought a veritable *synaesthesia* of modalities, in which life and art were inextricably intertwined.

The transmutation of human dynamism into music effects a *containment*_____ "stylized," to be sure_____ in the work of art. There is, therefore, "representation"; but more, there is, as it were, a "capture" of emotion; and the music, consequently, *is*, in whatever measure, what it "stands for." ("A poem should not mean but *be*," said Archibald Macleish.) Recognizing, in some widely touted "masterpiece" of any era, its capacity to be brought to life again and again, and to speak (in the phraseology of the old Anglican prayerbook) to "all sorts and conditions of men," the inference commonly drawn that an experience of profound significance can take place in human perception, through the agency of such music, appears altogether justified. (Inferences as to possible cathartic and therapeutic values may also be drawn; a consideration of these, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.)

But ascribing to music the power to encapsulate and evoke emotion as an exclusive function must still be, despite the magnitude of such a claim, an oversimplification. The dynamism of both thought and feeling, perceived as a unity, would correspond more accurately, I suspect, to the sources of music in human experience. We need not go so far, perhaps, as Nietzsche, poetphilosopher, who declaimed, in exaltation, that "language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the PerimalUnity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and before all phenomena."¹

More sober voices have reiterated the same message. Edmund Gurney, Nietzsche's contemporary, put it this way: "The ground which preclude verbal interpretations and set verbal descriptions lie at the root of the art's wide comprehensibility and diffusion."² Susanne Langer, more than half a century later, observed that "the limitations inherent in verbal

conception and discursive forms of thought are the very *raison d'être* of artistic expression."³

Despite a long acquaintance with her thought, I have found it strange that Langer subsumes, implicitly, mind within emotion; and yet, paradoxically, her *magnum opus* bears the title *Mind*. When she speaks of art as an analogue of emotive life—and music, hence, as a tonal analogue of that life—she is acknowledging art as representative in *that* sense. But "thought-feeling," or some acceptable equivalent, would seem to fit the case better.

Gurney published *The Power of Sound* in 1880. William James, who reviewed it, hailed the work as the most important book on aesthetics in the English language: an estimate which, a century later, I am tempted to second. (Being "up-to-date" in aesthetic theory is, in any case, a laughable idea.) Its neglect from the first—a neglect which has continued to the present day—was explained by several preceptive readers among Gurney's own circle, who observed that the book was too philosophical for musicians, too musical for philosophers. Whatever the reason, its neglect has meant a loss for everybody concerned with the philosophy of music.

Gurney's description of music as "ideal motion" fulfills all the requirements of Langer's *symbolic analogue*: "In the imaginative work the ideas and emotions are embodied *as such*, to be again and again reawakened as such."⁴ Gurney, like Langer, was an organicist. (I can find no evidence that Langer ever read Gurney; her thought, nevertheless, has many affinities with his.) Where Langer speaks of "the forms of sentient being" which art gives expression to, Gurney maintains that music "condenses a very large amount of inner life."

Corroborating both, John Dewey—still another much neglected theorist in this sphere—sees music as depicting the "stir, agitation, movement, the particulars and contingencies of existence." In a most remarkable passage, he says that "music complicates and intensifies the process of genial reciprocating antagonism, suspense and reinforcement, where the various 'voices' at once oppose and answer one another."⁵

Dewey is noted, in general, for the felicity of his prose style, nor are we especially concerned with that quality just now; but in those lines, surely, he comes close, if he does not altogether succeed, in bursting

logocentric bounds: in pointing, that is to say, toward what language is incapable of communicating.

Alfred North Whitehead was responsible for the long life of *presentational immediacy* as a concept in artistic experience. Its difference from *representational* can be most easily understood in the notion of the non-discursive symbol as objective: an entity which does not merely "stand for"____or in place of____something else. The symbol may, indeed, and characteristically does, signify an "other," or "more," as well; its boundaries are not fixed. Gurney expressed the identical insight, using the term *presentative*. Gurney's "organic" postulates, affirming the inseparability of matter and form, were subscribed to both by Whitehead and Langer. Gurney emphasized the pertinence of his organic and presentative canons to music in particular: "The successions of intensity and relaxation, the expectation perpetually bred and perpetually satisfied, the constant direction of the motion to new points, and constant evolution of part from part, comprise an immense amount of alternations of posture and of active adjustment of the will."⁶

Philosophic neglect of the musical practitioner, which I spoke of earlier, is nowhere more evident than in the example which the late Roger Sessions affords us. Should we not listen with special interest to what a composer has to say about his art? Yet one may look in vain, in most of the theoretical literature, for references to Sessions, one of the most verbally articulate and eloquent of twentieth century composers. His two large contributions to aesthetics, *The Musical Experience* (1949) and *Questions About Music* (1970), were delivered originally as public lectures: the earlier ones at the Juilliard School in New York City, and the later ones, many years later, at Harvard University where he held the Norton Chair of Poetry in 1968-69. The books are not footnoted: Sessions had no need to consult "authorities."

But he, like our "bona fide" theorists just quoted, regards his art as organic, an expression of the dynamism of life. Musical experience is human, and has to do with the listener's relationship to the sound he hears. Sessions speaks of those elements of tension and relaxation present in music as in life, which contribute to the emotional analogue shaped by art: "What we may call the raw, formal materials of music are also the

expressive elements, and these, again, have their basis in certain of the most elementary, intimate, and vital experience through which we live as human beings.”⁷ He says further that “a melodic motif or phrase is in essence and origin a vocal gesture; it is a vocal movement with a clearly defined and therefore clearly expressed profile.” Emphasizing the organic analogy Sessions maintains that rhythm is fundamental : breathing is our first and most lasting experience of rhythm, reflected musically in upbeat and downbeat, arsis and thesis; and what we call a musical phrase is a musical breath. Finally—for there is no need to multiply examples——he tells us that

In embodying movement, in the most subtle and most delicate manner possible, music communicates the attitudes inherent in, and implied by, that movement; its speed, its energy, its elan or impulse, its tenseness or relaxation, its agitation or its tranquillity, its decisiveness or its hesitation. It communicates in a marvelously vivid and exact way the dynamics and the abstract qualities of emotion, *but any specific emotional content the composer wishes to give to it must be furnished, as it were, from without, by means of an associative program.*⁸

Music does not contain propositions. The claim that experience must be verbally expressible in order to have “meaning,” as many professional philosophers contend, is, after all, a futile exercise in semantic nit-picking; for the denial of meaning to all human enterprises not susceptible to verbal approximation is in obvious contradiction to the richness and variety of life; and it trivializes the philosophic quest. But it is this kind of unnecessary, professionally imposed linguistic impasse that prompted Langer——a symbolic logician concerned that her tenets enjoy a wide applicability and intelligibility——to coin “import” as a possible way out of that terminological dilemma.

The empirical evidence for what may be called a symbiosis between music and human thought-feeling is overwhelming. The hypothesis of a *symbolic analogue* is testable in the only acceptable laboratory; the psyche of the individual listener. The invitation, moreover, is to a sumptuous banquet : and this test is also a testing. Plato said that all learning is a remembering. Because music does have recourse to those dynamisms “at the core of life,” one who is open and receptive to its intrinsic mean-

ings may experience a strong sense of recognition : may even feel impelled to say, "Yes, that's the way it is !"

Sri Aurobindo gives compelling testimony in support of the "symbolic analogue :"

For the universal soul all things and all contacts of things carry in them an essence of delight best described by the Sanskrit aesthetic term, *rasa*, which means at once sap or essence of a thing and its taste . . .

We attain to something of this capacity for variable but universal delight in the aesthetic reception of things as represented by Art and Poetry, so that we enjoy there the *Rasa* or taste of the sorrowful, the terrible, even the horrible or repellent; and the reason is because we are detached, disinterested, not thinking of ourselves or of self-defence (*jugupsa*), but only of the thing and its essence.⁹

There is, to be sure—in the vernacular of the drug culture—the possibility of one, or many, "bad trips," in the vicarious modality of art. (Yet we are, as Schopenhauer also expressed it, "far from their pain." Thus we can *enjoy*.) For the entire compass of human vitality and experience may be accommodated, symbolically, within a musical purview; the quicksands of ambiguity, the ambivalences, "negative" and "positive" states—all are mirrored there.

The experience of music is not an exercise, surely, in reductionism. It should be possible, very nearly, for a listener of strong appetite, curiosity, and capacity for adventure to "have it all." Dynamism is at the core and there are no static goals; but there are revelations along the way—self-validating and verbally incommunicable epiphanies. The continuing *experiencing* of music is a broken journey without a fixed destination. But in perceiving and participating in the nature of such symbolic representation it is an enhancement for the listener if he can be *aware*, and yield to the strong magic in full consciousness. The illusion which great art provides is an elixir that does its work with or without our consent. But how much better, following Bergson's injunction "to enter in," to comprehend, as it were, *Rasa*: its function as well as its flavor. It is not necessary, nor desirable, to flounder forever in the dark.

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Dance Representation

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Although a lengthy tradition in dance theory locates the essence of dance in representation or imitation, postmodern dances such as Merce Cunningham's *Summerspace*, Yvonne Rainer's *Trio A*, Trisha Brown's *Primary Accumulation* and Doug Dunn's *Gestures in Red* cast serious doubt on this general theory. These dances lack a narrative structure, and they do not employ standard story-telling theatrical conventions; in short, they are not representations. In spite of the fact that a general theory of dance is not baseable on representation, it is still important to elucidate the nature and range of representation in dance, and these are my aims in this brief paper.

Let us start with a dance that everyone would agree is representational: *Billy the Kid*. A story-telling ballet, *Billy the Kid* represents sequences of events and acts in the life of Billy: his witnessing the killing of his mother, his act of killing her killer, how he becomes an outlaw; is then captured, escapes, and is finally killed by Pat Garrett. The representationalism in *Billy the Kid* is largely based on represented actions. We have to take a simplified example, dancer William Carter representing Sheriff Pat Garrett drawing his pistol to shoot Billy. Although from the spectator's point of view there is only one sequence of movements seen, logically speaking the representation of an act involves two actions; we have, in this case, William Carter drawing and William Carter representing Sheriff Pat Garrett drawing. In the stringing together of such complex acts the saga of Billy is represented.

The recognition that the performance we are watching is a representation of Billy's life is, in part, based on resemblance, in the sense that resemblance is necessary for representation. If there were no scenes, sequences of events, or actions that resembled the events and actions of Billy's life we would not say that we were presented with a dance that

represents Billy's life. But resemblance is not sufficient for representation for the sequence of actions on the stage may more closely resemble the life and demise of Two-gun Jack, little known desperado who lies buried in Boot Hill Cemetery. There are, however, other factors, such as the title, program notes, costuming, and scenery, upon which representation may also depend; program notes are particularly important in establishing the representation of particular individuals.

If representation in dance is based on convention and resemblance, then realism is based on degree of resemblance. *Billy the Kid* is fairly realistic; there are signature dances for characters, e.g., the riders have bowed legs and spread elbows, there are realistic scenes in which everyone recognizes that guns are being drawn, and the costumes and sets are realistic. But even here we do not find the degree of realism achieved in some theater and mime; Billy the Kid never danced a pas de deux with his girlfriend. The degree of realism is thinner in most full-evening Romantic ballets, where realism is established at the beginning with mime and character dances as opposed to the white acts which feature pure ballet. In Aston's *Enigma Variations* the resemblances are even more attenuated. The costumes and staging are very realistic and capture Elgar's social milieu, and there are some character dances, but the "Nimrod" variations stick strictly to a classical sequence of arabesques, tombes, and pas de basque. Perhaps some relationship among the trio is represented, but the reference is unclear. And what should we say of a dance such as Balanchine's *Four Temperaments*? John Percival and Don McDonagh regard it as a sequence of character representations; Marcia Siegel demurs from a representational reading.¹ This seems to be a borderline case; if the dance represents it is by vague hints and allusions.

Given that dance representation often occurs via allusions, or hints of resemblance, an understanding of style is important, and sometimes essential, in recognizing resemblances. An example is the pas de deux for a tipsy couple in Christensen's *Filling Station*, as described by Marcia Siegel: "... the couple grab for each other and miss, or contact the wrong body parts. They set themselves up for a supported pose, calculate wrong, fall free for an instant, then collapse against each other. The girl achieves a perfect line in arabesque and locks herself into it while the man ducks confusedly under her leg and comes up on the other side, still holding her up."² The resemblance does not obtain between the movements of a typical drunken couple and the dancers' movements, but between the distortions of natural movements we see in a drunken couple and the disto-

rtions in the general ballet style exemplified by the dancers. To see that resemblance one must understand ballet style. Similarly, in *Giselle* the ballerina representing Giselle and the dancer representing Albrecht must be capable of representing a range of emotions in both mime and the classical style. In the waltz scene of the first act their mutual joy is represented by a series of ballone - chasse - coupe, with a beckoning movement by the raised arm on the ballone. Yet the same series repeated by Giselle after she becomes hysterical, and now done a bit tentatively and with some stylistic unevenness, represents her torment and disintegration.³ In both cases a grasp of the emotional state being represented depends on an understanding of ballet style.

In modern dance, Doris Humphrey's *The Shakers* realistically represents a Shaker dance in terms of floor plan, separation of men and women, and costuming, but it also represents the tensions of Shaker life, the struggle to overcome the gravity of flesh and achieve spiritual communion. Humphrey herself has pointed out that her style, based on the fall and recovery principle, is integral to the representation of this struggle, and Suzanne Youngermanns detailed. Effort-Shape analysis elucidates how the tension is depicted.⁴ On the one hand, there are movements using combinations of strength and bound flow -- with the body narrowed or contracted and the limbs held in, and little attention to the environment -- which depict the constrictions of the flesh; on the other hand, light movements with an emphasis on time qualities and spatial attention are used to represent the Shakers' spiritual yearnings. Similarly, Elizabeth Kagan has pointed out that certain elements of Humphrey's style, a "pattern of rebounding in weight and flow with its corresponding breath fluctuations setting off a spatial reaction," forms the basis of representation in *Water Study*.⁵ In sum, then, representation is based on convention and resemblance, but an understanding of style is important in recognizing and articulating resemblances.

The dances discussed give us an indication of the range of representation in dance. Individuals, their actions and sequences of events (*Billy the Kid*), sorts (a Shaker dance in *The Shakers*), and types stereotypes (the heroic gas station attendant in *Filling Station*) are representable. So are fictional individuals (Oedipus in Graham's *Night Journey*) and sorts with no members (the Lilac Fairy in *Sleeping Beauty*), for in saying that Bertram Ross looks like or resembles Oedipus we are saying that what we see on stage is what Oedipus would look like if he existed as historically specified; the resemblance is in a counter-factual context.

Processes are also representable; natural processes, such as the movement of water in *Water Study* or the play of light on crystals in Balanchine's *Jewels*; and psychological processes, such as the process of sexual repression, indulgence, guilt and redemption in Tudor's *Pillar of Fire*.

A dance may also represent by denotational devices. Dance mime exhibits a range of representational devices, from the sign for stop (holding a hand up with the palm out), which resembles an ordinarily used conventional sign for indicating to someone to stop, and which is recognizable to one not acquainted with theatrical conventions, to purely conventional devices based on denotation, not resemblance. In the first act of *Giselle*, for example, when her mother warns Giselle that if she continues to dance she will die and become a Wili, she does so by extending her entwined hands above her head, then clenching her fists, crossing her wrists, lowering her arms in front of her, unclenching her fists, placing her hands at her lower spine and gently fluttering her hands. Here we have conventional mime devices that do not resemble or hint at natural gestures, and the meaning of such movements is not available to one who does not understand the conventions. Since such mime conventions are embedded in the ballet style, an understanding of that style is necessary for grasping their meaning.

Finally, dance representation may occur via representational symbolism in which an action or object represents by resemblance and what is represented is symbolic of a quality set qualities. In Ted Shawn's *Labor Symphony* we see the acts of laborers represented by resemblance -- scattering seeds, cutting, wood, pulling oars, etc. -- but the acts themselves are symbolic of the nobility, dignity, and honesty of manual labor. Mary Wigman effectively employed representational symbolism in *Face of Night* the third dance of her solo *Shifting Landscapes*. The dancer works off a rigid representation of a cross -- feet together and arms extended; the pose resembles a cross, which, in part, symbolizes suffering. Wigman's movement variations the cross-posture themselves resemble agonized suffering and are especially effective in the symbolic context. In many cases the symbolism is not as clear cut. Graham's *Errand in the Maze* features a male dancer who represents the Minotaur by resemblance; he wears a bull-like mask and his arms are fixed on a yoke that rests on his shoulders. Yet the Minotaur is symbolic of crude force, perhaps, or blind oppression, or sexual power; it's hard to unambiguously pin down the meaning. And in certain instances the symbolism seems to be personal or private. At one point in Meredith Monk's *Education of a Girlchild* the dancers assemble

carrying certain objects: a little model house, a stuffed lizard, a set of deer antlers and a scythe. The scythe symbolizes death and time, and one feels that the other objects are presented as symbolic, but taken together their symbolism remains unclear to the viewer.

Let us now consider some important connections between the concepts of expression and representation. It is common to distinguish the expression of an emotion from an emotion expressed, exhibited, or naturally worn. Jak Palance, for example, could be said to exhibit a cruel facial expression even though he may not be expressing cruelty at a particular time. This distinction is acknowledged in dance. In ballet, for example, both the character dancer and the classical dancer have to be able to do the steps, and certain physical features such as height and limb proportions do, in part, differentiate them, but the character dancer also typically has an expressive or "magnetic" personality; in part this means that he can exhibit a wide range of expressions, not that when he does so he is expressing his emotions. For the character dancer typically exhibits his expressions in mimed action or dramatic representation, and these may not involve the expression of emotion at all.

This brings us to a link between the concepts of expression and representation. If I mimic your fear of a snarling dog, I may cringe and grimace in a way which resembles your expression of the dog. But my behavior is not an expression of fear because I am not afraid. My action is not an expression of fear, but a representation of your expression of fear. So there is a "surface" of expressive behavior that can be used for representational purposes in dance. In dancing the role of Giselle, for example, Fonteyn represents Giselle's love of Albrecht, but Fonteyn is not necessarily feeling the emotion of love. And Nureyev represents Albrecht's love of Giselle, but does not necessarily express his personal love. In fact, Fonteyn notes that Nureyev often worked himself into the role of Albrecht by getting angry; he found it "easier to dance in a rage than in cold blood," and in that context Fonteyn often found herself to be a bit afraid.⁶ In that case we have Fonteyn expressing (and, we might imagine, trying to repress) fear of Nureyev, while representing Giselle's expression of love for Albrecht.

Now in most cases in ballet the expression of emotion is not the dancer's focus. Standardly, the dancer concentrates on executing her movements and staying in unison with other dancers. Yet in many cases expression and representation reinforce each other powerfully in dance. Fonteyn, for example, may express delight in the progress of a

performance and also represent Giselle's delight in Albrecht's love. In modern dance, Martha Graham's works are representational, yet training, technique, style and narrative structure are often employed to reinforce expression. In *Appalachian Spring*, Graham represented the slightly nervous, excited, happy Bride, but she *Was* a slightly nervous, excited happy bride, having recently married her dance partner Eric Hawkins. *Errand into the Maze*, as danced by Graham not only represents a woman's indignant fear of crude power and sexual oppression, it expresses Graham's own indignant fear of crude power and sexual oppression.

Expression and representation, then, thread together in three important ways in dance. In many theatrical dances we have the representation of an expression with no emotion being actually expressed by the dancer. But, where representation is effective, it typically rests on the use of a dancer who is expressive in the sense that he can exhibit, and thus represent, a range of expressive postures. Finally, we have dancers, such as *Appalachian Spring*, of whom it can be said that they both express their emotions and represent a portrayed character's expression.

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The Politics of Performance and the Temporality of representation

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Perhaps no truth is more evident than that works of art inhabit a midworld, caught somewhere between the reality of lived experience and the forms of representation, between signified and signifier, nature and artifice. This characteristic of art has been described in manifold ways, from the Greeks to the present, largely producing more consternation than illumination. The ancient quarrel of which Socrates speaks between poetry and philosophy, juxtaposes a triumphant philosophical reason against activities of storytelling in relation to which the supremacy of sense and clarity over agon and duplicity is unintelligible. One must choose sides without reservation in this ancient quarrel in order to claim rational superiority for philosophy over art. Those who would today renew this quarrel, repudiating the supremacy of propositional reason, may be said to seek to inhabit a midworld, resisting all efforts to repress it. It is the region in which order and intelligibility are in question, the region between representation and truth, style and substance.

That all who love art are fascinated by the middle region it occupies has not led to uniformity in its characterization. The most famous expression of the doubling of art is to be found in Kant's third *Critique*, where on the side of taste art is caught between pleasure and delight, purpose and purposiveness, end and finality; on the side of genius is caught between the establishment of rules and their abrogation; on the side of imagination is caught between freedom and repetition; on the side of the sublime is caught between representation and excess; on the side of judgment is caught between the artifice of nature and the naturalness of art. In our century, the doubling of language has become the metonymic model for all these other doublings: the midworld of the sign.

These doubled moments of artistic representation embody most contemporary understandings of the midworlds of art, and have served as paradigms for other images of the middle region that inhabit the central writings of "postmodernism"-- in Derrida and Foucault, for example, but also in Hegel, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. In Nietzsche's earlier work, art is caught between Apollo and Dionysus. In his later work, truth inhabits the midworld of power and will. In Hegel, tragedy occupies the midworld of circularity that Spirit eventually makes its home. In "The Origin of the Work of Art," this middle region is inscribed between earth and world.¹

What is important in these different views of the midworlds of art is not so much what it is caught between, nor even how the middle regions are to be understood or experienced, but the idea of "betweenness" itself. Whether, as much of the tradition has suggested, human experience is caught between the finite and the infinite, or whether finiteness itself is caught between representation and embodiment, the "between" is the region occupied by art; if not art alone. In this role, art serves to remind us of the neighbourhoods in which we are both most at home yet feel most homeless.

Art is not alone within this middle region, nor does it present it to us uniquely. Virtually all the writings that are called "postmodern"-- where modernity pertains to the Enlightenment and empirical science more than to our century's music and art--extend their reach to this middle region. A striking example is found in Foucault:

... between the already "encoded" eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself: ... This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, ... in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being.²

Setting aside the emphasis on purity and fundamentality, possible expressions of a foundational movement even in a thought that would occupy a space between fundament and surface, we find a striking image of a historical thought that seeks to inhabit the region between representations and the order that they represent. Historical reflection is as

caught up in this between as is poetry--caught up along with poetry. Elsewhere Foucault defines a divided image of power; power is everywhere, divided by resistances.³

Another sense of the between is described by Heidegger in connection with language, using the imagery of art:

This unity of the being of language for which we are looking we shall call the design To design is to cut a trace. Most of us know the word "sign" only in its debased meaning--lines on a surface. But we make a design also when we cut a furrow into the soil to open it to seed and growth. The design is the whole of the traits of that drawing which structures and prevails throughout the open, unlocked freedom of language. The design is the drawing of the being of language, the structure of a show in which are joined the speakers and their speaking; what is spoken and what of it is unspoken in all that is given in the speaking.⁴

The betweenness of language lie within:

The being of language;
The language of being.⁵

This theme is continued by Gadamer in one form, by Derrida in another. We may follow Foucault to say that it is the midworld occupied by representation and order. That language is so much part of our experience entails that it occupies the region between humanity and whatever defines its limits, whether that be the infinite, the conditions of representability, or the ideal. In this sense, language occupies the same space as nothing and difference, the conditions of representation. Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Derrida all identify this space with time. Lyotard refuses it such an identification, keeping it firmly planted between the representable and unrepresentable.⁶

To those who understand this middle region as defining something fundamental, even essential, to human experience, whether a reflection of its finiteness or subjectivity, its temporality, or simply a denial of any foundations, in relation even to humanity, it is crucial to be able both to experience and think within this middle region, within

middleness "itself," whether of time as such, rather than of what occupies time, or of difference itself, rather than of its poles. The appeal to art on the one hand and to a "postmodern" sense of history on the other, are attempts to escape from a tradition thought blind to its own contingencies, especially to the circular contingencies in the representation of representation.

The image of a middle region in which the conditions of representation may be thought suggests the further image of the naming of the conditions of naming--more precisely, naming what is at stake in language. By analogy, it is as if we were to be able to define what is at stake in art despite--or even because of--its capacity to transcend any definition, to redefine what is a stake, as if we were to define the essence of a humanity that denatured every essence while still forced to accept the contingencies of its historicity. The analogies here among art, humanity, and language are compelling: at once a historicity whose meaning is conditioned by the contingent facts of cultural experience and a surplus in every meaning that pertains to every condition. I identify it with the finiteness of every finite, the limits of every limit. The middle region that art, humanity, and language occupy is at the limit of limitation. Only by understanding the capacity of humanity to occupy this space of aporia can we understand the nature of life and art.

The aporias in this region are many; I will discuss but a few of them. Yet there is so to speak a "greater" aporia: that of this region itself. In Kant, the sublime is the presentation of the unrepresentable, an unconditioned upon which the entire architectonic of the system rests. It lies within the very fabric of his view of reason that there must be the thought of an unconditioned that cannot be thought, a knowledge that cannot be known. If we depart from his sense of the unconditioned, we cannot continue to speak of *an* unconditioned, of *a* limit to representation. Rather, the surplus and middle region both invade every representation and are dispersed throughout them. It is for this reason that Foucault can say that power is *everywhere*, divided by resistances. In Derrida and Heidegger, there is a more Kantian sense of the specific--almost named--site of the interior: the ontological difference or the arche-trace: *difference* itself.

The philosophic question is of the "itself." The middle region occupied by art, humanity, and language is not a place, but must be inhabited, is nothing, but must be experienced and thought as deeply as possible. To these images of the between *itself*, I would reply that since it is everywhere,

it is thought in every thought, represented in every representation (if only by its absence). It has never been and cannot be forgotten, but it cannot be thought completely either. There is an inexhaustibility to thought and being that is manifested as a surplus in the most ordinary of beings. This is the terrain of art. The midworld that it occupies is that of the sameness and difference that define representation. Sameness and difference are the complementary poles that together define inexhaustibility.

There is another image of the terrain of art-and of humanity and language as well, indeed, of every form of being as well as spirit-that avoids any suggestion of an unsituated site: not of a middle region but of the doubling of every site, multiple locality. Every being occupies many locations, at once-its inexhaustibility--but every being is local: located and locating. Art and language are not unique in this multiplicity, but in their capacity to represent their own multiplicity in multiple ways: to represent inexhaustibility inexhaustibly. Not only does this doubling (also tripling, quadrupling, etc.) not commit us to the between itself, but it allows the reflexivity of representation to function not only within, but without, not only in the aporias of the between but in the constellations of reflexivity that comprise the ethereal regions of spirit--representation and representation of representation. This is the terrain of art, to present the inexhaustibility in presentation as inexhaustible locality: the "worlding of multiple worlds."

If works of art occupy a middle region, and if this middle region is the essence of art--essentially to have no essence--then the suggestion to be considered is that particular arts and their works are distinguished (and therefore related) by the ways in which they differentiate--by the different middles they inhabit and the relationships of betweenness they define. We may note, then, that if time is the difference that defines the middle region of representation, then performance arts occupy a doubled (perhaps tripled and more) relationship to time, inhabit a more complex temporality than the other arts: they are in and of time as well as inhabiting its difference. They occupy different times at least twice, not only in the presence of the work at different historical sites, but in different performances. Borrowing Plato's extraordinary image of the doubled distance from truth inherent in the mimetic function of pictorial art, but emphasizing the midworld of mimesis rather than its reproductiveness, we may say that performances in dance, drama, and

music, even the reading of poetry, occupy a more complex, perhaps even "greater" representational distance than where the original work of art can be presented again rather than re-presented through different performances. The life of the performance work lies in the temporality of its productions. Here the capacity of dramatic works to be read as well as performed--their almost autonomous artistic lives--engenders another doubling that enriches the presence of such works in unmatched ways.

To this we may add that *praxis* inhabits an analogous relationship to times' between, a relationship absent from other forms of representation. Practice takes place at different times and is meaningful in different times that pertain profoundly to the intelligibility of the events in which it took place. One of the reasons why Foucault is mistakenly called a nihilist is that the region he occupies is almost entirely historical. His genealogical and archaeological methods are ways of thinking historically of the underlying conditions of the order of historical representation. The future remains an absolute abyss: the space of *praxis*.

I wish to address in my remaining time the particular midworlds or localities of performance art and their relation to *praxis*. I wish to examine the analogy inherent in the temporal and representational multiplicity that pertains to politics and performance. Let me begin with the question of what may be meant by performance art. Clearly, every work of art occupies the time of its presentation, engages us in an event inhabiting time and space. Clearly as well, there are performing arts--aleatory improvisational, conceptual, singular -- in which no work is performed: the performance is the only work. A similar distinction can be made between a work produced by an artist that is performed by others and a work that is presented in an event of performance. The principle is one of sameness and repetition, and there are two kinds of performed works: one in which the work is performed, and may be performed again; the other in which the only work is the performance, and it can never be performed again. There are performances that are re-presentations of a work; there are performances that are presentations of a non-re-presentable work.

A performance is the presentation of a work in an event occupying a doubled time and space--that of the performers and that of the audience--in which the distinction between the work as material object and the work as presented collapses. In the presentation of a work of plastic art, the work retains its integrity within the event of presentation--for example, in the commemoration of a public work consecrating those who died in a battle. The work and the ceremony coexist, but the work

inhabits a larger world in which it may be presented recurrently. The possibility of recurrence for such a work lies in its reality as a material object. In a performance of Hamlet, the tangible presence of the play is to be found only in performances (or readings), while the performed play occupies the doubled event of performance. What distinguishes a textual reading from a performance is the doubling of lived experience pertaining to the latter. A work of cinema is not a performance to the extent that the tangible reality of the film outstrips the event of presentation. The autonomy of the work beyond its presentations is what Benjamin calls its "aura" (though he does not identify it with its materiality).⁷ I am concerned here with the relationship of performances both to works that have an aura and where no work exists that could possess an aura. I am particularly concerned with the aura of a work that exists only in its representations--in performance and conceptual works.

Performance works comprise two groups, in one of which an autonomous work is performed, and in relation to which each performance is another presentation of that work--its re-presentation, in the other of which there is no work other than the performance. There are in this sense imitative and original performance works.

The works that are repeatedly performed include the greatest known. To say this, however, is to adopt a masterpiece view of art, and there are artists and critics today who find in "postmodernism" an important movement away from masterpiece theory. Art is where you find it, not in works that possess sublime grandeur. Without taking a stand here on this controversial subject, I wish to explore an important side of the negative view. It is a concern with the politics of performance as a consequence of the temporality of representation.

Two observations are in order, one that performance works, especially drama, are sites at which many radical political movements congregate, forms of opposition to oppression; the other that there is security for a regime of power in the repetitions of traditional works that no longer threaten in the present moment. These two moments, together, suggest a tension unique to performance arts despite analogies in the canon, archive, and museum or tensions involving repetition and transformation.

On the side of the security within the sameness of representation lies the aura of the authenticity of the performance--a notion quite different from the authenticity of the original work of plastic art. Goodman calls the latter "autographic": the work does not serve as model for repetition.⁸

By way of contrast, an "allographic" work is one that lends itself to repetition in a multiplicity of renditions. Goodman addresses only the question of how notation can define the identity conditions of a performance: the question of what makes a performance "correct. The question of *authenticity* in performance is quite different, neither that of correctness--all the notes but perhaps none of the *bric-nor* that of the singularity of the work--the one and only original work. No performance can be the original (even where there is such a work). Authenticity in performance is something different.

Some might respond that the idea of authenticity cannot be defended in relation to a performance where the original work cannot be tangibly present, representative of its time and place. Concerns with period and style may be responded to in manifold ways, none of which confers unequivocal authority in relation to how the work is authentically to be performed. Moreover there is the inescapable fact of the public life of any work or text: to be adopted by any family and given any upbringing. Whatever canons are violated by extreme performances, they do not define authenticity though they may define good taste. Yet despite these considerations and controversies, we do speak of authenticity in performance. It is a way of defining the tradition in which a work is to be performed.

Authenticity, like canonicity, conforms to a principle of repetition conjoined with variation. One of the revolutionary consequences of recording technology is that new resources have been made available to the performer for defining authenticity: the performance is retained on tape or film as if it were the original. The corresponding loss is the aura of the work. It passes into the aura of the performance, particularly striking in the case of popular music, whose works in the past either were incorporated into monuments or passed away from the current scene. There are now original works and original performances, all preserved as if their own authenticity were at stake. Repetition is now both essential to performance and made impossible, since every important performance is recorded somewhere, and its repetition is plagiarism. (A similar trend may be noted in politics, where repetition passes into plagiarism to the extent that recording technology confers legitimacy on authenticity.)

At the other end of this spectrum lie performed works that have no models, to which no concept of authenticity can apply. We come to the very heart of performance in a tradition. The idea of authenticity canonically defines the tradition. Authenticity defines the archive even

in arts where there is no work except as performed. Corresponding to the forgery is the plagiarized performance; corresponding to the inept reproduction is the inauthentic performance. The performance thus inhabits the tradition in its own divided way, at once representative of the original and an original itself, possessing its own aura. I am speaking of occurrences such as the preservation of recordings of Toscanini performances as monuments themselves with traits of originality and authenticity. It is not merely collector's idiosyncracies that define the authenticity of recordings. It is not, as Adorno suggests, merely the fetish character of high capitalism, supported by the recording technology of late capitalism.⁹ It is as much the multiplicity inherent in the idea a tradition, voraciousness pertaining to the circularity of representation, that impels a technology capable of turning on itself to do so in the form of art. To be able to preserve performances on tape or film is to inhabit another midworld, between the life of the medium and the life of the work. In this midworld we find the nature of both authenticity and tradition, not an essence pertaining to masterpieces and monuments, but the circularity of every representation, magnified in the repetitiveness of performance.

The idea of belonging to a tradition and the idea of authenticity are inseparable. In the repetitiveness of form and structure lies the preservation of a tradition; in the departures from the sameness of repetition lies the enrichment of the tradition. Stability in a tradition rests on a sense of originality whose repetitions define the preservation of a tradition and whose departures define its enduring presence. That the notion of preservation is so strong in our sense of a tradition presents us with a continuing tension inherent in the capacity of a tradition to appear to close upon itself.

If we now consider the role of performance art in controlled societies we may see a role for tradition that runs counter to its capacity to transform itself: a capacity to conserve itself through the aura of authenticity. There is, in virtually all controlled societies, an emphasis upon works of performance, upon the development of remarkable performance skills that at once conserve a tradition and consecrate its monuments. Performance art is, here the great conservator, playing the role archivist in the guise of the vitality of lived experience. In the museum, we confront the work in its originality. Its aura belongs to it alone. In the library the book stands completely for its original, lacking the surplus that makes the present relevant to it. What intercedes in both

cases is our capacity for interpretation, It is what brings the archived work into our present.

We use the same word, "interpretation." to describe performance. There is the analogy of bringing the established work into our present through its performance. Yet there is a striking difference, lying in the autonomous aura of the performance. There is a constant tension in performance concerning authenticity. It is found within the vicissitudes of the critical discussions in music about period instruments, the recapturing of lost techniques, the importance of prior norms. It is found in the repeated discussions about the legitimacy of a particular rendering of *Hamlet*. It is present in the striking capacity of certain performing artists to transform our sensibilities and expectations: Glenn Gould's performances of the Bach *Partitas*, delicate renderings of the *Appassionata*, dreamlike renderings not of *Midsummer's Night* but of *Lear*.

The looming presence in all arts of the question of authenticity, even where the original work cannot be presented to us except in performance, may suggest certain contingent features either of Western industrial societies or of our historical epoch. Have there not been cultures--Australian aboriginal, medieval Church art--for which the idea of authenticity was marginal at best? The answer I believe is that such cultures express their own sense of tradition in what they understand to be authentic and what they understand authenticity to be. If not the paintings of Christ, then his teachings demand concern for authenticity. And if there is little concern with authenticity in aboriginal and Balinese art, then there is equally little concern for a unified tradition. More accurately, no doubt, there is a different concern for history and a different sense of tradition. Our understanding of tradition is deeply involved with question of authenticity.

If the meaning of tradition is inseparable from the question of authenticity, and if the question of authenticity pertains to performed works in a unique way, to the performances as well as to the works performed, and if there is a corresponding role in political practice for both tradition and ceremony--akin to performance--then there may be expected a close analogy in the relationship of both art and practice to tradition. It is essential in a closed society that deviation be controlled, custom: whether externally or internally, overtly, or covertly, by force or by each a manifestation of power. The role of art in such a society, where equally under central control, must be the mirror image of the political

structure. This mirror image is the traditional performance, analogous to the repetition in practice of the forms of political representation, doubled by the repetition in performance of the forms of artistic representation. The rituals and ceremonies that define the social fabric, that manifest the order of power in its most palatable form, are analogous to if not identical with the rituals and ceremonies of performance art. Thus, coronations are marked by anthems and marches, great wars produce their dramas; dance frequently celebrates the accepted order of society.

In such societies, where the constellations of power issue in domination, but where the question of legitimacy is fundamental, it will inevitably depend on enduring tradition. Such a society will manifest itself in repetition in its claims to legitimation, in its scholarly forms and in its performances and celebrations. Here novelty in performances of ceremonial works like anthems and requiems is in the service of repetition: the reestablishment and reconstitution of authority. This is not to say that all authoritarian societies legitimate themselves through tradition: some work by brute force and power. But they cannot then be regarded as legitimate. Legitimacy in a contingent, historical world requires appeals to history. Here art and practice mirror each other, repetitions of a golden age.

The monumental in art and practice is not the only form to be taken by ceremony and celebration. There are performances of established works and established public ceremonies to legitimate power. There are also performances of new works-mirror images of new consolidations of power. More important, there are performances without works, just as there are characters in search of authors and political practices without legitimacy. There is, in "postmodernism"'s rejection of canonicity a political agenda, not to establish another canon, still within the sphere of power, but rejection of the very idea of tradition, with its inherent glorification of authority through repetition, and with it the idea of legitimation.

Another repetition is to be found within the technological roots of cultural "postmodernism," the fragmentation of the authorial subject: repetition through dispersal. There is no escape from repetition--the sameness in difference--nor escape from tradition or the subject. There is similarly no escape from the work in a recording culture, but rather the presence of works everywhere. Every performance becomes its own work, asserting claims of authenticity, absurd in a culture in which no works possess the aura of originality. Where originality is everywhere there is

no pedalpoint of repetition upon which difference can manifest itself. In the most repetitious and traditional performances, there are the moments of departure--in character, voice, or stance--that enliven performances beyond the vitality of static works. Even so, this interplay of sameness and difference that constitutes the play of art, the revelation of inexhaustibility, retains its traditional nature, and does not thereby face its own midworld--its inexhaustibility. Where the inexhaustibility of art and life are confronted in a piety of questioning the very stability of the work through its manifold performances is a threat to the radical thrust performances in time.

Time is essential to performances as it is not to works that are produced in time but do not revel in it through the temporality of performances. Here the temporality of performance is the historicity of re-presentation: repetition. The presence of an unknown and uncharted future, pregnant with a promise for which the past is an enigma, is a radical theme in every performance that threatens dissolution. The transitoriness of any historical past is evident in the transitoriness of performed works, under the pressure of historical and cultural differences.

The interplay of authenticity and departure that defines a tradition is mirrored in the interplay of authenticity and variation that defines performance. The temporality of performance is its political nature: the promise of a transformed future. The transition from a canonical tradition in which authenticity is central to a tradition that endures without authenticity is a mirror of the movement from a society in which norms are all to a society without enduring norms. There is the absence of norms without chaos, the presence of ceremony without imitation. There is the loss of the intensity defined by what endures through a tradition by means of its variations. There is the gain inherent in the artistic awareness of the region occupied by human experience.

We can understand here the contrasting presence in the dramatic tradition--if not in music and dance--of works that challenge the fabric of social order. The temporality of representation moves forward as well as back although the repetitiveness of performance has only historical movement. The concern with authenticity in both work and performance is an archival movement while the question of the future defines *praxis*. It follows that authenticity and canonicity present us with a dubious answer to the inescapable question of how we are to relate to our future--an answer given by preservation of the past. The natural response

by artists and critics for whom the future is the central question is then to repudiate the masterpiece tradition, even tradition itself, repudiating with it the focus upon the artist and the originality of the work.

In this context, within performance arts, the aura of authenticity that surrounds both performances and works performed is as much a political as an aesthetic condition: a relation to the future by reconstituting the past. The idea of a discontinuous history, found in Foucault and Lyotard, is a political sense of both work and practice. Its representation apart from history itself, lies in our representation of both authenticity and canonicity. And it is within performance arts that we find mirrored in an especially acute way the representations that define authenticity, doubled in relation to historical time: to past and future. The sense of authenticity in performance doubles the sense of preservation of the past, making even more abyssal our relationship to the future.

Several solutions have evolved to this predicament, whereby we must establish a relationship to a future that may be inauthentically related to the past. One is the repudiation of authenticity in performance. Rather, performances of established works, like translations--which face the same representational difficulties of sameness and difference--belong to the present and future more than to the past. Even this response is limited, however, since it lacks a strong enough sense of historical discontinuity. It has the virtue of facing the past amidst an urgent concern with avoiding its entrapments. A second solution is the repudiation of the canonical tradition, emphasizing even in performance present and future works. This solution must be regarded in the extreme as more political than artistic, but it emphasizes the divided temporality that belongs to representation. A third solution is still more extreme, rejecting the repetitiveness of performance for the presentation of singular works that live only in performance. Performance arts become events never to be repeated. The absurdity of a work that ceases to be a work upon performance mirrors the absurdity of a present that immediately ceases to be present upon the emergence of activity within it. There is a temporality to performance that express a pervasive structure of the politics of representation,

An irony of contemporary recording technology is that it makes such an evanescent art of performance entirely in vain. This is I believe, the fundamental paradox in the emergence of a performance art that

repudiates repetition: the performance either ceases to be relevant in any present or is recorded, thereby taking on the repeatable aura of the singular work. We may regard this development as another way in which technology enslaves us, overshadows our historicity. Alternatively, we may regard it as a way in which the truth of history imposes itself on every attempt to escape its materiality, every attempt to sever representation from power,

The transformation of a work that would have no tangible historical presence into an enduring work for which questions of authenticity and repetition are inevitable--wherever recording technology emerges: witness the questions raised today by colorization--is a mirror of a deeper political truth than the work itself may recognize: that the gap between past and future resists control on all its sides--on the side of preservation, the discontinuities of tradition; on the side of revolution, the irresistibility of repetition. The inexhaustible surplus that pervades human life and thought, and that is manifested intensely in art, threatens to dissolve the very fabric of art, a mirror of the dissolution of the tradition--as well as of every form of dissolution--that characterizes political reality.

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A Note on Representation in Kathak Dance

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Kathak of North India is one of our major classical dance-forms. It is commonly known for its rich and skilful employment of rhythm. But it is by no means indifferent to verbal meaning. In fact, some of its exponents take pride in presenting some patterns in which the *bols* or syllables, though apparently mnemonic, have a covert meaning as well, because of which they are called वामायने (or with meaning). Speaking quite generally, it is common knowledge that the Kathak utilizes not only the intrinsic charm of structure and of the very sound of *bols*, but the evocative power of words. Our dance-forms indeed have never been plagued by the controversy as to which of the two is more essential for art, mimesis or sheer form. There is here no dearth of patterns which blend passages of pure footwork and figural carriage with representation of verbal meaning through gestures.

Nor has Kathak ever been faced with the 'either-or' of representation and expression. As we shall see in the pages that follow, both have their due place in this dance-form. But let me first explain what the two terms mean and how in the context of art their mutual difference may vary in sharpness.

Of the various meanings of the word, *represent*, the ones that are relevant to art are : 'to stand as an equivalent of', 'to correspond to', 'to portray', and 'to present an image of, through the medium of a picture or sculpture'. Representational art is indeed taken to mean the arts which aim at depicting objects, scenes and figures directly as seen. This does not however mean that what such a work of art signifies is always a mere particular. A painting like 'The Madonna and Child'¹ is a generalized image; it is the token of a *type*. On the other hand, a landscape or a still life painting or a portrait can be representational in a much simpler way. It may be 'purely descriptive

of an experienced reality unencumbered by interpretive content... (connoting) nothing beyond the surface appearance depicted². But whether the art-work is symbolic or simple, some equivalence or likeness between what is represented and that which represents is implicit in the very meaning of representation; and it is no accident that the word is turned into a principle by the imitation theory which looks on art as 'faithful literal duplication of the objects and events of ordinary experience'³.

Turning now to the rival word : *express*, I find its following meanings germane to our purpose : 'to transform into words', 'to show or reveal' 'to communicate emotion etc.) without words. as through music, painting etc ', and 'to force or squeeze out'. Taken as one, these various meanings suggest that expression is the act of making clear or projecting what is hidden or inward, say, our thoughts or feelings. In representation the emphasis is on likeness to outer reality; in expression, on projection of (what makes the content of) our subjective life. Indeed as we know, the art movement known as expressionism seeks to express emotions rather than to represent external reality by resorting to such deviations from literalism as symbolism, exaggeration and distortion.

But, be it noted, the difference between the two views of art appears a clear opposition only if we assume that our inner emotional states have nothing to do with our perception of outer reality. The evidence of recent psychological researches, on the other hand is that 'perception depends upon the basic structure of the mind... past knowledge *and expectations based upon known experience*'⁴. But if this is so, our very perception of outer reality is already determined by our *attitudes*, and therefore the representation of a reality so determined must at once be regarded as being in part *their* expression. In other words, representation is not *as* removed from expression, as it was thought to be in traditional art theory.

The same truth is suggested by a contemporary refinement of the concept of artistic expression. Such expression is no longer regarded as a direct projection of the artist's own present feelings. The change, I may add, is supported by the evidence of actual art. Thus, when in a Kathak number of Radha Krishna *ched-charh* 'Radha' is seen to withdraw in *bashfulness*, the quality that we see in 'her' face and bearing may not at all touch her inner attitude which is likely to remain, if the dancing is competent, as one of mere quiet confidence. But if this is so - that is, if the seeming coyness is a look of the mere body - 'expression' loses its sense of projection *from within* and becomes indistinguishable from a representation of the quality in question.

Here, I find it instructive to mark a feature of our Kathak parlance. In respect of *bhava-pradarshan* on a *thumri* we often use the words : भाव बताना or भाव करना rather than the following : भावों का इजहार करना या उन्हें फर्म व्यक्त करना ।

A question may however seem to arise from the view that we cannot *separate* representation from expression. If the two go together, and if expression as projection of a distinct emotion cannot be ascribed to our *patterns of pure rhythm*, they cannot be said to be representation either. But then, if they neither express nor represent anything, what do they do ? The answer to this question may run roughly as under :

Much here depends on how well we are able to hold on to the truth of creation in rhythm. Our experts in this field of course do not *aim at* what is today sought by some painters of the Post-Modern kind : that is, the creation of (art-) objects that may be quite non-referring. But, on the other hand, they also wholly eschew⁵ imitation of *outer things and happenings*. At the same, however, just as the very spatial relationships in a painting may make it seem suggestive here and there of things and situations, attitudes and moods⁶, similarly there are moments when the rhythmic design and syllabic filling of a pattern may make us admire the confrontation (लड़न्त) or criss-cross (ताना - बाना) or (काट तराश) of *bols*. But such incidental features that often encourage us to use the language of life in respect of art do not make a number representational on the whole, any more than a formation of clouds may be said to represent the geographical bounds of a country simply because it seems to be roughly similar to a map of that land. In the actual contemplation of a rhythmic number we certainly notice details of inner content and arrangement, as also the occasional changes of pace. But the notice is here inseparable from how the 'bols' *sound*, and the 'confrontation' of two ufts of *vibrant* rhythmic *aksharas* (or letters) is therefore a quite different experience from two human adversaries facing each other in real life.

I may now answer the question, as to what it is that a rhythmic number *does*. It cannot be said to (merely) *represent* rhythm, for it is *itself an essay in rhythm*; and in case one insists on being told what the pattern's function is, we could fairly say : 'it just shows what rhythm is' or, to be more precise, 'it reveals possibilities of creation within the limits of a particular rhythm-cycle'. I have a definite feeling that the challenge of some modern aestheticians that art can never succeed 'in being completely self contained and non-representational'⁷ is squarely met by our rhythm, whether Hindustani or Karnatik. It is

certainly possible to argue, with fair sense, how our rhythm is an independent *art*⁸. But it is not fair to suggest that the moment we put an art-work 'in an art context' it at once comes to refer beyond itself - and towards reality; for putting in an art context may simply mean comparing (say) an exposition of rhythm with works in the region of other arts, say painting and poetry, and this is surely not the same thing as rhythm's being *about some detail of actual life*⁹. 'Claiming' to be non-referring may well be 'itself a kind of referring'. But our rhythm just does not refer to reality; *it* does not claim to so keep apart; and if *I* make this claim on behalf of rhythm it does not make the art itself referential, in the sense of referring *to reality*.

Yet, as is widely known, quite a few Kathak numbers are frankly referential. They depict outer happenings, real or mythological; and express inner feelings. *Nritya* or dancing as representational/expressive is indeed an essential part of a full Kathak recital, and it is to a part of this subject that I now turn.

Here, as we know, just as in the case of the other arts, so in respect of *Kathak* dance, the question about the different ways in which art can relate to reality reveals interesting details.

A clear distinction can be made between the representational and the non-representational aspects of the dance. Intra-forms (or numbers) like *thata* and *gatinikas*, *parans*, and *tatkar* do not tell us anything about life and reality. They are all designs or configurations to be sure; but they only present bodily bearing as graceful or as unfolding itself majestically, or the latticework of pure rhythm, instead of representing any event from common life. Nor are they said to express any definite emotion. Perhaps the most abstract of these is *tatkar*; for, whereas in respect of the other intra-forms listed the terminal stance is (by some) required to be that of *thata*, and so may give a slight hint of Krishna, in *tatkar* we only contemplate the clarity, variety and adroitness of rhythm as manifest in footwork. Here, how well the *ang* is prevented from shaking awkwardly is of course a part object of admiring notice; but the figure is not at all taken to *represent* any character, thing or attitude.

Tala and the basic *ang*, however, do not exhaust Kathak; and we find in this dance-form all the common ways of art-reality relation: representation as depiction and as portrayal, imitation, abstraction, transformation, idealization, and even a measure of distortion¹⁰ at places. Imitation, or attempts at expressly faithful representation, may be found in such intra forms as *panghat-ki-gat* and *draupadi cheer haran* where details like pulling the full bucket from the well and making a coil of the rope may be quite clearly shown; and unending rolls of cloth be in fact secretly supplied from the wings

by enlisting the *rasika's* imagination - than the one who first goes through the act of imitating the bird's winged spread. The really subtle thing here is, however, the way in which a seasoned Kathak abstracts continually from both the normal impact of *bols* and the usual width of beats, so to say, in respect of the (more or less) time that they occupy. His *bols* - as they sound on the floor - are very rarely thumps, though they are always discernible¹⁴ with ease; and as he touches the *sama*,¹⁵ it is often a hardly perceptible turn of the neck or a lift of *nigah* that meets the eye, instead of the customary footfall that is only correct and loud, and not a delicate accent enframed in winsome *ang* which it may at once seem to enliven. Abstraction of this kind makes for an admirable leanness of style.

a. Abstraction and the Dramatic :

In any case, in so far as representation in dance is throughout meant to be *seen*, such phrases as the following : 'हिरण्य कश्यप चीर डालो' are *not* broadly imitated in Kathak; for, if such restraint is not exercised the onlooker may well feel repelled. Here however, a question may be put :

Where the *narsingha avatara* theme is portrayed in the Kathakali way,¹⁶ representation is frankly imitative, at places it is indeed expressly so as when the dancer sets out to suggest that the very entrails of Hiranyakashyap are being dug out. Even in Orissi the representation of *narhari rupa* and the tearing apart (by using the *urnanabha mudra*) of the vicious king in the *dasavtara* intraform is fairly obvious, though not so elaborate as in Kathakali. How is then Kathak justified in making it seem relatively subdued ?

My answer may here be developed with an eye on the following *tritita Kavitta* :¹⁷

१ जरामरा	२ नरहरि	३ खम्ब	४ तेऽ	५ प्रराटज्वा	६ ऽलधरा	७ धरा	८ ऽधरा	९ धरा	१० ऽ
११ इकरस	१२ चलोभु	१३ वाहरि	१४ केवल	१५ ऽ	१६ ऽ	१ प्ररारारा	२ निकसत	३ खरारारा	
४ निकसत	५ कृपालु	६ हरिशिशु	७ पालकह	८ रिपरि	९ नाशक	१० हरि			
११ हरिनमा	१२ मिहरि	१३ नमाऽमि	१४ त्वकधा	१५ ऽधा	१६ नधान	१ धाऽ	२ ऽ		

to the swirly figure of the danseuse.¹¹ In thematic patterns like *Kaliya-daman* and *Radha-Krishna छेड़छाड़* movements like jumping (into the river) and clapping when *Kaliya* has been subdued) and 'holding Radha by the arm' are plainly imitated. Depiction (or representation in general) occurs where a *gopi* or a mere boat is shown; and portrayal - that is, representation of specific characters - in such intra - forms as the ones that relate to Shiva or Saraswati. Portrayal of gods and goddesses may, however, be said to be 'nominal' in so far as we do not claim such a direct familiarity with them as is freely seen to distinguish the portrait-painter's relation to the 'sitter.'

Those Kathaks who aim at absolute imitation in their representational intra - forms would do well to remember that in art, speaking generally, 'imitation, though faithful to what the artist sees is never a copy in the ordinary sense, (it is rather) a record of what he finds significant'; and that, though art is commonly said to have originated in the instinct of imitation, even primitive art tends to be 'purely stylized'¹²

Good Kathaks, indeed, prefer suggestion to imitation. Showing Krishna with the flute, मोर मुकुट and *vaijan'imola* is an instance of direct representation which can with ease become imitation. But the person of Krishna can also be gently suggested. A very good instance of this, I recall, occurred in the Jaipur Seminar (of March '69). There, when some Kathaks of the Jaipur School objected to the representation of gods and goddesses in dance as an act of irreverence, the late Lacchu Maharaj, whose quick-wittedness was truly remarkable, promptly presented a variant, saying : "हम सीधा क्यों दिखाएंगे; हम ऐसे दिखाएंगे कृष्णा को," he cupped his hands deftly, but fairly apart, over his head and stepped out with such appropriate daintiness that the knowledgeable at once registered what the movement suggested : namely, that the *baby* Krishna was being gently smuggled out of the prison. Of course, the meaning could here be seized only in the context of the full Krishna story that most Indians know, illustrating the working of a determinant that seems akin to what has been called suggestion - congruence,¹³ a principle which requires one to determine the suggested meaning by considering the context of the detail that appears to be suggestive.

It is here easy to see how the avoidance of imitation at once makes for a measure of abstraction. But the forms of abstraction in Kathak have to be carefully distinguished. The instance just cited abstracts a whole incident. But what is taken out of a whole may be a mere movement, a typical gait. Thus, in representing *mayur ki chal* the dancer who, after a mere mention of what he is going to present, is able to work up the intended effect *without* representing the peacock's playful plumage, abstracts better - and satisfies more deeply,

३ हरिनमा	४ मिहरि	५ नमाऽमि	६ त्तकधा	७ ऽधा	८ नधान	९ धाऽ	१० ऽ
११ हरिनमा	१२ मिहरि	१३ नमाऽमि	१४ त्तकधा	१५ ऽधा	१६ नधान	१७ धा	सम

The composition abstracts what is perhaps the devotional - visual core of the story of the child devotee Prahlad. Here, there is no direct reference to the vile king Hiranyakashyap, or to the terrifying way in which his body is clawed apart. All this is left to the imagination of the *rasika* who is supposed to know the whole story. What is presented to the onlooker's eye is only the dance - portrayal of the following ideas : Narsingh¹⁸ (or the half - man God) shining through the pillar, afire and frightful; a tiny ant yet creeping on the pillar utterly unharmed, and so serving to steady the faith of Prahlad; the flames that flash out like swords; God (to whom Prahlap prays) as One who is the ever - merciful, protector of children and the slayer of enemies; and the final victory of the Lord which is simply suggested by the sparkling tuft of mnemonic syllables, following हरि नमामि which verbal twosome is danced as an offering of flowers to the Lord on His spectacular conquest. The first of the images listed - that is, *Narhari* (after जरामरा) - is just presented as a fleeting yet unmistakable glimpse of the terrifying clawed deity with mere facial gestures and movement of hands and arms. The *bols* : प्रराटेज्वाल are duly reinforced with emphatic footfalls. But, the following complex : इकरस चली मुँवा, हरि के बल is rightly danced without footfalls, and as the etching of a delicate movement by cupping a thumb with its adjacent finger, thus providing a clear contrast to, and so balancing the preceding धराधरा which is obviously dramatic in quality. The next tuft of syllables : प्ररारारा निकसत खरारारा निकसत is again danced vigorously, and with forceful footwork, after which another delicate foil is provided by कृपालु हरि शिशु पालक हरि portrayed by hands alone so used as to work up the images of blessing and reassurance. The entire composition, though brief, is a blend of the dainty and the dramatic, and of meaningful words and *bols* that accord therewith in a way onomatopoeic¹⁹. Imitation of the entire episode is here eschewed because, I repeat, the *rasika* as a knowledgeable onlooker is expected to know the full theme; and, what is more, to register the merely euphonic character of dancesyllables.

b. The Verbal and the Mnemonic :

The detail just listed as the last impels me to make a mention of

another *kavitta* which is admired for its वामानी बोल, that is, as a blend of meaningful words and accordant syllables or *bols* :

Kavitta

१ २ ३ ४ ५ ६ ७ ८ ९ १० ११
तटतिट कृतरा धाऽऽ दिण दिण नित करत ध्या नकृत कृततकृत ततदिण जात

१२ १३ १४ १५ १६ १ २ ३ ४ ५
ऽदृश दृशनव सेदृश दृशनव सेरा धाथी हरि दृश दृशनव सेदृश दृशनव

६ ७ ८ ९ १० ११ १२ १३ १४
सेरा धा, थी हरिदृश दृशनव सेदृश दृशनव सेरा धाथी हरिरा

१५ १६
धारा धारा धा

The net meaning of this (partly) representational composition is that on the river bank and day in and day out - Radha remembers Krishna who, we are told, abides for ever in her eyes. But see how the verbal and the merely mnemonic cooperate in making for the total meaning. The word तट means a bank; तिट is a mere syllable that seems euphonious with तट; कृत is another meaningless *bol* that lends a little sparkle to the dance; and दिण here signifies day. In the complex, नित करत ध्यान which means the act of contemplating ceaselessly, करत seems a mere explication of, and so related to कृत कृत कृतत कृतत is doubtless a meaningless phrase, but कृ and तत (as we know) are apt as *bols* for dance²⁰; and, what is more, the following दिण जात taken along with the preceding नित करत ध्यान, which is a quite explicit phrase, saves the verbal meaning from getting quite eclipsed. The closing *tiya* of दृश दृश न वसे ... राधा gives to the total composition a clear look of dance.

c. *Transformation and some other ways :*

Of *transformation* too we find quite a few good instances in Kathak. But let me first explain, quite simply, what the word in question means.

Where the native material of a specific art does not permit direct imitation of an 'object' that interests the artist, he may yet succeed in representing it by producing an equivalent sense - impression rather than a visible likeness of the thing²¹. For instance, unlike shapes of things, sounds cannot be imitated in painting. But, as borne out by *The Scream*, a well-known work of

Edward Munch, a terrified cry can well be represented by, so to say, transforming the sound - impression into an apt configuration of shapes and lines.²² Other examples of 'transformation' are : conveying a spatial effect through the medium of sound, and the dramatic quality of a situation by 'well-timed silences instead of exciting statements'. In Kathak similar instances are provided by representation of the pranks of Krishna as a child (say, where the dancer is an elderly male) as much by brief and sprightly bouts of toying with *laya* as by a twinkle of mischief in the eyes; the terminal continuity of the sound of a syllable like धिन्ऽऽऽ in terms of a gentle taking apart of the two outstretched hands, so that what is presented to the eye is, as it were, the suggestion of a wire drawn out; and the heard self-completion (or *sama*-attainment) of a rhythmic pattern, by carefully manifesting its orderly quality till before the penultimate syllable when the dancing is cleverly withheld and the focal beat lit up for the mind's eye through the coercive quality of rhythmic design capped by the adroit avoidance of *sama* in terms of a well-timed moment of silence.

Does the Kathak danseuse also resort to idealization, that is, to the practice of representing things as better than what they really are? Yes, she does. One may here refer to details such as the following : depicting eyes, with the aid of fingers, always as more distinctly almond-shaped than they commonly are; and the bloom of a flower as a more noticeable self-opening than it can ever in life appear to any one act of attention. The aim here, I may add, is not only at easier visibility, but at visual appeal. This is why कटि (or waist) is shown as streamlined rather than as ample or broad.

Finally, *distortion* too may be said to occur in the art of Kathak provided the word is taken to mean not the pervasive variation of details from the usual manner - an artifice which makes each one of them appear to be directly congruent with the rest, as in the generally vibrant brushwork of Van Gogh or in the consistently elongated figures of El Greco - but the wilful hurrying or slowing of *a mere syllable or tuft of bols* to which the phrase that follows has to be duly adjusted in respect of pace and filling. The italicized words are here important. For, if what the danseuse presents is a *complete* pattern of 'ateet' or 'anagat' variety, though the deviation from the normal location of the *sama*-sound will of course be there, the danseuse will not in fact be *distorting* anything; for she would only present what is wholly prefixed in respect of structure. What is more, and this is noteworthy, whereas distortion in painting is generally apparent to the common man, what we have given the same name in Kathak dance can be appreciated only by those who have devoted considerable prior attention to the flow and variations of rhythm.

Notes and References

1. By the great Venetian painter, Titian. We here see the Virgin's figure holding the infant Christ tenderly on her lap, but the work may well be regarded as an effective projection of maternal love as such. See the reproduction, Plate XIII in *Masterpieces in Colour*, (at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York) ed. Bryan Home, American Studio Books, New York & London, 1945.
2. C. Donnell-Kotrozo : 'Representation as Denotation' in *JAAC*, Summer, 82, p. 361.
3. Jerome Stolnitz : *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* Boston, 1960, p. 110.
4. Donnell Kotrozo : 'Representation and Expression : A False Antinomy' in *JAAC*, Winter 1980, p. 168. Italics added.
5. That is, where they are not forced to somehow please a lay audience.
6. H. Gene Blocker : 'Autonomy, Reference and Post-Modern Art' in *BJA*, vol. 20, No. 3, Summer, 1980, p. 230.
7. H. Gene Blocker's essay : 'Autonomy, Reference and Post-Modern Art', op. cit., p. 235.
8. See my essay : 'Aesthetic Theory and Hindustani Rhythm' in *BJA*, Summer 1976, Vol. 16, No. 3.
9. Cf. Blocker's essay, op. cit., p. 235.
10. In my understanding of these concepts I follow here the treatment of Monroe C. Beardsley in his : *Aesthetics : Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1958, pp. 269-223.
11. This has happened at least once in my knowledge; to be precise in the evening recitals that formed a part of the Jaipur Kathak Seminar of March 1969.
12. S. K. Langer : *Problems of Art*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, p. 95.
13. M. C. Beardsley : *Aesthetics ! Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, op. cit., p. 284.
14. Here, I am partly indebted to the following remark of Padma Vibhushan Birju Maharaj in the Kathak Kendra (New Delhi) Seminar of March 78 : *बोल पैर से निकलें तो, मगर जरा प्यार से*. The remark was made by the maestro in the course of his recital on March 30.
15. The first or rather the focal beat of the rhythm-cycle.
16. In comparing Kathak with our other dance-forms, I am, in this essay indebted to Smt. Rani Karnaa, the well-known Kathak danseuse.

17. The bracketted part of the composition is to be danced thrice.
18. The text of the pattern, be it noted, speaks of 'narhari', not really of 'narsingh'. It is the context provided by the whole story that enables the *rasika* to readily interpret narhari as *narsingh*.
19. Thus, see the coupling of ज्वाल with धराधरा
20. कृ incidentally, also opens the word कृष्ण
21. S. K. Langer : *Problems of Art*, op. cit., p. 98.
22. Reinhold Heller : *Munch - The Scream*, The Penguin Press. See the full-colour pull-out at the end of the book.

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BOOK REVIEWS

George Dickie, *The Art Circle: A Theory of Art*, Haven Publications, New York, 1984, pp. 116.

The Art Circle was published in 1983, the result of a series of attempts by Dickie to define art or rather, the expression "work of art", which began with an article entitled "Defining Art" in 1969 and continued through the publication of the book *Art and the Aesthetic* in 1974 and culminated with *The Art Circle*. What is the background of Dickie's work in aesthetic theory?

First of all, Dickie reacted to the influence of a number of aestheticians such as Morris Weitz and Paul Ziff who in the 1950's argued that no definition of art was possible. Reacting to the influence of Wittgenstein, Weitz maintained that the concept of art is analagous to the concept of a "game". While many games have certain common characteristics, such as winning or losing, there is no one *essential* feature which all games possess and which sets them off from other classes of things. Weitz, in particular, exploited Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances", holding that while certain games, such as chess and bridge or baseball and cricket, share important resem-

blances, there is no one feature which is necessary and sufficient for any thing to be a game,

Secondly, Weitz argued, perhaps less persuasively, that any definition of art must foreclose on the creativity and inventiveness inherent in the process of artmaking itself. Art, he insisted, is an 'open concept' if for no other reason than that the historical development of art cannot be anticipated beforehand; new artistic forms and genres will undoubtedly come into existence which will modify, perhaps in radical and certainly unforeseen ways, our present conception of art.

In the second place, Dickie was convinced of the bankruptcy of traditional attempts to define art. In his book *Aesthetics: An Introduction*, Dickie traces the emergence of the modern system of the arts together with the developments in aesthetic theory which accompanied this rise in the arts themselves. Beginning with the theory of art as imitation in Plato, Dickie records the movement in aesthetic theory in the 19th century to the view that art is the expression of the artist's personality, and thence to the more current developments such as formalism and

Langer's view of the artwork as a symbol of human feeling.

The trouble with all of these theories, Dickie believes, is that they are easily defeated by counterexamples. For example, the prominence of 'non-objective' painting and sculpture in contemporary art gives the lie to the imitation theory-- the old fashioned view that the function of art is to imitate or represent nature. Similarly, but less obviously, aestheticians have argued persuasively that expression artistic form, and the view that artworks symbolize human feelings, however important in much art, are simply not universal features which can be applied to each and every work of art. As a result, Dickie rejects traditional theories, claiming that they are partial and one-sided. These theories, as Weitz maintains, point clearly to the theorists' idea of what is important in works of art, but overlook other features which may be just as significant or even more so in other works.

However, Dickie is not convinced that the traditional attempt to define art is misguided. Like the traditional theorists, he seeks to uncover the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art. However, he is convinced that a new theory must be contrived which is so broadly based that it cannot be defeated by

the extraordinary diversity among the arts and developments within the artworld itself.

In order to complete this background sketch of Dickie's institutional theory, we must cite the work of Arthur Danto, whose important article "The Artworld" had, by Dickie's own admission, a critical influence on his own theorizing. In "The Artworld", Danto singles out the social and cultural matrix within which every work has its place. In so doing, Danto points to the *atmosphere* in which artworks are created; this atmosphere is not an *exhibited property* of works of art, such as their representational or formal qualities, but is non-exhibited, that is, visible not to the human eye but rather to the awareness of the social and historical setting of art. This means that art is essentially institutional in nature; like religion, science, and other, institutions of our society, art can best be understood by its place in society as a whole. Dickie clearly follows this lead when he regards art as an "informal institution" and the artworld as a name for the background and milieu which surrounds each and every work of art.

Moreover, Dickie also utilizes an important argument from Danto which he calls the "Indistinguishable Objects Argument". Suppose that

you are confronted with two objects whose empirical properties are exactly the same, such as a piece of driftwood lying on the beach and an identical piece of driftwood which is exhibited in a gallery as a work of art. In Dickie's view, the "natural driftwood" is not an objet d'art while the exhibited driftwood clearly is. What makes the crucial difference here is the framework or atmosphere in which each has its place, despite their empirical similarity- The exhibited driftwood, by virtue of the position it holds in the artworld, has become a piece of sculpture, while the natural driftwood, untouched by human intervention, remains a bit of nature. This argument, Dickie believes, is sufficient to demonstrate the necessity of an artworld context or framework without which works of art cannot be identified as such.

Let's turn now to a basic distinction drawn by Dickie as a basis for his definition of art. Dickie distinguishes between the classificatory and evaluative senses of the expression "work of art". It is only art in the classificatory sense which Dickie is trying to define. Art in its classificatory sense covers the entire spectrum of works which inhabit the artworld--whatever their individual merits. Dickie insists that his definition is intended

to encompass not merely great or good art, but works which are mediocre, inferior and even worthless. The evaluative sense of art, according to Dickie, occurs when we are criticizing the merits or demerits of specific works, and it is this sense which occurs most frequently in everyday discourse. It is quite natural for us to say, "This painting is a fine work of art," thus praising it, but it would be redundant to say, "This painting is a work of art," because we have identified it as such merely by referring to it as a painting. Only in unusual situations in which we wish to call attention to something's being a work of art is the classificatory sense being used. However, according to Dickie, it is this sense which is deeply imbedded in the ways in which we think and talk about works of art.

Dickie's attempt to define art in the classificatory sense has two parts, each of which he claims is necessary for a work to be art and which together are sufficient for arthood. The first condition, artifactuality, refers to anything which is a product of human making. Dickie claims to do no more than cite the dictionary definition of artifactuality in *The Art Circle*. By characterizing artworks as artifacts, Dickie is trying to bring under a single umbrella arts diverse as poetry, the novel, operas, improvised

dances, etc. Apparently, any of these things can be innocently considered an artifact, and there is thus no reason to inquire into the ontology of different forms of art. At the same time, Dickie's discussion of artifactuality centers on the visual arts, as he is concerned to distinguish between works like Duchamps' *Fountain*, which possess artifactuality (but just barely) and ordinary junkyard objects which never achieve the status of art.

In *Art and the Aesthetic* Dickie maintained that artifactuality can be "conferred" on an object. His reason for making this claim harks back to the driftwood example mentioned earlier. Dickie regarded the untouched driftwood as a natural object, but wanted to claim that a piece of driftwood which is exhibited as art possesses artifactuality despite the paradox that virtually no "work" has been done on the driftwood. Similarly, Dickie wished to allow a Place in the artworld for such phenomena as junkyard art, and for the same reason he insisted that *Fountain* is a work of art notwithstanding the fact that Duchamps did little more than inscribe a urinal in a junkyard and attempt to exhibit it in a gallery.

The problem is how to account at one and the same time for work which have an accepted

position in the artworld but involve virtually no crafting or making on the part of the artist. Under the harsh criticism of Joseph Margolis, among others Dickie withdrew the notion of "conferred artifactuality" in *The Art Circle*, agreeing that artifactuality cannot simply be conferred on objects but must be achieved by at least a minimum amount of crafting or technical skill. As a result; he is somewhat ambivalent about works like *Fountain* and its ilk in *The Art Circle*, claiming that perhaps the minimal amount of crafting required to make an object into art is present in *Fountain*. However, Dickie is now at pains to reject the claims of much modern art actually to be art, including minimal and conceptual art, on the grounds that such works are not artifactual. In addition, he asserts that works like Robert Barry's conceptual art lack a medium as well as the craft necessary to achieve arthood.

In my view Dickie's attempt to establish the old-fashioned notion of artifactuality as a criterion of arthood is unsuccessful. On the one hand, he is unable to deal with borderline cases like *Fountain*; on the other, he is obliged to dismiss a wide range of contemporary art which has become firmly entrenched within the artworld.

So much for Dickie's use of the concept of the artifactuality to

distinguish art from non-art. However unsuccessful this part of his definition, it is the second part, that which bears on the artworld as a social institution, which is most critical to his theory. First, though, let's examine Dickie's definition of a work of art in *Art and the Aesthetic*. There he writes: "A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)."

This earlier characterization of the artwork is complex in its formulation and needs to be analyzed into some of its component parts. First by "a set of aspects of a work of art", Dickie merely means point out that not every aspect of an artwork; such as a painting or a play, belongs to the specifically artistic dimension of the work. The frame of a painting, for example, is not intrinsic to the work itself; nor is the backside of the painting. Similarly, the work of the stagehands behind the curtains is not part of the play itself. Thus Dickie is at pains to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic aspects of the work.

Now, the following words in his definition refer to the conferral of the "status of candidate for

appreciation" upon certain aspects of the work. It is this notion which Dickie modifies later work in the light of criticisms by Monroe Beardsley. Just as Dickie had earlier spoken of conferring artifactuality and then withdrawn this claim, he now withdraws the claim that the status of candidate for appreciation can also be conferred. Dickie notes that because the artworld involves an informal kind of activity, it is inappropriate in his definition to use such phrases as "conferred status" and "acting on behalf of". Such phrases, he writes, "typically have application within formal institutions such as states, corporations, universities, and the like." Beardsley considers it a mistake to use the language of formal institutions to try to describe an informal institution or "established practice" which Dickie conceives the artworld to be.

The last part of the definition refers to "some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)". This notion of a person or agent acting against the background of the artworld now becomes the focal point for Dickie's new theory. Instead of speaking of "conferring status" Dickie now characterizes the artists relationship to the artwork as *presenting* his work to an appreciative public. In an article

composed just prior to *The Art Circle*, Dickie defined a "work of art" as "an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public". In *The Art Circle*, he expands this definition into a fourfold characterization involving the terms "artist", "artworld", "public", and "artworld systems". In each case, he defines one of these terms utilizing one or more of the *other* terms in the set, thus giving rise to a circular definition-- "the art circle". For example, an artist may be defined as an agent of the artworld who presents his work to an artworld public. And the artworld is an "established practice" consisting of artists, members of the artworld public (including critics, aestheticians, museum curators, etc.), all of which comprises the totality of "artworld systems" (literature, music, the visual arts, etc.). Thus, each of these pivotal concepts in Dickie's definition bend in on, presuppose, and support one another. The circularity of the definitions, according to Dickie, has the merit of exhibiting their interdependency-- they reveal that "art-making involves an intricate, correlative structure which cannot be described in the straightforward, linear way envisaged by the ideal of noncircular definition."

There are several difficulties with Dickie's interlocking definitions of

"work of art". The most obvious is whether the circularity involved in the definition is vicious or not. Perhaps there are no *a priori* reasons against circularity as such in a definition, although a circular definition is logically incapable of explicating a concept in terms of other distinguishable concepts. If we waive this requirement, which incidentally, was met by many of the traditional theories of art, we are left with the question of whether Dickie's definition is sufficiently informative, to be philosophically respectable. In defense of Dickie, we can allow that he has attempted to do no more than characterize the minimal framework within which something can be a work of art. The question is: does a framework consisting of elements such as the artworld public, artworld systems, etc., provide enough insight and elaboration of works of art to be the basis for an acceptable aesthetic theory?

The answer, I think, is "no". Almost the sole virtue of Dickie's definition is its utilization of a few concepts which he relates to a social and cultural framework. There are no revelations, certainly, about the fact that art-making is an established practice and that there is a receptive public, critics, and others who function as agents of the art-world. Beyond these platitudinous

ideas, there is virtually nothing to excite the aesthetic theorist. In effect, Dickie has all but surrendered to the anti-theorists whom he claims to rebut. We are left finally with little more than the barest description of the institutional character of art: Perhaps we can expect a more interesting and philosophically significant development of the artworld in other writers, such as Arthur Danto, among others. At best, Dickie's work is a stepping stone to the elaboration of a more insightful and penetrating theory of art.

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Cleo Mc Nelly Kearns, T. S. Eliot and Indic Traditions: A study in Poetry and Belief, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. XIII + 286.

The influence of Indic philosophy on the poetry of T. S. Eliot has been viewed as a baffling issue. Ever since *The Waste Land* appeared with its Sanskrit endings and *Four Quarters*, with its introduction of the Gita episode, different critics have, in their own way, analyzed the relevance or irrelevance of these Indic sources to the body of the. While critics like Matthiessen, Helen Gardner and B. Rajan are not happy

with Eliot's incorporation of these Indian elements, Philip Wheelwright defends Eliot's such practice. In his view, it enables Eliot in explicating his philosophical themes. However, Professor Cleo Mc Nelly Kearns's approach sounds strikingly fresh, original and unique. Although Prof. Kearns is well aware of the obvious hazards one ought to face while undertaking such a study, ("... this understanding involves travel over some rather distant frontiers of language, literature, and religious practice...") she has been considerably successful in developing profound insights into the ever-intriguing problem. The author argues that the importance of the Indic sources in structuring the system of Eliot's belief and art, should not be approached as a mere source study or case study. Instead, she discusses the important ramifications of Indic philosophy for Eliot's religious growth, for his formulation of artistic theories, and their practice. The author examines the influence of such thinkers as Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, F.H. Bradley, William James and Bertrand Russell on Eliot, and simultaneously suggests how the realist-idealist debates in western philosophy patterned Eliot's perception and assimilation of Indic thought. The author's final view is that Eliot was more interested in comparing texts and traditions than

in synthesizing various traditions. The juxtaposition of the different traditions and cultural context gave rise to manifold dimensions to Eliot's work. It served to enlarge his sense of the boundaries or what he called the 'frontiers' between many ways of speaking and many kinds of texts. Kearns strongly declares that Indic texts acted not only as a repository of images and allusions for Eliot. Rather, they operated as catalyst for fundamental changes in his thought and style. The major classics of Hindu and Buddhist traditions enabled Eliot to find some definite perspectives, and he intersected them with his own growing religious convictions and his mode of writing.

The second chapter of part I is devoted to the study of Hindu

tradition, and, in particular, to the ideas contained in the Vedas and the upanishads and the Gita. The theories of Shankara, Paul Deussen, Patanjali and James Woods are presented with a remarkable precision and clarity. Similarly, Chapter three in the same section concentrates on the ideas represented by Buddhist tradition. These discussions aim at our understanding of Eliot's theory of art and practice in a more comprehensive way.

The book speaks for itself with an eloquence which comes from its own merits. It has been planned both soundly and comprehensively. The treatment has been increasingly meticulous and sensible, fulfilling the promises implicit in that plan.

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